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1Chapter One
Equality in roles between women and
men: theories and hypotheses
1.1 Introduction
Equality between women and men is one of the fundamental values of the
European Union. Article 23 of its Charter of Fundamental Rights, in fact,
states that “Equality between men and women must be ensured in all areas,
including employment, work and pay”. Furthermore, the council of the EU
recognizes that “[. . . ] gender equality policies are vital to economic growth,
prosperity and competitiveness” (Council of the European Union 2011, p.
3).
One of the Lisbon 2020 objectives regards precisely gender equality and
implies having 75% of women in the workforce throughout the European
Union by then. Furthermore, in the framework of the European Pact for
Gender Equality (2011-2020), the Council of Europe urges member states to
adopt additional measures such as flexible working arrangements, provision of
parental leave and child care services in order to reach the proposed objective.
Although the Lisbon target may not be in the reach of all member states
by 2020, over the last 50 years women’s participation in the workforce has
greatly increased in most European countries. For instance, according to
OECD figures, female labor force participation in Italy has grown from 29%
in 1970 to 52% in 2011. In the same time span, it went from 48 to 72% in
Germany and from 51 to 77% in Norway. By contrast, men’s employment in
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the same countries has remained stable or even decreased (OECD 2009).
Scholars argue that women’s increased participation in the educational
system has largely contributed to their entrance and success in the labor
market. According to human capital theory (Becker 1993), in fact, human
capital gives individuals an advantage in the labor market as it implies higher
skills and productivity. Currently, women are competing in many fields of
schooling and, on average, now reach higher levels of education than men: in
the EU27 area in 2001 there where 137 women vs. 100 men who graduated
from the highest levels of education (ISCED 5 and 6). By 2010, the figure
reached 150 (Eurostat 2012c).
Despite women’s improved educational attainment, gender segregation by
field is still widely present in European states: while women are over rep-
resented in low-paid sectors such as health care and services, men represent
over 60% of graduates in fields such as engineering (European Commission
2011). Segregation in education translates into segregation in the work force,
which is responsible for part of the gender gap in earnings that is still large
in many European countries. In 2010, in fact, the unadjusted gender pay
gap1 was around 16% in the EU27 area, ranging from 4% in Slovenia to 25%
in Austria (Eurostat 2012b).
Gender inequality, however, is not only present in the work place. In a
recent article regarding the different contributions to paid and unpaid work
between women and men over time, Jennifer Hook (2010, p. 1480) has
suggested that “Inequality in household labor is linked to inequalities in the
labor market and vice versa”. In fact, large disparities in the allocation of
time to unpaid work can be noticed in all European countries. Even though
the gender gap in time devoted to housework has decreased over time, mainly
due to decreases in women’s time, rather than to increases in men’s time
(Gershuny 2000, Hook 2010, Sayer 2010), women do more than half of the
domestic work in all European member states (Knudsen and Waerness 2008).
All in all, the gender gap in female labor market participation, in earn-
ings and in time to domestic chores is slowly narrowing. Life course research
has shown, however, that while women and men are becoming more equal,
mothers and fathers are not. Parenthood, in fact, has a different effect on
work effort for women and men. Looking at the differences in employment
by parenthood status for individuals aged 25 to 49 in 2009 (Eurostat 2012b,
1The unadjusted gender pay gap is defined as the relative difference, in percentage,
between the average gross hourly earnings of women and men.
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p. 35), we find that, compared to not having any children in the household,
having a child under 12 is associated with a reduction in employment rates
of 11 percentage points for women and an increase of 8.5 percentage points
for men in the EU27 area. Scholars have argued that the inequality in access,
continuity and productivity in the labor market results in the ‘motherhood
penalty’, i.e. the loss of income that derives from being a mother vs. a child-
less woman or a father (Budig and England 2001, Lundberg and Rose 2002,
Avellar and Smock 2003, Koslowski 2011). Having children, in fact, can lead
to loss in job experience and in wages for women who exit the labor market,
but also to a reduced productivity or to the trade-off between higher wages
and a mother-friendly job for those women who choose to accommodate their
work life around their family life (Budig and England 2001).
The division of unpaid work is also shaped by the presence of children.
Not only has cross-sectional comparative research shown that mothers per-
form more housework than fathers, childless men and women (Craig and
Mullan 2010, Dribe and Stanfors 2011): recent longitudinal studies in fact
have brought support to the notion that women and men shift into tradi-
tional divisions of tasks when they become parents (Ku¨hhirt 2011, Schober
2013). In other words, even couples who divided domestic chores equally
before having children tend to specialize in different tasks after becoming
parents. In particular women tend to pick up the bulk of domestic chores.
The findings reported up to now hold true throughout western, not just
European, countries. In other words, there is no modern society where equal-
ity in gender roles has been established. There are, however, large differences
between countries, for mothers and fathers as well as for childless men and
women. As we have seen previously, female labor force participation and the
gender gap in earnings vary notably by country (Eurostat 2012b). Women
in northern European countries in fact are more likely to be in the labor
market, even when they have children. On the contrary, the gender pay gap
is more pronounced in these countries, suggesting a higher job segregation
compared to countries such as Italy, where the gender gap in earnings is very
low (5%, Eurostat). Housework effort also varies along geographical borders.
Couples in northern Europe, in fact, share housework more evenly. Knudsen
and Waerness (2008) show that in Finland, Denmark and Sweden women
do around 66% of domestic chores, while they perform a much higher share
in southern European countries such as Spain (78%), Portugal (80%), and
Cyprus (81%). Such large gender disparities between countries suggest that
different historical developments and contextual features can be important
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in determining women and men’s choices and behavior.
The achievement of gender equality is an important goal in the general
human rights framework, but reaching gender equality is also instrumental,
as it would be “vital for the EU’s growth, employment and social cohesion
objectives.” (European Commission 2011, p. 4). Furthermore, recently re-
searchers have been pointing towards an additional reason to boost gender
equality: the intuition that the decline in total fertility rates that has charac-
terized many European states in recent decades may be reversed by improv-
ing women’s condition in society. However, whether policies fostering gender
equality in work and earnings with the aim of achieving higher fertility should
be developed is object of an ongoing debate (Billari et al. 2006). According
to the gender equality argument (Ola´h 2011), women have reached nearly the
same opportunities as men in education and employment but they still face
the majority of domestic tasks when they become mothers. Lowering their
fertility would be their strategy to cope with the increasing demands from
the labor market, and with the lack of support from their partner and from
the state. The author argues that if the disparities between women and men
in the private and in the public sphere were reduced, and policies to render
men and women more equal were enforced, fertility levels would be higher.
Such a perspective is upheld by other scholars – e.g. McDonald (2006) –
and would seem to find support in the higher levels of gender equality and of
fertility rates of northern European countries. The opposers of this position,
however, argue first of all that low fertility is a false problem that rests on a
number of period-specific assumptions regarding the ‘correct’ age structure
of a population. Furthermore, they argue that addressing low fertility rates
by promoting pro-natalist policies disguised as gender equality policies could
actually be detrimental for gender equality itself (Neyer 2011, Van de Kaa
2006).
One of the obstacles to this debate is the inconclusiveness of empirical
research on the relation between gender equality and fertility. While some
authors find a positive relation between some within household equality and
child-births (Ola´h 2003), others find that high levels of gender equality are
not related to fertility in any way (Duvander and Andersson 2006). In terms
of the division of housework, in a study on American couples, Torr and
Short (2004, p. 19) find that “at the individual level the relationship be-
tween women’s share of housework and fertility is U-shaped. In a setting
with reasonably high gender equity in individual institutions, both a greater
and lesser burden in the family sphere, as indicated by the division of house-
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work, are associated with an increased probability of a second birth”. In
Germany, Cooke (2004) also finds a positive relation between fathers’ greater
relative child-care time and second births. In Australia, by contrast, Craig
and Siminski (2011) find no evidence that housework sharing or the amount
of housework or child care performed by men has any effect on the probability
of having a second child. In terms of paid work, instead, in a study compar-
ing Italy and Spain, Cooke (2009) finds that women’s hours of employment
reduce the likelihood of a second birth in both countries. Furthermore, while
in Spain the use of private child care increases the likelihood of having a
second child, in Italy it is fathers’ greater child care share that increases the
likelihood.
The achievement of broader human rights and the enhancement of fertil-
ity rates are two examples of why gender equality may be desirable. There
is another issue, however, that I would like to address. According to the
Economic Theory of the Family (Becker 1981), the male breadwinner-female
homemaker model, which implied full task specialization, was the optimal
strategy to maximize the household’s utility function: with one household
member in paid work and the other one taking care of domestic work the
needs of the household’s members would be fullfilled. However, the develop-
ment of partner specific skills which arises with specialization is most suc-
cessful in long term relationships. In case of partnership dissolution, in fact,
each partner is left with a set of non-interchangeable abilities that can be
more or less portable, i.e. which can be used again in another relationship.
In this sense, the skills acquired in paid work are generally portable, while
homemaking skills tend to be relationship specific. Thus, if a specialized
couple dissolves, the homemaker may not be equipped to survive on its own
out of the partnership. It follows that the development of a specific skill
set can be potentially damaging in contexts where divorce is becoming in-
creasingly common and where individuals’ well being strongly depends on
economic resources. To the contrary, the development of parallel skill sets
within couples renders individuals equally equipped to survive within or with-
out that specific partnership. However, the relationship between economic
(in)dependence and partnership (in)stability may also be reversed: without
economic dependence, the barrier to divorce or breakup becomes easier to
overcome. Thus, scholars have pointed out that symmetric economic roles
within the household might actually trigger partnership dissolution (Becker
1981). However, demographers have pointed to the fact that it is the cultural
changes in values concerning self-realization and autonomy which are behind
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the increasing divorce rates (Van De Kaa 1987) and that therefore even cou-
ples that divide labor in a traditional way may be at risk of partnership
dissolution. Furthermore, in times of economic instability women’s resources
become more valuable to the entire household, which brings men to have
more to loose in case of divorce (Oppenheimer 1997). From this perspec-
tive, an increase in within-household gender equality could mean reducing
the risks of divorce.
This dissertation contributes to the debate on gender equality by asking
to what extent women and men’s behavior differs in European heterosexual
partnerships, and by asking whether the presence of children in the household
is related to the degree of within-couple gender equality. To operationalize
gender equality, I consider three areas: employment, housework and earn-
ing capacity. Why focus on these three areas when there are a variety of
potential within-couple (in)equalities (i.e. happiness, health, life satisfaction
etc.)? The reason to do so is that these areas form the skeleton of within-
couple specialization and are intrinsically linked. As discussed in the previous
paragraphs, inequality in housework and in paid work are two faces of the
same coin and represent the core of within-couple specialization. The male
breadwinner-female homemaker model is the clearest example of this. Par-
ticipation in the labor market, in turn, is the key to earnings, which can be
related to the housework-employment loop, as figure 1.1 shows2. Earnings,
in fact, can ease the housework-employment association because they can:
a) translate into better bargaining skills to achieve a more equal division
of chores; and/or b) allow outsourcing domestic chores to a larger extent.
Hence, by considering the three areas we obtain a more accurate and com-
plete picture of the degree of within-couple specialization and the extent to
which it is (un)equal. Having clarified why I consider these three areas, it be-
comes evident that these inequalities can only be addressed by taking couples
in their entirety as unit of analysis. Looking at differences between women
and men in general, in fact, would obscure the dynamics at the couple-level
that are integrant part of the cycle of inequality.
In broad terms, my research strategy takes the following form. I first in-
vestigate the different behavior of partnered women and men in these three
areas in different institutional circumstances, and analyze if and how indi-
vidual and household characteristics are related to within-household gender
2The figure has a purely descriptive purpose and the arrows do not in any way imply
causal links.
6
Figure 1.1 – Cycle of within-couple inequality in employment, domestic
chores and earnings
Employment
Domestic
chores
Earnings
equality; then, I verify to what extent the presence of children is associated
with less gender equality in women and men’s participation in the work force,
division of domestic chores, and relative earnings capacity; further, I consider
how individuals embedded in different contextual and institutional circum-
stances – in particular referring to welfare regimes, but not only – behave
differently in the three areas and whether the contextual traits have a me-
diating effect on the relation between individual characteristics and women
and men’s behavior in paid work, unpaid work and relative earning capacity
in the presence of children or in the event of a childbirth.
The thesis is organized as follows. Since the dissertation has a compar-
ative approach, I devote the following paragraphs to a discussion of welfare
and gender regimes that are referred to extensively in the literature review
and in the empirical chapters. Then I review the main findings in the litera-
ture regarding gender differences in paid work, domestic chores and earnings,
and their relation with parenthood. From these I draw my hypotheses. In
chapter two, I introduce the data and the methods, although a discussion
of these is also included in each empirical chapter. Chapters three to five
report the analyses and the findings: in chapter three I analyze the relation
between paid work and parenthood in four European countries; in chapter
four, multi-level models are applied to 23 European states to investigate to
what extent the presence of children is associated with the division of do-
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mestic chores within couples, and whether the association varies by country;
in chapter five, I use multi-level models first and fixed effects panel models
afterwards using data from 26 European countries to test, firstly, the associ-
ation between parenthood and relative earnings of couples, and secondly the
‘effect’ of child birth on the earnings’ balance of couples. Finally, in chapter
six I draw some concluding remarks on my findings.
1.2 Context counts: welfare regimes and gen-
der regimes
Comparative social studies emphasize the association between individ-
ual behavior and contextual characteristics, with particular attention to the
country of residence. It is argued, in fact, that cross-country differences in
people’s behavior may be shaped by the different contextual circumstances
individuals are embedded in. For the scope of this thesis, it is important
to consider if and how different European states contribute to shaping the
within-household gender equality in roles. Specifically, the extent to which
countries intervene on the division of paid and unpaid labor within house-
holds and on the relative earnings capacity of the household members.
The welfare regime typology (Esping-Andersen 1990) is a suitable start-
ing point, as it focuses on the effectiveness of states in granting social rights
of citizenship and reducing class inequalities. Such approach, however, has
the secondary effect of masking within-class differences, among which gender
differences (O’Connor 1993, Orloff 1993). To obviate to this, other schol-
ars have attempted to explicitly introduce gender-equality in the dimensions
along to which cluster countries. Korpi (2000) in particular makes a first
attempt to build a “typology for the analysis of inequalities with respect to
gender as well as class” (Korpi 2000, p. 172).
In the following paragraphs I briefly introduce the main concepts under-
lying Esping-Andersen’s capitalist welfare regime typology and Korpi’s ideal
typical model of gendered welfare state institutions. Then I present some
country-level data to provide some empirical evidence of how the countries
fit together in the different regimes. In the last section I explain how I se-
lected the countries to compare in the analyses.
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1.2.1 The worlds of welfare capitalism: state, market
and family
In the framework of the welfare regime typology (Esping-Andersen 1990,
1999), with the development of hegemonic markets individuals’ survival and
welfare becomes dependent on their performance in the labor market. The
notion of welfare state, in the proposition of T.H. Marshall (1950), was based
on the idea of social citizenship involving social rights, that, ultimately, would
have the aim of de-commodifying individuals from the market, that is of
allowing individuals to survive even when out of the labor market.
Other than being a de-commodification system, the welfare state is also
a stratification system. In fact, the extent and the modes of state interven-
tion have important implications for the formation and/or reinforcement of
differences between social classes. For instance, a system based on transfers
that are means tested translates into a clear-cut division between the wel-
fare state recipients, who share a condition of ‘relative equality of poverty’
(Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 27), and the remaining citizens who base their
welfare on the market, with varying degrees of success. On the contrary,
universalistic transfers tend to have equalizing effects.
Finally, the welfare state has different ways of relating with the ‘private
sphere’, i.e. of addressing the needs of care and assistance within households.
This issue is especially important for our case because it explicitly involves
gender differences.
Esping-Andersen identifies three clusters of welfare states. Although his
typology is not perfectly ‘pure’, in the sense that countries in either regime
incorporate some traits of the other regimes to a certain extent, the author
argues that the world is neatly formed by separate regime-clusters (p. 29,
1990).
In the ‘liberal’ welfare states, de-commodification is minimized: assis-
tance is low, on a means tested basis and associated with social stigma. Fur-
thermore, states belonging to the liberal cluster are highly stratified. The
Anglo-saxon countries, archetypes of which are the United States, Canada
and Australia, belong to this cluster.
Countries such as Austria, France, Germany and Italy are characterized
by a ‘conservative’ and corporatist welfare state. Such welfare states, on the
one hand, do not rely on the market as dispenser of welfare because they
provide it themselves. On the other hand, their emphasis is on the preser-
vation of status differentials, which rendered the conservative welfare state
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far from redistributive. Maurizio Ferrera in 1996 argued that Mediterranean
European countries were different from continental countries under a large
number of characteristics and could be grouped all together in an additional,
separate group. The author in particular is concerned with altered distribu-
tive practices, such as the Italian political clientelism. Before him, Leibfried
(1992) had also suggested a distinct group for the Mediterranean countries,
mainly because of the extremely residual and strongly familistic nature of
their welfare state. Esping-Andersen takes these arguments into account in
his 1999 book, the Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies, and tests
whether a fourth ‘Mediterranean’ regime (Italy, Portugal, and Spain) should
be added to his original three clusters. He argues that the issue of extended
familialism could indeed be the grounds for a distinction between the latter
and the conservative group. His results show substantial similarities between
the two groups, but also some differences which in sum leave unanswered
the question of whether the Mediterranean cluster should be considered sep-
arate in absolute terms. Ultimately, the solution seems to largely rest on the
indicators that are used for the clustering.
The third, ‘social democratic’ regime-type pursued a “welfare state that
would promote an equality of the highest standards” (Esping-Andersen 1990,
p. 27). This meant not only that benefits and services were guaranteed to
all citizens on a universalistic basis, but also that these were of such a high
quality that even the wealthiest would rather use the public service rather
than opt for market services. As a result, citizens of this cluster are, on the
one hand, highly de-commodified, and on the other hand face less social class
inequalities compared to citizens of the liberal or the conservative cluster.
The cost of keeping such high standards of services and transfers trans-
lates into the need of full employment: this in fact guarantees a high income
revenue and reduces the number of those who rely completely on state pro-
vision. This feature of the social democratic regime-type has an interesting
by-product: by promoting full-employment, it promotes female labor force
participation. Furthermore, as the state takes responsibility for family wel-
fare by caring for children, elderly and other people in need, it effectively
de-familizes women’s work. In contrast, the liberal regime took no posi-
tion on female labor force participation by leaving the matter to market
self-regulation, while the conservative welfare regime explicitly discouraged
women from being employed and adopted a subsidiary approach to family
welfare.
Thus, the welfare state may play a very important part in equalizing
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roles within households. Consider the social democratic regime-type: by
de-familizing the care needs of frail family members, it allows all household
members, regardless of gender, to participate in the work force; in practi-
cal terms, a reservoir of non-employed women who would otherwise be in
full-time unpaid labor, may be employed. Then, because of the large public
sector, necessary to fulfill said family services, the state is capable of ab-
sorbing the female labor force. Thus, in terms of labor force participation,
the social democratic regime type would seem to foster within-household
equality. The liberal welfare state would also reach a similar result although
through a different path: the modest intervention of the state in providing
family-services leaves space to the market self-regulation. Private services
emerge as a result and de-familization may follow: household members are
free to join the work force. Their access to private services, however, is con-
ditional on their working performance, which is by no means protected by
the welfare state as it is in the social democratic countries. The conservative
welfare regime, instead, explicitly fosters the conservation of the traditional
family by discouraging women from being employed (Esping-Andersen 1990,
p. 27). The within-household gender inequality that derives from this can
have serious repercussions as social insurance does not include non-employed
women, leaving them ill-protected in case of marriage failure.
The extent to which women participate in the labor market is one aspect
of gender inequality that is addressed in the capitalist welfare state typology.
As I will discuss in the following paragraph, however, some scholars have sug-
gested that other aspects of gender inequality in this framework are not fully
addressed. For instance, the degree to which the state enables/encourages
men to take active part in unpaid work, or the extent to which it provides
maternity leave and child care services, can make large difference in the
within-household division of paid and unpaid work, and ultimately, in the
position of each individual in the stratification system.
1.2.2 The gendered side of welfare regimes
Some scholars have criticized the welfare state typology because it does
not explicitly take into account gender (among others: Lewis (1992), Lewis
(1997), O’Connor (1993) and Orloff (1993)). Their argument rests on the
idea that welfare states are systems of stratification not only in terms of
class differences but also in terms of gender differences. Therefore, they
foster the study of welfare states in terms of measures that do not address
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just the “typical worker-citizens” (Orloff 1993, p. 308) - such as pensions or
unemployment benefits - but that apply to gender-specific constraints, such
as maternity leave and child care availability.
It must be recognized that the welfare state typology did take into ac-
count gender by considering whether female labor force participation were
an objective of the welfare state or not. However, in the construction of the
typology there is no empirical attempt to include policy measures that are
tailored to gender specific needs.
Korpi (2000) responds to this argument by performing an analysis that
integrates both class and gender as different dimensions of inequality. The
author distinguishes between three ideal typical models of gendered welfare
state institutions by building a typology along two dimensions. The first
dimension involves the extent to which states support policies that enable
families to be dual-earners. In this type of families, both partners are in
the work force and care obligations are partially out-sourced to the market
and partly absorbed in a more gender-equal division of unpaid work in the
household. Elements of this dimension are public day care services for chil-
dren between 0 and 2 years of age, the extent and duration of paid maternity
leave, the generosity of paid paternity leave and public help to the elderly.
The second dimension, instead, is built on policies that give general sup-
port to the nuclear family, which is described as single earner or one earner
and a half, typically with a male earner that may or may not be aided by
a part time female earner. The indicators used to build such dimension are
availability of cash child allowances to minor children, the extent of family
tax benefits and public day care services for children older than 3 years of
age. The three clusters of countries that emerge along the two dimension, as
we will see, reflect the one’s from Esping-Andersen’s typology to a notable
extent.
To reach the proposed aim of comprehending class and gender within a
single framework, the typology is then blended with one based on social in-
surance characteristics. The result is what Korpi refers to as an ‘institutional
typology of welfare states’ under which countries are clustered as follows:
• The basic security/market-oriented institutional combination includes
Canada, the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom and Switzerland;
• The encompassing/dual-earner constellation comprehends Finland, Den-
mark, Norway, and Sweden;
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• The state corporatist/family support combination includes continental
European countries with the exception of Switzerland;
The similarity with the capitalist welfare regime typology depicted pre-
viously is striking, but one difference emerges in the case of France. In
Esping-Andersen’s typology, in fact, France belongs to the conservative wel-
fare regime along with Germany and the southern European countries. Ac-
cording to Korpi’s results, instead, Germany and France do not belong to the
same cluster. In fact “Germany clearly has a general family support model,
while in France this model is combined with a weak version of the dual-earner
support model” (Korpi 2000, p. 161).
In a way, the results suggested by Korpi can be considered a litmus test
of the welfare regime typology: even when considering a different, additional
set of measures, the three clusters of countries clearly emerge. Therefore, in
what follows I refer to the welfare regime typology to draw hypotheses on
the way individuals behave in different contexts.
1.2.3 Regimes, policies and individual behavior
In the previous sections I have introduced two frameworks to select and
compare countries: Esping-Andersen’s capitalist welfare regime typology and
Korpi’s institutional typology of welfare states. The reason to do this is that,
throughout the dissertation, I argue that women and men, mothers and
fathers residing in different countries have different levels of within-couple
equality and that this stems not only from different characteristics of the
individuals but also from structural differences in the surrounding context.
States, in fact, can actively foster gender equality or they can actively pursue
the maintenance of the status quo. Before moving to the selection of coun-
tries to study, it can be useful to dwell upon some of the policies that have
emerged in the previous sections and see whether they can relieve within-
couple inequality and why.
The most obvious consideration regards parenthood and the extent to
which the welfare state provides support to families with children. A first
aspect to consider is the immediate time demands posed by the presence of
children in the household: somebody has to take care of the baby. Tradi-
tionally, mothers have been considered the best candidates for taking care
of children (Hays 1996), but the state can give indications on who should
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provide care and especially for how long small children should be looked af-
ter by a parent. The availability of child care, for example, provides a good
indication of when mothers can stop looking directly after their children: if
the state provides universalistic availability of child care for small children
(under two years of age), this means that parents, including mothers, are free
from child care and available for employment. If the state provides univer-
salistic availability of child care for older children (three years or older) then
it is more difficult for parents of children under three to be in the work force.
Given the persistence of the male breadwinner model, in the vast majority
of cases it is the mother who stays home with the child. A similar argument
can be made regarding public spending on family related benefits, to the
extent that they can be used to purchase available formal child care. Table
1.1 shows the values on a set of policy indicators of ten European countries.
As expected, countries belonging to the social democratic regime display
the highest levels of child care enrolment among the youngest children, while
countries belonging to the conservative regime, such as Austria and Germany
display the lowest values. Public spending on family benefits instead is much
lower in southern European countries than elsewhere. This highlights one of
the peculiar characteristics of the familistic welfare regime: it does not sup-
port individuals by supporting families, rather it relies on families to support
individuals. In the two southern European countries it is also interesting to
compare the enrolment rates of children under two years old with those of
children three years and above. The latter in fact are above 97% in both
countries, while the former are much lower: 37% in Spain and 20% in Italy:
this indicates that there is a large difference in the opportunities for mothers
to be in employment conditional on the age of their children.
Another interesting figure is the neutrality of the tax-benefit system, since
different taxing systems can benefit dual-earner families, thus encouraging
the female partner’s labor force participation, while others may have the
opposite effect. The last column of table 1.1 shows that in most cases, single
earner household pay higher average payments to the government3 compared
to dual earner households. Ireland and the social democracies in particular
seem to favor dual earner household. In Germany and to a smaller extent in
France, instead, the single earner household is taxed less than a household
with the same income but with two earners.
3In per cent of gross household earnings, couples with two children age 6 and 11 with
income equal to 133% of average worker earnings, 2008.
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Table 1.1 – Public policies for families and children in ten European countries
Public Child care Enrolment Neutrality
spending on enrolment rates rates for tax benefit
family for 0-2 year 3-5 year system (% gain of
benefits (% of GDP) olds olds equal earnings†)
Austria 3.05 12.13 77.62 28.97
Germany 2.78 17.76 92.69 -5.15
Finland 2.70 28.33 74.23 36.83
France 3.68 42.00 99.89 -1.75
Ireland 2.59 30.78 56.40 57.15
Italy 1.38 29.24 97.44 27.04
Norway 2.91 51.33 94.49 20.90
Spain 1.60 37.45 98.53 32.51
Sweden 3.07 46.66 91.10 33.31
United Kingdom 3.56 40.79 92.68 20.75
† Difference in net transfers to government: single and equal dual-earner couples.
Source: OECD family data base (OECD 2012). All presented data as as of 2007 or 2008.
All these elements could be called upon to explain how the social democ-
racies and to some extent the liberal welfare states favor gender equality in
the household.
A second aspect regards not the immediate time demands but the long
lasting legacy that parenthood can have on women and men’s behavior. This
legacy can be seen in terms of two complementary processes:
i) The more time women spend being full-time mothers, the more human
capital relevant to home production they develop and the more human
capital relevant to employment they loose.
ii) The more time women spend being full-time mothers, the less their
partners develop human capital relevant to home production and the
more their partners develop human capital relevant to employment.
Thus, the arrival a child can create a disequilibrium in abilities that leads
to specialization within the couple that is obviously very far from equality4.
4Indeed, specialization may not produce equality, but it may produce equity. In other
words, being a full-time homemaker could reflect the aspirations of many women and
thus could be a fair solution for many couples (Hakim 2000). As I have discussed in the
introduction, however, equity is a marvelous solution within a solid, “till death do us
part” partnership. In countries with growing couple instability, however, equality in labor
market participation, earnings and homemaking skills could be a good safety net from a
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The duration and compensation of maternity, paternity and parental leaves
can be very important in determining the extent to which this cycle is initi-
ated. For example, a maternity leave with a long duration, a low replacement
rate, and not backed up by a father-specific leave, is likely to initiate the cycle
described above, leading perhaps to equity but not to equality; on the con-
trary, leave schemes that imply mother and fathers’ participation to the same
extent – at least in principle – could more easily lead to within-household
equality.
Table 1.2 provides the duration and compensation rates of three types of
leaves in a set of European countries belonging to different welfare regimes.
What can be striking at a first glance is that there are no weeks of maternity
leave in Sweden and Norway. This is because the two countries replaced
maternity leave with the parental leave in 1974 and in 1977 respectively.
Although, in Norway, three weeks before and six weeks after the birth are
reserved for the mother, that fact that maternity leave has been replaced in
favor of a gender equal parental leave gives a strong signal in favor of equality
in roles within the household. Furthermore, a three week paternal quota was
established in 1993 and was extended to ten weeks in 2008. Additionally, the
parental leaves provided in Norway and Sweden are not the longest, but are
the better compensated. To the contrary, parental weeks in continental and
southern European countries are much longer, but are less paid. In countries
where a minority of children age two or younger are in child care, this long
and scarcely compensated parental leave could be the strategy applied by
employed women to take care of their young children, at the cost, however,
of employment-related human capital devaluation.
Having provided a panorama of policies which could be connected to
greater or lesser within-couple gender equality, I shall discuss in detail in
each empirical chapter whether the welfare state manages to equalize (or
not) individuals beyond their personal characteristics. It must be noted that
I do not explicitly tap any of the country-level characteristics that may be
associated with the outcomes I study; rather, I select countries belonging
to different welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990, Ferrera 1996, Esping-
Andersen 1999, Korpi 2000) and presenting diverging characteristics in areas
that may be related with the outcomes of interest. In other words, rather
number of risks in case of union dissolution. This applies, for instance, to divorced mothers
who would be economically better off if they were in the labor market, but is also relevant
for divorced fathers who so often see themselves denied custody of their children because
their status of primary breadwinners has earned them the status of secondary care givers.
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Table 1.2 – Length and coverage of maternity, parental and child care leave
in ten European countries
Type of leave Maternity Maternity Parental Parental Child care Child care
weeks pay† weeks pay† weeks pay†
Austria 16 100 104 17.9 0 0
Germany 14 100 156 22.3 0 0
Finland 25.8 70 31.6 70 156 12.8
France 16 100 156 25.8 0 0
Ireland 26 80 28 0 0 0
Italy 21.7 82 44 30 0 0
Norway 0 0 56 100 104 9.8
Spain 16 100 156 0 0 0
Sweden 0 0 68.6 65.1 78 12.7
United Kingdom 39 14.5 26 0 0 0
† Cash benefits paid during leave as a percent of female wages in manufacturing.
Source: Gauthier (2010) Data base. All presented data as as of 2010.
than including policy indicators in the models, I prefer comparing the results
between countries belonging to different regimes. The ratio behind this choice
is the following: on the one hand, specific indicators can be useful tools
to interpret differences in behavior. For example: compulsory, full-paid,
paternity leave could have a direct effect of equalizing domestic chores for
households where fathers take the leave; and it may have an indirect effect
by signaling to other fathers that it is ok to take the leave. On the other
hand, the indirect effect can be downright impossible to ascertain, because
our indicator may be one of the many in a multitude of contextual features
that could be related to the outcome. At the end of the day, our macro-
level indicator can only serve, at best, as a guide in the interpretation of the
results. Thus, instead of focusing on specific indicators, I take countries in
their entirety and use Esping-Andersen’s capitalist welfare regime typology
and Korpi’s institutional typology of welfare states as conceptual frameworks
to interpret the results, keeping in mind the policies discussed in this section.
1.2.4 Sample selection: rationale
The choice of countries to compare is crucial in cross-national research.
Esping-Andersen’s capitalist welfare regime typology and Korpi’s institu-
tional typology of welfare states are useful theoretical frameworks to interpret
the findings but they also serve as guidelines for the selection of the countries
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to compare. In the course of the dissertation, I shall focus on a variety of
European states. When possible, and as will be detailed in sections 2.2 and
2.3, I will use a quasi-universe of European countries and will rely on the
theoretical background of the welfare regimes only to interpret the results.
In one case, however, as detailed in section 2.1, I run models for which the
use of a high number of countries would have rendered the presentation and
the interpretation of the results extremely cumbersome. Therefore, in such
occasion I limit the analysis to four European countries: Germany, Italy, Nor-
way and the United Kingdom. Since the selected countries belong to different
welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990, Ferrera 1996, Esping-Andersen 1999,
Korpi 2000) their comparison might provide some additional, albeit indirect,
confirmation of my hypotheses on cross-country differences.
Note that I chose the UK as it is the only country belonging to the liberal
welfare cluster in Europe. The choice for Italy and Norway among the other
southern and nordic countries was a pure convenience choice based on the
higher number of observations available for such countries in the data-sets.
As far as Germany is concerned, I preferred it over France, the two largest
countries of the area, because while they both belong to Esping-Andersen’s
continental welfare cluster, Korpi finds France to be in between the general
family support model and the dual-earner support model.
I now move to a review of the empirical findings regarding the relationship
between parenthood and gender differences in paid work, between presence
of children and division of domestic chores, and between relative earnings
and childbirth.
1.3 Individual and contextual determinants
of employment and parenthood
The first domain of within-household equality I consider is parents’ labor
market participation. Considering that being in paid work is a buffer against
poverty and that the labor market is the primary source of resources, which
are necessary in mostly non-decommodified countries, whether both partners
have a job can be considered a measure of within-household equality. As
described in the introduction, however, the presence of children in the house-
hold reduces the likelihood of maternal – but not paternal – employment,
suggesting the existence (or persistence) of within household inequalities in
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the division of labor. Thus, this chapter analyzes how women and men differ
in the probability of being employed and having children, and how individ-
ual, household and contextual characteristics relate to the work-parenthood
combination by gender. In other words, I ask what circumstances favor being
in paid employment and at the same time having children for women and
men.
A rich literature has developed on what individual and household traits
are associated with being in paid employment. There is also extensive work
on the determinants of fertility. And indeed there is a growing body of lit-
erature on the relation between being in paid work and having children – in
particular for women – and on the causal direction of the relationship. Fur-
thermore, recent comparative work has shed light on the relation between
country characteristics, work performance and parenthood decisions. Build-
ing on this work – which I review in the following paragraphs – I focus on
three traits that have been found to be strongly linked to employment or par-
enthood decisions at the individual and household level: a) the educational
level of the respondent; b) the relative educational level of the partners; c)
the economic resources of the partners. As far as contextual traits are con-
cerned, I compare four European countries pertaining to different welfare
regimes to assess how institutional arrangements are associated with work-
parenthood combinations and whether they mediate the impact of individual
and household circumstances.
1.3.1 Individual and household traits
Educational attainment
Educational attainment is a crucial determinant of individual outcomes
and its association with occupational status, on one hand, and childbear-
ing decisions, on the other hand, has been vastly studied. In the following
paragraphs I review these two lines of research one at a time and then draw
hypotheses on the relation between being employed and, contemporaneously,
having children.
Education has been found to be positively associated with being em-
ployed because the higher a person’s educational attainment, the higher the
returns from the labor market both in economic and in psychological terms.
As a pull factor, higher education leads to higher wages (Becker 1991, Shavit
and Mu¨ller 1998), which make labor force participation attractive. Further,
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higher educated persons have more to loose from exiting the labor market,
not only in terms of foregone wages, but also because of depreciation of
human capital which increases with education (Michael 1974). Non pecu-
niary aspects of employment must be considered as well, namely the greater
satisfaction that better educated people get from their jobs. These have
been referred to in the literature as consumption benefits (Duncan 1976),
more general fulfillment from being employed (Lesthaeghe and Johan 1988)
or “alternative sources of self esteem” (McQuillan et al. 2008). The posi-
tive association between education and employment is gender neutral, in the
sense that both women and men are more likely to be employed if they have
achieved higher education.
How educational attainment influences the choice of having a first and
additional children is less straightforward. Especially for women, the substi-
tution effect away from fertility (Becker et al. 1994) vastly rests on the idea
that better educated women face greater costs in child rearing and therefore
links education to fertility via labor market participation. In other words,
it is not being better educated that reduces the chances of having children,
rather the additional work effort that is associated with higher education.
Another work-related explanation is the so called tempo effect (McDon-
ald and Moyle 2010), according to which higher educated women enter the
marriage market later compared to their lower educated peers – as a result
of longer time in education and in the search for a stable position in the
labor market – and therefore have children later in life. Indeed, research
has shown that higher education leads to the postponement of the transition
to the first childbirth (Baizan and Martin-Garcia 2006, Bratti and Tatsir-
amos 2008), which can also translate in higher risks of remaining childless
(Gustafsson 2001, Martin-Garcia 2009). There has also been some evidence
pointing in an opposite direction, suggesting that higher educated women
delay their first childbirth but ‘catch up’ with less educated women in suc-
cessive years (Rondinelli et al. 2006). Men face smaller opportunity costs
in having children. This mainly happens because the costs of children, in
terms of foregone work hours, lost opportunities in the labor market, depre-
ciated human capital and so on and so forth are largely paid by the mother,
rather than equally shared between partners. This inequality in opportunity
costs may be traced back to different contextual characteristics. Consider
for example the differences between availability of maternity vs. paternity
leave in most countries: as they are, they signal that it is the mother that
should take the leave. Even if the leaves were equally generous for mothers
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and fathers, the gender wage gap would make it more costly for men than
for women to stay at home with the baby. Therefore the substitution effect
and, to a smaller degree, the tempo effect, are likely to be less consequential
for men than for women.
Educational attainment, however, can affect childbearing plans also inde-
pendently from labor market participation. In historical perspective, higher
educated women belonging to the e´lites have been the first to fully adopt
birth control behaviors, forerunners in a diffusion process that brought fer-
tility from its relatively high pre-industrial levels to the relatively lower ones
of the first half of the twentieth century (Knodel and van de Walle 1979,
Hajnal 1982). The additional reduction in fertility rates that characterized
the second half of the twentieth century, often referred to as the second de-
mographic transition (Van De Kaa 1987), has also been partially attributed
to a more informed use of contraception by better educated women (Michael
1974, Klijzing 2000, Traeen et al. 2002). There has also been some evidence
suggesting that higher education is associated with lower valuing of children
vs. other objectives and higher odds of being voluntarily child free (House-
knecht 1987, Myers 1997), although the development of “intensive parenting”
(Hays 1996) ideologies that involves primarily better educated parents could
suggest that being childless is not the optimal outcome.
The delay in having the first child faced by highly educated women, in-
stead, may contribute to the formation of interests which then compete with
child bearing and rearing (Presser 2005, McQuillan et al. 2008). Further,
it has been suggested that the better bargaining skills of highly educated
women might allow them to more effectively voice their needs and desires in
terms of ideal number of children to their partners (Blood and Wolfe 1960,
Brines 1993, Shelton and John 1996), especially in terms of downsizing fer-
tility plans that may be overly cumbersome for the woman.
What can be said on the association between educational level and the
probability of being employed and having children at the same time? On the
one hand, better educated women and men have greater probabilities of being
employed; on the other hand, education is known to postpone the transition
to childbirth, especially for women. Therefore, I expect mothers with higher
education to be present in the labor market to a greater extent than less
educated mothers; at the same time however, better educated women are
also more likely to be employed childless than less educated women. On the
contrary, I expect to find no association between education and being an
employed father or an employed childless man. I summarize the hypotheses
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as follows:
Hypothesis 1a: For women, being highly educated is expected to be pos-
itively associated with the probability of being employed and having
children.
Hypothesis 1b: No association between education, employment and par-
enthood is expected for men.
Thus, if education is associated with the outcome for women, but not for
men, then we can legitimately speak of gender-inequality in the probability
of being employed and having children conditional on level of education. The
reported findings are not country-specific but are consistent across western
countries. Therefore, I expect the hypothesized associations to emerge in
all the countries under analysis. However, the institutional setting is likely
to mediate the association between education and the outcome, thus I do
expect cross-national differences in the magnitude of the associations. More
detail on the macro-micro mechanism in section 1.3.2.
Relative education of the partners
Partners’ relative educational level and the educational homogamy of cou-
ples have been vastly studied, in particular given the increase in marital selec-
tion in several western countries (Kalmijn 1991, 1994, Blossfeld and Drobnicˇ
2001, Blossfeld and Timm 2003, Schwartz and Mare 2005). Marital selection
is associated with the concentration (or lack) of human capital in the house-
hold (Mare 1991), and is therefore an important determinant of the overall
well being of the household and of its members. In particular, educational
attainment of the partners has been considered an important predictor of
their labor force participation and of their childbearing decisions. In the fol-
lowing paragraphs I review the main findings that have emerged from these
fields of work.
According to the Economic Theory of the Family, the husband’s level
of education would negatively effect the wife’s labor market performance
because of larger gains from specialization (Becker 1965, 1991, Bernasco et al.
1998). However, the gains from specialization have been declining, partially
as a result of better education of women (Oppenheimer 1994, Gray 1997) and
partially thanks to changes in the production of household goods. Lam (1988)
in fact, already in the late eighties showed that when goods are purchased
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in the market rather than produced at home then the gains from positive
assortative mating on productivity traits (i.e. having higher labor market
productivity) are greater. Less tangible, but nonetheless important, is the
amount of social capital that can be transmitted between similar spouses.
Specifically, women married to a highly educated partner may be exposed
to a broader social network and may receive higher level of understanding
of work demands in different career phases (Benham 1974, Bernasco 1994,
Bernardi 1999, Dribe and Nystedt 2011). It is also the case that highly
educated men have more gender equal attitudes when it comes to housework
and women’s labor force participation and career (Presser 1994, Kravdal
2007). Thus, for highly educated women, having a highly educated partner
could translate into higher chances of being employed.
As for men, there is no empirical evidence suggesting that their partners’
level of education is associated with their labor market participation. Indeed,
men’s position in the labor market reflects their traditional, unchanged role of
providers, that is not influenced by their partners’ educational level. In fact,
men generally fulfill the role of breadwinner in the case of marital hypogamy,
which is still the dominant model in ‘more gender-traditional societal regimes’
(Blossfeld 2009, p. 521), as well as in the case of marital homogamy or
hypergamy.
Childbearing decisions are also related to the educational level of the
partners. First of all, higher educated men tend to participate more in
homemaking and child care and might therefore be more motivated towards
parenting (Hyde et al. 1993, Craig 2007). It has been indeed found, in Scan-
dinavian countries especially, that women are more likely to transit to second
birth when their husband is actively taking part in domestic chores (Esping-
Andersen 2007, 2009) and that educational homogamy lowers the odds of
reproductive failure (Huber and Fieder 2011).
So, how can relative education of the partners relate to the probability of
being employed and having children? We have seen, first of all, that better
educated women benefit from having highly educated partners in terms of
understanding and emotional support. Second, educated husbands partici-
pate more in homemaking and especially in child care (Berardo et al. 1987,
Brayfield 1992, Brines 1994, Haddad 1994, Hardesty and Bokemeier 1989,
Kamo 1988, Presser 1994, South and Spitze 1994). Third, the bargaining
processes that take place among higher educated couples could yield positive
outcomes in terms of employment and motherhood. On the one hand, in
fact, better educated women have higher bargaining skills and better human
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resources to more effectively pull off a “voice or exit strategy” (Hirschman
1970), if they do not obtain help from their partner. On the other hand,
the highly educated male partner is likely to be more open to discussion and
to the bargaining process because of the higher egalitarian attitudes that
characterize better educated men. For all these reasons, I would expect a
positive association between a woman’s probability of being employed and
having children and being part of a highly educated homogamous couple. To
the contrary, and for the same reasons that applied in the case of education,
the relative education of the partners is not likely to be consequential for
men’s probability of being employed and having children.
Hypothesis 2a: For women, being part of a highly educated homogamous
couple is associated with higher chances of being employed and having
children.
Hypothesis 2b: No association between relative education and employment-
fatherhood combination is expected for men.
The institutional setting is bound to have a large impact on the way the
relative educational level relates to the outcomes. I shall dwell on this in
section 1.3.2.
Partners’ economic resources
Economic resources are obviously an important determinant of the well
being of a household and can have important repercussions on the decisions of
the members to be employed or not, whether to have children and how many
have. So how is women and men’s behavior in employment and parenting
related to their partner’s earned income?
For what concerns the association between income and employment, in
a simple labor supply and demand framework the greater the household
resources the lower the need for any member of the household to be in paid
work (Becker 1991). Therefore, women whose partners’ have high income
are more likely to be out of the labor market. Men are likely to be slightly
less sensitive to the economic argument, as their role of breadwinners has
such a longstanding tradition that men work regardless of their economic
background.
For what concerns reproductive behavior, however, the argument is more
complex. Research has shown that, for men, unemployment, fixed term con-
tracts and in general a fragile position in the labor market strongly reduces
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the risk of forming a stable couple and likewise, of becoming a parent (Op-
penheimer 1988, 2003, Ahn and Mira 2002, De la Rica and Iza 2005, Gonza´lez
and Jurado-Guerrero 2006, Salvini and Ferro 2007). This would suggest that
income is necessary to reach higher order fertility because children are nor-
mal goods and as such have costs. It follows that high income families can
afford the cost of an additional child, and are therefore better off when it
comes to realizing their desired parity. However, authors have stressed the
presence of a substitution effect (Becker and Lewis 1974, Becker et al. 1994),
in that the income elasticity of the quality of children is larger than the in-
come elasticity of the quantity of children. Higher levels of income, therefore,
instead of translating into a higher number of offspring, are more likely to
result into a higher expenditure towards a smaller number of children. In the
light of this, it is plausible that mothers partnered to men with high earnings
can rely on their partner’s resources and thus will not be in the work force;
women partnered to men with low earned income instead, may need to be
in the work force regardless the presence of children. At middle levels of the
male partner’s earned income, instead, women with children may be pulled
in the labor market in order to supply greater resources to the household.
Men who are partnered to women with high earnings, instead, are less
likely of having a high number of children, because of the large opportunity
costs faced by employed women in having children, in particular those work-
ing in well compensated jobs. Therefore, I expect men who are partnered to
high earning women to have a lower probability of having children and being
employed.
Hypothesis 3a: For women, the probability of being employed with two or
more children is expected to be highest at medium rather than high or
low levels of the partner’s relative earned income.
Hypothesis 3b: Men whose partners have higher earned income are less
likely to be employed and at the same time have a high number of
children.
1.3.2 Contextual circumstances
As anticipated in the previous paragraphs, individual and household char-
acteristics are expected to be of a certain importance in determining the
outcome, in particular for women. However, the institutional environment
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individuals are embedded in is also important in shaping people’s behavior.
The capitalist welfare regime typology presented in section 1.2 is an excellent
starting point for a discussion on the association between contextual traits
and within-household gender equality. This is especially true in the case of
work related behavior and parenthood, because female labor force participa-
tion is an explicit objective of the social democratic welfare states, but not of
the conservative nor of the liberal. Thus, not only will there be large differ-
ences in the number of women and mothers who take part in the labor market
in different countries, but contextual traits are also likely to mediate the rela-
tion between individual characteristics and work-parenthood combinations.
Specifically, social democratic welfare states are likely to stand out in terms
of within-household equality. In other words, the probability of being in paid
employment and having children should be similar for women and men. On
the one hand, in fact, such countries explicitly address maternal labor force
participation with policies concerning paid maternity leaves and child care
services (Gauthier 1998, Korpi 2000). On the other hand, they also address
paternal involvement via paternity and child care leaves that are meant to
equalize parents’ effort towards their children (McDonald 2006). As a result,
in social democracies mothers are much more likely to be found in paid work
as compared to mothers in any other country. In conservative and south-
ern European countries, in particular, given the lack of public and private
support to mothers, the share of employed women with children is likely to
be rather small. In liberal countries, instead, an intermediate situation is
likely to be found: given the residual nature of the welfare state, the labor
market is the main source of welfare for all individuals, including mothers.
Notably, cross-country differences for fathers are not expected. In fact, men’s
participation in the work force is not jeopardized by paternity (Bernhardt
1993). On the contrary, studies have shown that fathers are more likely to
be employed and to have higher earnings than childless men (Kaufman and
Uhlenberg 2000).
A second point regards the strength of the association between the out-
come and the individual and household traits for women and men in different
contexts. Although the direction of the associations at the individual and
household level is expected to be the same across countries, the magnitude
of the relation is likely to be contingent on contextual features. For example,
empirical research has shown that the extent to which educational homogamy
influences the wife’s position in the labor market depends largely on which
gender and welfare regime a country belongs to (Bernardi 1999, Bernasco
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et al. 1998, Blossfeld and Drobnicˇ 2001). In my case, given the large public
support to employed mothers in social democratic regimes, individual and
household traits are likely to have a smaller impact on the probability women
have of being employed and being a parent. Thus, in countries where the
equalizing effect of the welfare state is large (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999) in-
dividual differences are not expected to fully account for different individual
outcomes. On the contrary, in contexts where state intervention is minimal,
such as in liberal welfare states, or targeted, as in conservative and Mediter-
ranean countries, the importance of individual and household resources are
expected to be larger. The following hypothesis summarizes this idea.
Hypothesis 4: In countries belonging to the social-democratic welfare regime,
institutional characteristics are expected to mediate the impact of indi-
vidual characteristics for both women and men. In countries belonging
to the liberal and conservative welfare regime, instead, individual and
household characteristics are likely to have a stronger association with
the outcome for both women and men.
1.4 Presence of children and the division of
domestic chores in comparative research
The second empirical chapter analyzes the different relative time on do-
mestic chores spent by partners. In particular, the scope is to highlight
whether the presence of children is associated with a more unequal division
of housework in couples living in different institutional settings. Therefore, in
this section I review the main findings in the literature on the division of do-
mestic chores within households in western countries. In the first paragraph
I present a line of research, dating back to the second half of the twenti-
eth century, that has focused mainly on individual and household traits to
explain the allocation of time to housework. Among these, the presence of
children in the household. The second, more recent thread instead focuses
on how contextual characteristics can shape individuals’ behavior in the di-
vision of domestic work. I review the main findings of both in the following
paragraphs and develop the hypotheses accordingly.
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1.4.1 Micro-level perspectives
Since the 1960s, when research on the allocation of time to domestic
chores began, three theoretical perspectives have emerged to explain what
individual traits are associated with the division of household tasks between
partners. I draw from these theories to develop four testable hypotheses on
the association between individual-level traits and division of domestic chores
between partners in European countries.
My first hypothesis is tied to the gendered effect of parenthood on the
division of chores. The presence of children has been found to increase the
time on housework (Shelton and John 1996). The responsibility for such
domestic chores, however, is not gender neutral: parenthood in fact is found
to increase the domestic work load especially for women and to strengthen a
traditional division of labor. This finding has emerged both in cross-sectional
(Craig and Mullan 2010, Dribe and Stanfors 2011), and in longitudinal stud-
ies (Ku¨hhirt 2011, Schober 2013). While the former case could be the result
of a selection effect, in that couples with a traditional division of labor may
simply be more likely to have more children, the latter results indicate that
even couples who shared chores more equally before having children tend to
change their habits when they become parents. In other words, the authors
find that the event of having a child is associated in a strong way with the
shift towards a gendered division of chores. This might be the case because of
the gendered meaning of parenthood per se. On one hand, as Lorber (1986)
suggests, women see domestic chores as a form of love and devotion, rather
than work; on the other hand, the cultural norms concerning the importance
of being a good parent might override the importance of perfectly dividing
chores with one’s partner (Craig and Mullan 2011). In other words, mothers
may have a hard time bargaining over who has to clean the house when the
consequences of a dirty home influence her children and not just herself and
her spouse. My first individual level hypothesis therefore states that:
Hypothesis 1: The presence of children in the household is associated with
a higher share of women’s housework.
Given that I am concerned with cross-national differences, it is useful to
consider how the gendered effect of parenthood could vary by context. As
I will discuss in paragraph 1.4.2, there has been much research on whether
and which contextual traits are associated with a more or less equal division
of chores within households. To investigate this issue, my next hypothesis
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regards the mediating effect of the welfare regime on the division of domes-
tic chores in the presence of children. In previous sections I have discussed
the larger gender-equalizing effort that takes place in the social democratic
welfare states, in particular in terms of increasing female labor force partici-
pation and of sustaining paternal involvement with children. On the contrary,
continental welfare states place a larger emphasis on the preservation of the
traditional family, with the complementary roles of male breadwinner and
female homemaker. Thus, it is likely that the outcome in terms of gender
specialization in the presence of children will vary by context. In particular:
Hypothesis 1a: The association between the presence of children and the
higher share of women’s housework shall be weakest in the social demo-
cratic welfare regime and strongest in countries belonging to the con-
tinental, liberal and Mediterranean welfare regime.
Having highlighted my main hypotheses, I move to the historical explana-
tions for the time spent on domestic chores by partners. The time availability
perspective (Hiller 1984) explains the division of household labor as the result
of a rational process, where household tasks are allocated according to the
available time of both partners. The main indicators which have been used to
measure time constraints are the employment status and the work schedule
of the partners, and the presence and number of children in the household.
Indeed, research has shown that husbands do more domestic chores if their
wives are employed outside the home (Davis and Greenstein 2004). Among
others Ross (1987), Presser (1994) and Geist (2005) find that both partners
devote more time to domestic chores the more hours they spend at home.
Gough and Killewald (2011) show that during unemployment both husbands
and wives increase their hours of housework, but women’s increase is twice
men’s. On the basis of this, the second hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2: The greater the time constraints women and men face, the
smaller the share of housework they perform.
The second perspective regarding the division of household labor is the
relative resources perspective, according to which the division of domestic
chores is determined by the level of relative resources each partner brings to
the relationship (Blood and Wolfe 1960). Research has in fact found that the
smaller the wage gap between husband and wife, the more household tasks
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are equally divided (Blair and Lichter 1991, Greenstein 2000) while men’s
relative higher income leads women to do more housework (Geist 2005). On
the contrary, some studies find that economically dependent husbands do
less rather than more housework (Brines 1994, Greenstein 2000, Hook 2006).
Scholars have interpreted this as a means of neutralizing gender-deviant be-
havior. Gupta (2007), however, shows that in the United States women’s
time on housework is related to their own earnings rather than to their part-
ners’. Resources have also been operationalized through educational level.
Overall, more educated women dedicate less time to household tasks and suf-
fer a smaller task segregation. Also, husbands perform more housework when
their wives’ education is equal to their own or exceeds it (Blair and Lichter
1991, Greenstein 2000). Furthermore, the higher the husband’s educational
level, the more likely is his participation to household tasks (Berardo et al.
1987, Haddad 1994, South and Spitze 1994). Therefore, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3: Higher relative resources are associated with a lower share
of housework for both women and men.
Researchers who have deviated from the socioeconomic perspectives have
framed the problem in social constructionist terms, introducing the symbolic
content of household labor (Ferree 1990, Brines 1994). This view goes under
the name of social construction of gender or the gender ideology and argues
that gender is a social construction which is created and recreated through the
interaction with others. Consequently, gender would determine the division
of housework as a result of how men and women display their social roles
and “produce gender” (Connell 1985, West and Zimmerman 1987, Hochschild
1989). The underlying idea is that a more or less traditional gender ideology
will contribute to shape the division of chores. In fact, traditional women are
more likely to consider ‘fair’ an unequal division of chores because it matches
with the normative standards they embrace (Lavee and Katz 2002) and men
with more traditional gender ideologies do less housework than those who
are more modern (Huber and Spitze 1983, Brayfield 1992). Instead, non-
traditional women are more sensitive to the unequal share of domestic labor
(Braun et al. 2008). It therefore follows that:
Hypothesis 4: Women and men who favor equality in gender roles are ex-
pected to share housework more evenly.
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1.4.2 Macro-level perspectives
Recent research has attempted pinpointing the contextual traits that are
related to the division of domestic chores between women and men. Accord-
ing to this line of research, the fact that working, resourceful and gender
egalitarian women reduce their share of housework results in an equalization
process that goes beyond the individual-level bargaining within the house-
hold. This shift from individual to contextual-level happens, in Hook’s (2006)
words, because: “as women’s labor force participation affects more men, the
bar is set higher when men make social comparisons, creating an across-the-
board change in how men “do gender” [. . . ] In contexts where women are
more involved in the public sphere, men are more involved in the private
sphere, not necessarily because of household bargaining or other household-
level processes, but because of societal shifts in gendered behavior” (Hook,
2006, p. 643). To the contrary, women might feel social pressure to perform
more than their share of housework when they live in ‘traditional’ contexts
(Geist, 2005). Likewise, normative standards may encourage men not to
share household chores in order to live up to the male breadwinner model,
even if they have non-traditional attitudes (Coleman 1991). This happens
because, as Bianchi et al. (2000) argue, women and men internalize society’s
prevailing gender ideologies and assume gender specific beliefs, attitudes and
behaviors. I test the equalization process with two macro-level traits that
have been used in previous literature on the division of housework, namely
the presence of women in the workforce and the Gender Empowerment Mea-
sure. Previous research has shown that in countries where women are more
empowered, the division of chores is more equal (Batalova and Cohen 2002,
Fuwa 2004). Knudsen and Waerness (2008), however, find no direct effect
of the GEM on the division of domestic chores. The results for female la-
bor force participation are also not straightforward. Hook (2006), in fact,
finds that men perform more housework in countries where women are over-
all present in the labor market. In a successive study, the author also shows
that the presence of married women in the work force increases the time that
men but not women spend on cooking and on housework (Hook 2010). Treas
and Tai (2012) also show that housework is shared more evenly in countries
that have a high legacy of maternal employment. This could suggest that
female labor force participation has an equalizing effect on the division of
housework. Fuwa (2004), however, directly tests this hypothesis and finds no
effect of female labor force participation on the division of chores. Following
31
this work, I develop my last hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5: Greater presence of women in the labor market in particular
and in the public sphere in general are expected to be associated with
a more equal division of domestic chores between partners.
1.5 Relative earnings, presence of children and
childbirth in cross-national comparison
As seen from the findings illustrated in the previous sections, mothers
seem to have smaller chances of being in the work force compared to childless
women and fathers, and they also appear to be performing more housework
than the latter groups. For women who are or were active in the labor
market at some point in their life prior to childbirth, reduced labor market
participation and increased effort in unpaid work could be associated with a
reduction of their earnings. This, in the first place, may have consequences
for the overall well being of the household, but in the second place could
contribute to the degree of within-couple gender (in)equality.
Surprisingly, while previous research has put much effort in studying the
wage gap between women and men and the general ‘motherhood penalty’,
i.e. the difference in earnings between mothers, childless women and also
fathers and men, less is known on what happens within the household over
time, especially when children are born (Stier and Mandel 2009, Raley et al.
2006, Winslow-Bowe 2006). In the following paragraphs I review the findings
related to these issues and from these derive my hypotheses.
1.5.1 The gender wage gap and the ‘absolute’ mother-
hood penalty
In contemporary western countries, the average gross hourly earnings of
women are lower than those of men (Eurostat 2012b, Hersch and Stratton
2002). Authors maintain that the wage gap is driven by two main factors:
a) occupational segregation and b) gendered wages within the same occupa-
tions (Aisenbrey and Bru¨ckner 2007). Different explanations have emerged
to account for the two factors.
According to micro-economic theory (Becker 1985), the candidates to ex-
plain different levels of earnings are characteristics tied to human capital,
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such as education and experience in the labor market. Labor market perfor-
mance, type of occupation and hours usually worked are also typical predic-
tors of earnings. Bardasi and Gornick (2008) for example, study the wage
differential between part-time and full-time work in Canada, Germany, Italy,
Sweden, the UK, and the US. With the exception of Sweden, the authors
find a large part-time wage penalty for all women.
The wage gender gap would therefore emerge mainly from occupational
segregation, which is mostly a result of women’s choices. In other words,
as women anticipate greater investment in family life, they invest less in
employment-related human capital and look for jobs that can more easily be
accommodated around family needs, and that are generally less paid. An-
other explanation stemming from the supply side is provided within the so-
cialization approach, according to which the labor market decisions of women
and men are not driven by rational choice but are the outcome of gendered
socialization, i.e. the process that leads individuals to interiorize what is con-
sidered appropriate and desirable for each gender within a society (Marini
and Fan 1997). The two approaches have in common the notion that choices
and expectations are behind the decisions tied to labor market behavior.
Alternative explanations are the crowding and the cultural devaluation
of women’s work (Kilbourne et al. 1994, Petersen and Saporta 2004). The
first argues that women are discriminated against and excluded from male
occupations. As a consequence, female jobs are overcrowded and this artifi-
cial supply lowers the wages of such occupations (Bergmann 1986, Siltanen
1994). The second position instead hypothesizes a general cultural devalua-
tion of predominantly female jobs that leads both men and women to earn
less compared to those working in typical male occupations (Kilbourne et al.
1994).
Another perspective focuses on the demand side and on the structural
differences of the labor markets that women and men find. Aisenbrey and
Bru¨ckner (2007, p. 7) in fact suggest that: “Arguing from the demand side,
equally qualified men and women are evaluated and/or treated differently in
the labor market and therefore their economic rewards differ”. According to
this perspective, it would be these disparaged structural features of the labor
market that determine a horizontally gendered wage.
The question that many scholars have attempted to answer is whether the
gender wage gap is driven mainly by occupational segregation or by down-
right gender-based discriminations in wages. If the latter were predominant,
then women’s recent achievements in education (Blossfeld and Drobnicˇ 2001)
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would not be sufficient to eliminate the gender gap in wages. Furthermore, if
this were the case, occupational choice would also be insufficient to the cause
of gender equality in wages. In other words, if wages are gendered within
jobs, even women working in the highest occupations and not on the ‘mommy
track’ would be disadvantaged in comparison with their male counterparts.
Research has shown that outcomes in this respect vary notably by coun-
try. Petersen et al. (1997, 2003), for instance, show that in Norway and
in Sweden there is only a marginal difference between the wages of women
and men working in the same firm and in the same position. On the con-
trary, Aisenbrey and Bru¨ckner (2007) reporting the results found by Hinz
and Gartner (2005) who study the situation in Germany, highlight a strong
gender discrimination. In fact, they show that even when controlling for
human capital, men out-earn their female colleagues who work in the same
occupation and firm.
Above the gender wage gap, comes the motherhood penalty. Women
who have children, in fact, earn less than their childless counterparts (Budig
and England 2001, Avellar and Smock 2003). As the gender wage gap, the
motherhood penalty is resilient to individual traits: scholars have in fact
shown that when individual characteristic are controlled, the gap is reduced,
but does not disappear (Blau et al. 1998, Hersch and Stratton 2002, Sigle-
Rushton and Waldfogel 2007, Esping-Andersen 2009).
There are several reasons why the presence of children could lead to a
reduction in earnings. Budig and England (2001) specify four ‘causal’ and
one endogenous pathways to wage inequality:
Mothers may earn less than other women because having chil-
dren causes them to (1) lose job experience, (2) be less productive
at work, (3) trade off higher wages for mother-friendly jobs, or
(4) be discriminated against by employers. Or [. . . ] women with
lower earning potential may have children at relatively higher
rates. (Budig and England 2001, p. 204).
The motherhood penalty is counterbalanced by a fatherhood premium
(Harkness and Waldfogel 1999, Lundberg and Rose 2002, Whitehouse 2002,
Koslowski 2011), i.e. fathers have higher earnings than childless men, both in
Europe (Koslowski 2011) and in the US (Lundberg and Rose 2002). This is
generally accounted for by the fact that fathers increase their work supply to
access higher earnings, in line with Becker’s specialization theory. Another
possible mechanism, however, could be the selection of highly productive
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men into marriage first and fatherhood afterwards (Gray 1997). In both
cases men abide to the so-called ‘good provider’ model of fatherhood, which
implies maximizing the effort in the labor market in order to maximize the
financial resources for the family and – perhaps – to allow mothers to stay
at home with their children (Kaufman and Uhlenberg 2000). An interesting
alternative mechanism is proposed by Koslowski (2011) who suggests that
men who abide to the alternative fathering model, i.e. the ‘involved father’
model might reduce, instead of increase, their hours of work in order to
spend more time with their children. As a result, the earning balance of the
household may not be affected in the expected manner, although there are
no empirical pieces of evidence for this alternative mechanism.
If the birth of a child implies changes in earnings that go in opposite
directions for women and men, it is likely to trigger gender inequalities within
the household, which I address in the following section.
1.5.2 The ‘relative’ motherhood penalty
What determines couples’ earning contributions? Stier and Mandel (2009)
suggest that spouses’ endowments such as human capital, time devoted to
paid work, type and field of occupation and also the way the partners plan
their career determines the balance of earnings in the household. Wive’s de-
pendency from their husbands is found to increase with their age and with
the presence and number of children (Bianchi et al. 1999). On the contrary,
women increase their relative share of income when they are employed and
when they have high levels of education relative to their partners’ (Winslow-
Bowe 2006, Bardasi and Gornick 2008). In absence of gendered discrimi-
nation of wages, therefore, the more similar the partners’ endowments, the
more equal their earnings. However, even if there has been an increase in
educational homogamy in European countries in recent years (Blossfeld and
Timm 2003), women generally are younger than their partners. Therefore,
they have had less time to accumulate the work experience that is crucial
for earnings and they begin the partnership with a disadvantage (Gershuny
and Kan 2009, Stier and Mandel 2009). Another argument is suggested by
Winslow-Bowe (2006), who maintains that at lower levels of household in-
come partners are more likely to be earning similar amounts, to the point
that economic vulnerability of the household could be a determinant for fe-
male members to achieve the status of primary breadwinner (Winslow-Bowe
2006).
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On the basis of these findings, I formulate a first set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: On average, women earn a smaller share of income than
their partners.
Hypothesis 2a: Being employed and hours of employment are associated
with a higher share of women’s earned income.
Hypothesis 2b: Having a partner who is employed and the partner’s hours
of employment are associated with a lower share of women’s earned
income.
Hypothesis 3: Women who are more educated than their partners have a
higher share of earned income.
Hypothesis 4: Women are more likely to have a higher relative earned in-
come when the household is economically vulnerable.
In the previous section we have seen that, generally speaking, mothers
forego earnings compared to childless women while the opposite holds true
for men. In other words, the ‘family gap’ (Waldfogel 1998, p. 137) is not
gender neutral. Therefore, we may hypothesize two alternative processes: a)
women with smaller earnings select into having children to a greater extent,
therefore mothers’ have a smaller share of earned income than non mothers
and the relationship is not causal; b) the arrival of a child reduces women’s
earnings relative to their partners’. From a cross-sectional perspective it
is not possible to verify whether the association is pure or not, but using
longitudinal data, instead, I may test if having a child changes the relative
earnings balance of couples. To this end, I formulate my fifth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: The birth of a child decreases women’s share of earned in-
come.
What about cross-national differences? The question about earnings and
about the effect of childbirth on relative earnings in different institutional
arrangements is quite intriguing, because countries belonging to different
welfare regimes present quite different characteristics in terms of female labor
force participation, gender gap in earnings and fertility rates that could be
related to the way earnings are balanced within households. In the social
democratic welfare regimes, in fact, the higher rates of female labor force
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participation could suggest a more equal balance of earnings within couples.
However, the large availability of family friendly jobs; a gender wage gap
that is higher or similar to the one found in countries that are less advanced
in terms of gender equality (such as Italy, Spain and Latvia); and the overall
high fertility rates could imply that more women – and especially mothers –
are in low paid jobs and thus face a larger ‘relative motherhood penalty’. In
southern European states, instead, a smaller portion of the female population
is in paid work (Eurostat 2012b). So, on average, men are likely to be earning
more than women and, on the whole, within household earnings are likely
to be gendered. Given the small number of employed women, the fact that
the wage gap is smaller in southern European countries than elsewhere does
not change the main picture. However, since fewer women are in the work
force to begin with, the effect of childbirth is likely to be small, resulting in
a ‘floor effect’. Thus my last hypotheses are that:
Hypothesis 5a: Women’s share of earned income is highest in social demo-
cratic regimes.
Hypothesis 5b: The decrease of earned income associated with childbirth
is weakest in context with low levels of female labor force participation.
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2Chapter Two
Data and methods
To investigate how women and men, mothers and fathers, differ in paid
work, unpaid work and earning capacity, I use a variety of dependent vari-
ables and of data analysis techniques. The following paragraphs illustrate
the data and methods used in each empirical chapter.
2.1 Employment and parenthood: modeling
the joint state
The first empirical chapter focuses on the compatibility of employment
and parenthood, which I operationalize as the probability women and men in
different institutional settings have of being employed and having children at
the same time. For the analysis I use data from the EU-SILC 2005 and 2007
data-base. The EU-SILC (European Community Statistics on Income and
Living Conditions) is a collection of longitudinal and cross-sectional surveys
that started in 2004 and involves a large number of European countries. Its
main focus is on income, poverty and social exclusion and it has two features
that render it a suitable source of information for this analysis. Firstly, data
are collected at the household level, allowing to verify to what extent not
only individual but also household variables are related to the outcome of
interest. Secondly, it is one of the few micro data-sets that collects very
detailed information on income, again at the individual and at the household
level.
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To estimate the probability of being employed and having children, I
build a limited dependent variable where different combinations of employ-
ment and parenthood constitute the response categories (i.e. working1 and
having two or more children, working and having one child, not working
and having two or more children, not working and having one child, working
childless). Then, using multinomial logistic regression models I estimate the
probability of experiencing a certain outcome separately for women and men
and by country. Tests for the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives were
performed for all the models and are reported in the Appendix.
The logic of the model is that individual i chooses betweenM alternatives,
indexed j = 1, 2, . . . ,M , to each of which i has attached a certain utility Uij,
j = 1, 2, . . . ,M . Individual i chooses alternative j if this gives the highest
utility, i.e. if Uij = max{Ui1, . . . , UiM}. Since the utility levels are unknown,
Uij is assumed to be equal to µij + ij, where µij is a non stochastic function
of observables and some unknown parameters and ij is the unobservable
error term. In this case, µij = x
′
iβj where xi is a K-dimensional vector that
contains individual i characteristics and βj is a vector of coefficients for each
alternative.
In the model, µi1 is set to zero and we may write:
P{yi = j} = exp{x
′
iβj}
1 + exp{x′iβ2}+ . . . exp{x′iβM}
, j = 1, 2, . . .M (2.1)
where β1 = 0. The alternative-specific coefficients are a number of rel-
evant socio-demographic individual and household characteristics: age, age
squared, marital status (cohabitating vs. married), education of the respon-
dent (lower education - reference category, medium education, higher educa-
tion), educational level of the partner (lower education - reference category,
medium education, higher education), the partner’s relative level of earned
income, the household’s relative level of economic resources and the year of
the survey2. I run two sets of models, one including own level of education
and the education of the partner separately and one with a variable measur-
ing relative level of education which accounts for five possible combinations
of educational attainment of the partners.
1Throughout the dissertation, working is used as a synonym of being employed, while
domestic work is always referred to as such or as unpaid work.
2The variables are detailed in section 3.2.2.
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The outcome of the multinomial logit is not immediately interpretable in
terms of raw coefficients. Not only because they come in the form of log-odds,
but especially because the coefficients for each alternative outcome are to be
interpreted with respect to the baseline category, which in my case is working
and having two or more children since it has the highest number of cases.
To render the results more straightforward, I calculate and report predicted
probabilities for the outcomes of interest and display them graphically. I
prefer probabilities over relative risks and marginal effects as I find them
more easily and directly interpretable3.
The choice of the multinomial logit, above and beyond its lengthy inter-
pretation, can be arguable. First of all, the model rests on the heave as-
sumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Since the response
categories of the dependent variable have common components, it might be
argued that they are close substitutes, and the fact that the number of chil-
dren is sequential adds on to the potential violation if the IIA assumption.
However, the Small-Hsiao tests reported in the appendix indicate that the
models I run do not violate the IIA assumption. Notwithstanding, the re-
sults from the IIA tests are not necessarily the only element to consider
when choosing a model, since researchers have pointed out that “even in
well-specified models, IIA tests often reject the assumption when the alter-
natives seem distinct and often fail to reject IIA when the alternatives can
reasonably be viewed as close substitutes” (Cheng and Long 2007, p. 583).
Indeed, McFadden’s (1974) early advice was to use the multinomial logit
model when the response categories can plausibly be assumed to be distinct
and weighed independently in the eyes of each decision maker. In my case,
one could argue that women, for example, have a preference for working and
that therefore the choice of the number of children will be made conditional
on the fact that they are working. Based on this idea, a valid alternative
could be the nested logit model. There are two reasons for which I opt for
the multinomial logit instead of the nested logit. The first is that the issue of
sequentiality of the number of children would not be solved within the nested
logit framework. The second is that, even if the IIA test is not necessarily
proof of independence of the alternatives, it does not disproof the model ei-
ther. Given this point, I am reluctant in imposing a structure to the decision
making process. One the one hand, it may be that women decide the number
3Predicted probabilities are calculated using the margins command in Stata 12. For
details on the computation see Long and Freese (2005).
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of children they have conditional on their working status. On the other hand,
their preferences may have completely different patterns, and two alterna-
tives that appear similar may instead be very dissimilar. For example, in
Norway, there may be very little difference between working and having one
child or working and having two or more children. In Italy, on the contrary,
the first situation may be desirable while not working with two children may
be more desirable than working with two children. All in all, given that:
a) I am interested in comparing the outcomes of women and men, not in
the structure of the decision making process; b) that the tests results show
that the IIA assumption is never violated, and c) that the alternative model,
the nested logit, would not solve the issue of sequentiality of the number of
children, I opt for the multinomial logit.
2.2 Modeling relative time on domestic chores:
a multi-level strategy
To investigate the division of chores I use data from the fifth wave of
the European Social Survey (2010, ESS hereafter), which is the most up-to-
date data set containing information on the amount of time individuals and
their partners devote to domestic chores. In order to capture the relative
amount of housework each partner performs, the dependent variable is a
ratio between the time the respondent reports spending on housework, and
the sum of the time the respondent reports spending on housework plus the
time the partner spends on housework, as reported by the respondent.
The same variable has been used in previous studies (e.g. Knudsen and
Waerness (2008)), but I adopt a technique of analysis that is seldom used in
empirical studies. In fact, many studies use linear models, e.g. OLS, when
analyzing variables that take the form of proportions. While not incorrect in
themselves4, these approaches have the disadvantage of producing unrealistic
predicted values, i.e. that exceed the 0-1 range of the proportion. Therefore,
as suggested by Hox (2010) and by McDowell and Cox (2004), I use a gener-
alized linear model, with the binomial family and the logit link5. This way,
4As a robustness check, I also ran the OLS model and the results were not substantially
different.
5The generalized linear model is defined by: the outcome variable that has mean µ
and variance σ2; a linear additive equation producing a latent predictor η of the outcome
variable; a link function that links the predicted values to the expected values of the
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when calculating predictions I obtain values within the actual range of the
proportion.
For the analysis, I select individuals who are between 20 and 65 years old,
living with a partner, and residing in 23 European countries. The relatively
high number of countries allows using multi-level models, with individuals
nested in countries. I select all the European countries in the data set: Bel-
gium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Switzerland (CH), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic
(CZ), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland
(FI), France (FR), Great Britain (GB), Greece (GR), Croatia (HR), Hun-
gary (HU), Ireland (IE), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL),
Portugal (PT), Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK).
To investigate the within-household inequality in the allocation of time
to chores and test the hypotheses, I have to verify: a) to what extent couples
share housework in Europe, b) how individual and contextual traits affect this
division, and c) whether the presence of children is associated with a more
traditional division of chores in different contexts. I use random intercepts
models to verify point a) and b), while random intercepts, random slopes
models to test whether the association between the presence of children and
the division of chores changes by country.
The random intercepts model with only individual level predictors takes
the following form:
yi = αji +Xiβ + i (2.2)
where αji is the only coefficient allowed to vary between groups. In other
words, for each country a different intercept is estimated, while Xiβ is a
vector of coefficients that are constrained to be the same for all groups,
and that contains all the individual and household-level predictors. For this
analysis I include: age (centered at the grand mean), marital status (married
vs. not legally married), number of household members, total time spent on
housework by the partners, employment status (employed vs. not employed),
hours of employment per week, employment status of the partner (employed
vs. not employed), economic and educational resources, attitudes towards
outcome variable for η : η = f(µ). In this case, I apply a logistic regression model that
is specified by having a binomial probability distribution (µ) with mean µ and by using
logit function given by η = logit(µ) as link function, i.e. η = ln(µ/(1-µ)). In the multi-
level framework, the simplest model would be given by yi = logistic(αji). To be noted,
the GLM does not apply a transformation to the outcome variable; rather, it applies the
inverse logistic transformation to the expected values.
43
gender roles and, finally, presence of children6.
I run a second set of random intercepts and random slopes models, where
I allow one coefficient, indicating the presence of children, to vary between
groups:
yi = αji +Xiβ + Kidsjiβ + i (2.3)
This allows assessing whether there are between country differences in
the association between presence of children and division of chores.
In a last set of models I return to random intercepts and include country-
level predictors, as follows:
yi = αji +Xiβ + Zjγ + i (2.4)
where the level-two predictors, Zj, are a measure of female labor force
participation and the GEM, the Gender Empowerment Measure.
Given the very large differences between women and men in the time
devoted to domestic work in all countries, I run separate models by gender
in order to directly observe how individual and household level traits are
associated differently with the share of housework women and men report.
The alternative solution – i.e. running a pooled model for both women and
men and including a dummy variable for gender with all the interaction terms
– would be much less straightforward to interpret.
Since the raw coefficients are little informative, for the individual-level
regressors I calculate predictions of interest holding all the other variables at
the sample means and report them in the text and in tables in chapter four.
For the estimates of the macro-level variables, instead, I prefer a graphical
representation.
Tests for influential data should be performed when running analyses on
small samples. In multi-level models a potential source of bias are influential
cases at the higher level, which in this case is the country level. I use Cook’s
distance to test whether cases at the higher level influence the estimates.
Cook’s distance in fact provides a summary of “the influence a higher level
unit exerts on all parameter estimates simultaneously” (Nieuwenhuis et al.
2012, p. 40). The results, reported in figure B.1 in the Appendix, indicate
that none of the higher level cases influence the estimates.
6Variables are detailed in section 4.2.
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2.3 Relative earnings within-couples at child-
birth: is it a problem of selection?
In the last empirical chapter I focus on the equality of couples’ earnings in
European countries in the presence of children and in the event of a childbirth.
The research strategy moves in two steps. First, I use multi-level models
on a large number of European countries to assess, from a cross-sectional
point of view, the within-household earnings division and the extent to which
it is associated with a number of individual and household characteristics,
including the presence of children. Second, I run fixed effects panel models
on single countries and on groups of countries to test whether the birth of
a child affects the earning balance within couples in contexts with different
institutional arrangements.
2.3.1 Relative earnings in cross-sectional perspective
In the first analysis, using data derived from the EU-SILC most recent
longitudinal database, the 2008 release, which covers the years 2005-2008,
I assess the relative earned income of couples through a dependent variable
that is the proportion of the female partner’s earned income relative to the
sum of the female’s and the male’s earned income. The variable is constrained
between 0 and 1, and therefore, as in the previous chapter, I use a generalized
linear model, with the binomial family and the logit link (Hox 2010, McDowell
and Cox 2004). The analysis is conducted using two-level random intercepts
models (αji) with individuals nested in countries and with individual and
household level predictors (Xi):
yi = αji +Xiβ + i (2.5)
The individual level covariates (Xi) include: age in classes (18-29 as ref-
erence category, 30-34, 35-39, 40-45), hours of paid work per week. The
household predictors are: relative education of the partners (both partners
are low educated r.c., both partners have a medium level of education, both
partners have a high level of education, respondent is more educated than the
partner, respondent is less educated than the partner); age of the partner;
partner’s hours spent in paid work per week; household income and wealth
expressed in country specific quartiles; number of children age ≤ 18 in the
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household7.
As far as the sample is concerned, I consider women aged 18 to 45, living
with a partner and residing in the 26 European countries available in the EU-
SILC 2008 longitudinal file: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG),
Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain
(ES), Finland (FI), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS),
Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV), the Netherlands
(NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Sweden
(SE), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK) and the United Kingdom (UK). After
excluding women whose smallest child is older than 18, and those who report
zero earned income throughout the observation window, the total N adds up
to 93023.
2.3.2 Relative earnings in longitudinal perspective
For this part of the analysis I use models based on panel data which, in the
EU-SILC, contain repeated observations for the same individuals. Models
based on panel data allow more complexity compared to models based on
cross-sectional data. In panel data, the observations within groups represent
individuals at different points in time and the order of the observations must
be kept into account.
The dependent variable I use in the analysis is, once again, a proportion,
i.e. how much the female partner earns with respect to the sum of her earned
income and her partner’s earned income. In order to test the last hypothesis,
i.e. whether there is a causal effect of a childbirth on the proportion, I use a
fixed effect model (FE) that allows for permanent unobserved heterogeneity.
In this instance it is particularly important because individual unobserved
characteristics might affect both the explanatory and the dependent variable.
For example, women who have children might be less career-oriented and
therefore have a lower earnings ratio compared to childless women.
Consider the following equation:
yit = ziα + xitβ + ui + it (2.6)
Where zi are observable time-invariant factors, xit are observable time-
varying factors, ui is an individual, unobservable error term (that can be
thought of as ‘ability’, or ‘propensity’, which is assumed to be constant over
7Variables are detailed in section 5.2.1.
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time), and it is another unobserved error term (such as luck) that is not
constant over time within the individual.
When estimating a fixed effects model, we obtain estimates of the ob-
served time-varying factors, while controlling for the observed time invariant
characteristics and for the unobserved individual traits of the individual. The
changes in the time varying covariates are used to account for the changes
in the dependent variable. In practical terms, a fixed effects model allows
estimating the effect of the time varying variables of interest within the same
individual, which in turn takes care of the unobserved heterogeneity issue
(Wooldridge 2010). The drawback is that, as an individual-level intercept
absorbs all the unobserved and observed time-invariant individual charac-
teristics, these cannot be immediately singled out or distinguished by the
person specific ui. An alternative to the fixed effects model would have been
to run the random effects model, which would justify extending the results
to the out of sample population. Hausman tests were run to verify whether
the fixed or random effects model were more appropriate: the large and sig-
nificant Hausman statistic - reported in table C.2 in the Appendix - indicates
that only the fixed effects model is consistent.
The models I estimate include a number of time-varying characteristics
among which two variables that allow tapping whether the birth of a child
affects the relative earnings of a couple. The first variable is a dummy vari-
able that I call ‘newborn’, indicating the presence of a child aged 0-1 in the
household (proxy of childbirth), without considering the order of birth of the
child. The second variable instead has three categories indicating whether
the newborn is the first, the second, or third or above child.
The first model is a pooled one, including all the 26 countries available
from the 2008 EU-SILC longitudinal file and takes the following form:
yit = ziα + xitβ + γ1Newbornit + ui + it (2.7)
where yit is the proportion of a woman’s (i) earnings to the total of the
woman’s plus the man’s earnings at time t, and Xit is a vector of time varying
characteristics assumed to affect the ratio. These include: age; age of the
partner; hours of paid work per week; partner’s hours spent in paid work
per week; household economic resources (income and wealth) expressed in
country specific quartiles; number of other children ≤ 18 in the household
excluding the newborn8.
8Details for the variables are provided in section 5.3.1.
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Newbornit indicates whether a women i has a child age 0-1 at time t and
is used to measure childbirth. The error term is composed by ui, the time
invariant unobserved individual characteristics, and a transitory component
it. The parameter of interest is γ1 which is the marginal effect of the birth
of a child on the relative earnings for women in all countries. I then run an
identical model where instead of the ‘Newborn’ variable I include the ‘Order
of birth’ variable.
In fixed effects models, all time-invariant characteristics are controlled
for, even if they are not directly estimated. In order to get an idea of the
differences between welfare regimes, I run a second model as follows:
yit = ziα+xitβ+γ1Newbornit+γ2Newbornit∗WelfareRegimei+ui+it (2.8)
where the parameters of interest are now γ1 which indicates the effect of
childbirth in the reference group and γ2 which is a vector of 5 coefficients
indicating the marginal effect of childbirth in each other group of countries.
Since the welfare regimes are interacted with a time-varying covariate, I
now get a measure of welfare regime difference on that specific covariate. I
then run models separately by welfare regime considering the order of birth
variable. This allows: a) obtaining group-specific estimates of this variable
and b) considering group-specific effects of the other covariates. Finally, I
test the robustness of the results by running the models separately for six
countries.
The sample is the same as in the previous analysis and includes women
aged 18 to 45 who live with a partner and reside in the 26 European countries
available in the EU-SILC 2008 longitudinal file: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE),
Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia
(EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE),
Iceland (IS), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV),
the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania
(RO), Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK) and the United Kingdom
(UK). The total N adds up to 93023.
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3Chapter Three
The incompatibility of employment
and parenthood
3.1 Introduction
In the first empirical chapter, I look at the compatibility of work and
parenthood and investigate the probabilities of women and men of being
employed and of having children in different institutional circumstances and
conditioning on different individual and household characteristics.
The decisions of working and becoming a mother are very closely inter-
twined. Too such an extent, that “childbearing and female work-force can
be viewed as the outcome of a simultaneous decision process which takes
into account of the basic antagonism between the two activities” (Bernhardt
1993, p. 31). As women entered the labor market over the last century -
massively in some countries, on their toe-tips in others - fertility rates were on
the decline: a negative correlation that enhanced the idea of incompatibility
between the roles of mother and worker.
Work and fatherhood, to the contrary, have historically developed as
compatible and complementary activities. The employment rates of fathers
and childless men, in fact, are roughly the same in most western countries.
Some authors have also found that fathers devote more effort to paid work
and have higher earnings than childless men (Harkness and Waldfogel 1999,
Lundberg and Rose 2002, Whitehouse 2002, Koslowski 2011). Female and
maternal employment rates, instead, differ both within and between Euro-
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pean countries. In most northern European countries, childless women and
mothers participate to the labor market roughly to the same extent. In Swe-
den, for example, the female employment rate is of 80%, while the maternal
employment rate is around 82%. The figures for Denmark are 79% and 76%
respectively: slightly lower, but still similar between them. In southern Eu-
ropean states, the situation is quite different. Beyond the very low overall
female labor force participation rates, mothers participate much less to the
labor market compared to childless women. In Italy, 61% of non-mothers
are in the work force, compared to 50% of mothers. The figures of another
southern European country, Greece, are around 64% and 52%1.
Further, the extent to which age and number of children ‘interfere’ with
working plans depends heavily on country context. European Labor Force
Survey (2008/09) data show that employment is higher for women who have
a child between three and five years old compared to those who have a child
age zero to three (OECD average: 62% and 51%). The overall average,
however, masks important country differences, as the figures for Sweden are
of 81% and 72% respectively but are both around 51% in Italy. The number
of children is also associated with reduced labor force participation for women
but with varying degrees of intensity between countries: while women who
have three or more children participate in the labor market by 15 percentage
points less than mothers of only one child in the Netherlands (from 65% to
80%), in Italy the figure is doubled (from 31% to 60%).
The extent to which mothers can combine work and responsibility for
children is important for a number of reasons. Mothers’ employment is es-
sential not only to guarantee their own economic independence, but also to
sustain their family: dual earner households are in fact found to be more
protected against the risks of poverty (Barbieri et al. 2012). Furthermore,
women and also mothers are an important part of the workforce and their
participation in the labor market – especially in the service sector – has be-
come essential for the economy. For what concerns reproductive choices, the
problem is twofold: on one hand, women appear to have less children than
they wish (World Value Survey, as in D’Addio and D’Ercole 2005). On the
other hand, in many western countries the fertility rates are close to or below
the substitution rate: if this trend is to continue, future labor supply is at
risk (McDonald and Moyle 2010).
The relationship between working and having children and the ‘causal
1European Labor Force Survey, 2008/09.
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direction’ of said relationship has been vastly studied (among others: Stycos
and Weller (1967), Kamerman and Kahn (1991), Sundstrom and Stafford
(1991), Bernhardt (1993), Rindfuss et al. (1996), Bettio (1998), Rindfuss et al.
(2003)). There is also a vast literature regarding what individual, household
and contextual characteristics can influence the two separate decisions of
working and having an additional child (Blood and Wolfe 1960, Michael
1974, Duncan 1976, Houseknecht 1987, Lesthaeghe and Johan 1988, Becker
1991, Shelton and John 1996, Myers 1997, Shavit and Mu¨ller 1998, Klijzing
2000, Gustafsson 2001, Traeen et al. 2002, Brines 1993, Presser 2005, Baizan
and Martin-Garcia 2006, Bratti and Tatsiramos 2008, McQuillan et al. 2008,
Martin-Garcia 2009).
Although far from reaching any definitive answer (Mason 1974, Ni Bhrolchain
1980, Cramer 1980, Sweet 1981), it has been suggested that female labor force
participation and participation plans may inhibit fertility over the long run
(Waite and Stolzenberg 1976, Hout 1978, Smith-Lovin and Tickamyer 1978),
while fertility may influence labor force participation in the short run, as
employed women exit and re-enter the labor market according to their fam-
ily status (among others: Ellingsæer and Rønsen (1996), Rosenfeld (1996),
Rindfuss et al. (1999)).
In this chapter of the dissertation, instead, I explicitly tap the inter-
relatedness of work and parenthood. In other words, I consider to what
extent women and men participate or not in the labor market, and have or
do not have children. In this way, I aim at tapping gender differences in the
behavior of women and men, mothers and fathers, in the first life-domain I
consider, i.e. paid work.
Secondly, I investigate if and how personal and household characteristics
affect the chances of working and having two or more children, in inter-
national comparison. To achieve this, having reviewed what are the most
important characteristics found in the literature predicting labor force par-
ticipation or childbearing, I test whether and how they account for the joint
decision of working and at the same time having children. I do so by run-
ning multinomial logistic models where the outcomes represent a number of
combinations of work and parenthood.
The main advantage of modeling working and having children jointly
lies in not having to make any assumptions about the casual ordering of the
decision. The causal relation between work and parenthood has been studied
extensively in previous research, as I have mentioned above, and requires a
longitudinal approach to be properly addressed. Here, instead, the aim is to
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look a posteriori at households with and without children and examine what
characteristics are associated with partners and/or parents being in paid
work or not. This can be very useful in the light of the large cross-national
differences in women and mothers’s participation in the work force.
In other words, the question I ask is: why are fathers (almost) always
employed all around Europe and why are mothers so often not employed?
I attempt to answer by breaking the question in two sub-questions: 1) Are
there baseline differences between countries that are determined by contex-
tual features (e.g. culture, welfare state provision, labor market characteris-
tics) that all women and men are subject to, regardless their individual and
household characteristics? 2) Are there individual and household character-
istics that enable women to work and have children regardless of contextual
features? If so, which are they?
As I will show in the results, the advantage of the joint approach is that
it gives an idea of how different individual and household traits are related
to work and parenthood combinations. As tables 3.1 and 3.2 show, we can
think of work and parenthood as different states in which an individual is at
a certain point of her life course. Each state can be associated with certain
individual and household characteristics. The most obvious example is ed-
ucation: being highly educated is strongly associated with being employed.
However, being highly educated is also negatively associated with having
children, in particular with having many children. The advantage of the
joint model is that is gives us some hints on what is the association between
a certain characteristic, in this case education, and the joint state.
Table 3.1 – Alternative state framework - Women
In Being a Joint state: being a parent in
employment parent employment
Education + − / Null +
Highly educated + + +
partnership
Partner’s − + / − Non-Linear
earned income
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Table 3.2 – Alternative state framework - Men
In Being a Joint state: being a parent in
employment parent employment
Education + − / Null Null
Highly educated Null + Null
partnership
Partner’s Null + / − Non-Linear
earned income
Thus, the hypotheses have been formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 1a: For women, being highly educated is expected to be pos-
itively associated with the probability of being employed and having
children.
Hypothesis 1b: No association between education, employment and par-
enthood is expected for men.
Hypothesis 2a: For women, being part of a highly educated homogamous
couple is associated with higher chances of being employed and having
children.
Hypothesis 2b: No association between relative education and employment-
fatherhood combination is expected for men.
Hypothesis 3a: For women, the probability of being employed with two or
more children is expected to be highest at medium rather than high or
low levels of the partner’s relative earned income.
Hypothesis 3b: Men whose partners have higher earned income are less
likely to be employed and have a high number of children.
Hypothesis 4: In countries belonging to the social-democratic welfare regime,
institutional characteristics are expected to mediate the impact of indi-
vidual characteristics for both women and men. In countries belonging
to the liberal and conservative welfare regime, instead, individual and
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household characteristics are likely to have a stronger association with
the outcome for both women and men.
The analyses are performed using EU-SILC 2005 and 2007 data. I se-
lect women and men who are married or cohabitating residing respectively
in Germany, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom. I do not explore di-
rectly the macro-level traits that might be associated with the outcome, but
the comparison of countries with different welfare arrangements should shed
some additional light on whether institutional characteristics can facilitate
the combination of work and parenthood. Furthermore, the international
comparison allows investigating if countries have a moderating effect on the
relationship between the outcome and the individual and household level
characteristics.
3.2 Data, sample and measures
3.2.1 Dependent variable
To capture the association between individual and household traits and
the joint state of working and having children, I build a dependent variable
that includes different combinations of paid work and presence of children.
The variable from which working status is derived goes by the name of “Self-
defined current economic status”. All women and men who report being in
some form of employment (employees and self employed) are coded as being
in paid work. All the remaining (i.e. women on full-time parental leave2,
the unemployed, the housewives, full-time students etc.) are coded as being
out of paid work. Parenthood is operationalized through the presence and
number of children in the household.
2Unfortunately the variable does not distinguish women who are in maternity leave or
full time parental leave from the rest. In the EU-SILC data, in fact, women on maternity
leave are coded as being in paid work while women on full time parental leave are coded
as out of paid work. Although I would have welcomed more detailed information on these
mothers’ working status, I do not believe the results to be affected. In fact, maternity
leaves in many European countries tend to be short, concentrated around childbirth and
very often are paid at a very high replacement rate. Additionally, these women can be
assimilated to the employed because de facto they are or they would not be entitled to
maternity leave. On the contrary, full-time parental leave can be much longer and is
generally not paid, which is why these women are considered out of employment.
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I distinguish between five outcomes3:
• Working and having two or more children
• Working and having one child
• Not working and having two or more children
• Not working and having one child
• Working and having no children
I set the threshold to two children because a) given the replacement rate
of 2.1 children per couple, having two children can be seen as having suc-
cessfully reproduced and b) the desired number of children still seems to be
(at least) around 2 (D’Addio and D’Ercole 2005). Distinguishing between
multiple child statuses rather than focusing on the dichotomy having vs. not
having children can give us some additional insights on the work-parenthood
interrelation. Studying mothers who have any number of children, in fact,
can be of little use in countries where the number of childless women at the
end of their fertile years is rather low, but where the number of single chil-
dren is getting higher. The problem in fact may lie not in having one child,
but in having two or more, since taking care of more than one child requires
more time and effort. This could have both an immediate effect in changing
women’s labor force participation plans, but it may also have a long lasting
legacy in reducing a mother’s employability. In other words, distinguishing
between multiple-child statuses could show us if there is a threshold effect in
the work-motherhood relation in different institutional settings.
3.2.2 Independent variables
The models I run include a number of variables4 that allow verifying the
hypotheses formulated in section 1.3. In a first set of models I include: age,
3The residual category, i.e. not working and not having children, was excluded because
of a small number of cases (3.25% of the sample in Germany, 3.26% in Italy, 4.99% in
Norway and 2.51% in the UK) and because these individuals are not of immediate and
substantive interest. Arguably, the non-employed father category has few cases as well, as
shown in table 3.4. However, the substantive interest in the comparison between women
in men justifies keeping the five categories, a choice that is further validated by the Small-
Hsiao IIA tests reported in the Appendix.
4Unfortunately, the EU-SILC file lacks a number of variables that could be used as
additional controls, such as use of child care, presence of grandparents or other means to
alleviate the incompatibility between work and motherhood. The data also lack informa-
tion on individual values such as religiosity or the importance of work in one’s life.
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age squared, marital status (cohabitating vs. married) and education of the
respondent (lower education - reference category, medium education, higher
education), educational level of the partner (lower education - reference cat-
egory, medium education, higher education5), year of the survey.
I also include two measures of economic resources. The first is built us-
ing the partner’s labor and transfer income6 and is a four category variable
indicating the partner’s position relative to the country’s income distribu-
tion expressed in quartiles. The ratio, therefore, is to verify the association
between the probability a women has of, for example, being employed and
having two children, and her partner’s labor earnings and transfers. The
second measure instead captures the household’s relative level of non-earned
income7.
In a second set of models I include a relative education variable which
accounts for five possible combinations of educational attainment of the part-
ners: both partners are low educated (reference category), both partners are
5The education variable used in this chapter, for both individuals and their partners,
has been recoded from the original ISCED code as follows: pre-primary education (ISCED
0), primary education (ISCED 1) and lower secondary education (ISCED 2) have been
recoded as low levels of education; (upper) secondary education (ISCED 3) and post-
secondary non tertiary education (ISCED 4) are recoded as medium levels of education
while first stage of tertiary education (not leading directly to an advanced research qualifi-
cation, ISCED 5) and second stage of tertiary education (leading to an advanced research
qualification, ISCED 6) is coded as high level of education.
6As detailed in the EU-SILC manual I built personal income by summing: employee
cash or near cash income (PY010G/N); non-cash employee income (PY020G/N); em-
ployers’ social insurance contributions (PY030G/N); cash benefits or losses from self-
employment (including royalties)(PY050G/N); value of goods produced for own consump-
tion (PY070G/N); unemployment benefits (PY090G/N); old-age benefits (PY100G/N);
survivor’ benefits (PY110G/N), sickness benefits (PY120G/N); disability benefits
(PY130G/N) and education-related allowances (PY140G/N).
7Income components at the household level are: imputed rent (HY030G/N); income
from rental of a property or land (HY040G/N); social exclusion not elsewhere classified
(HY060G/N); housing allowances (HY070G/N); regular inter-household cash transfers
received (HY080G/N); interests, dividends, profit from capital investments in unincor-
porated business (HY090G/N); income received by people aged under 16 (HY110G/N)
minus employer’s social insurance contributions (PY030G/N); interest paid on mortgage
(HY100G/N); regular taxes on wealth (HY120G/N); regular inter-household cash trans-
fer paid (HY130G/N); tax on income and social insurance contributions (HY140G/N). I
exclude family/children related allowances (HY050G) from the computation to eliminate
the endogeneity that would arise from having presence of children on the left hand side
of the equation and family allowances on the right side (a similar approach is found in
Del Boca et al. (2009)).
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medium educated; both partners are high educated; the respondent is less
educated than the partner, and the respondent is more educated than the
partner. This variable is a semi-compound measure of relative education
which has been found to be more reliable and less ambiguous than differ-
ence measures (Eeckhaut et al. 2011). Descriptive statistics by country and
gender, weighted using the personal base weight provided in the EU-SILC
database, and sample sizes are reported in tables8 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.
3.2.3 Method and sample
I apply multinomial logistic models, as introduced in section 2.1, to a sam-
ple of respondents from the EU-SILC 2005 and 2007 database. My sample
is restricted to household where the oldest child, if present, is younger than
18, thus excluding households with older children. I select couples based on
the age of the female partner that cannot exceed 45 years of age. This leads
to rather large sample sizes in all four countries: 5517 couples in Germany;
9001 in Italy; 2984 in Norway, and 3931 couples in the UK.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics
As can be seen from figure 3.1, there seems to be a certain degree of
country variability in the distribution of work and parenthood combinations.
Norway displays the greatest amount of women who work and have two or
more children (55%), followed by the UK with 36%, Germany with 32% and
Italy with only 27%. There are less cross-country differences, instead, in
the percentage of working mothers of single children, with the lowest figure
being 13% in Norway and the highest 18% in Italy. Italian women instead
appear to be the most likely to be out of paid work and mothers of two or
8The amount of missing data is minimal. The variable with the highest percentage of
missing is education, with 3.77% of missing values. Thus, no imputation treatment was
necessary. However, one of the income components variables (i.e. value of goods produced
for own consumption) presented a large number of missing values in the 2005 wave, i.e.
about 50%. The response to this variable in fact was rendered compulsory only in 2007.
Given that the values are on average very low in all countries in 2007, the missing values in
2005 are set to zero, as it is plausible that respondents did not report this amount because
it was very low rather than very high.
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more children (28%), followed by Germany (25%), the UK (17%) and Norway
(12%). Perhaps reflecting the low fertility rates of the country, Italy also has
the highest percentage of non employed mothers of single children (13%).
The UK, instead, is the country with the highest rate of childless working
women (24%).
The situation for men presents less cross-national variation. Working
and having two or more children is the most common combination. Norway
has the highest percentage, with 64% of men in this category, followed by
Germany (54%), Italy (50%) and the UK (49%). Italy instead has the largest
proportion of men working and having one child (29%), reflecting once again
the low fertility rates of the country. It is followed by Germany (23%), the
UK (20%) and Norway (16%). In all four countries, only around 5% of men
are non working fathers, while being a childless worker is most common in
the UK (24%), followed by Norway (15%), Italy and Germany (14% and 15%
respectively).
The within-country gender differences are more clearly displayed in figure
3.1, that shows the distributions of work and parenthood in each country.
The largest difference9 between genders emerges in the first category, i.e.
working and having two or more children. In all countries, men are more
likely than women to be in this group, although the gender difference is
smallest in Norway, reflecting the higher maternal labor force participation
rates of this Scandinavian country. To the contrary, the larger gender differ-
ence that emerges in this category in Germany and Italy is consistent with
the up-keeping of the traditional family and its division of labor. This is also
reflected in the fact that in these two countries, women are much more likely
than men to be non working parents.
To get a more accurate description of the relation between individual
characteristics, country of residence and outcome, in the following section I
discuss the results of the multinomial logistic regression models.
3.3.2 Multivariate analyses
To investigate how personal and household characteristics favor one out-
come over the other in different contexts, the results from a number of multi-
9Differences between genders in the outcome have been tested using paired t-tests. Gen-
der differences within countries are statistically significant (p<0.001) in all comparisons
with the exception of being childless workers, where there is no statistically significant
difference between genders.
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Table 3.3 – Descriptive statistics - Women
DE IT NO UK
Dependent variable
Working, two or more children .327 .271 .554 .367
Working, one child .168 .187 .139 .161
Not working, two or more children .258 .277 .119 .173
Not working, one child .095 .127 .0335 .0605
Working childless .152 .138 .154 .239
Mean age in years 37.2 36.8 35.8 35.3
In employment % .64 .59 .84 .76
Own level of education %
Low ed. .0576 .372 .102 .0778
Medium ed. .587 .49 .484 .561
High ed. .355 .138 .414 .361
Partner’s level of education %
Partner low ed. .0576 .428 .102 .099
Partner medium ed. .493 .451 .556 .56
Partner high ed. .466 .121 .342 .341
Partner’s earned income level %
<25 .225 .238 .194 .232
25-50 .259 .252 .26 .262
50-75 .256 .254 .274 .256
>75 .26 .256 .273 .249
N 5517 9001 2984 3931
Descriptives are weighted using the proposed personal base weight.
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Table 3.4 – Descriptive statistics - Men
DE IT NO UK
Dependent variable
Working, two or more children .545 .504 .645 .498
Working, one child .236 .293 .165 .204
Not working, two or more children .0399 .0443 .0275 .0425
Not working, one child .0274 .0208 .00771 .017
Working childless .152 .138 .154 .239
In employment .93 .93 .96 .94
Mean age in years 40.3 40.3 38.7 38
Own level of education %
Low ed. .0415 .428 .102 .099
Medium ed. .493 .451 .556 .56
High ed. .466 .121 .342 .341
Partner’s level of education %
Partner low ed. .0576 .372 .102 .0778
Partner medium ed. .587 .49 .484 .561
Partner high ed. .355 .138 .414 .361
Partner’s earned income level %
<25 .247 .272 .2 .23
25-50 .248 .215 .253 .247
50-75 .255 .255 .273 .262
>75 .25 .259 .274 .261
N 5517 9001 2984 3931
Descriptives are weighted using the proposed personal base weight.
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Table 3.5 – Descriptive statistics - couple
DE IT NO UK
Married % .886 .933 .722 .746
Relative education of the partners %
Both low ed. .0145 .251 .0211 .0379
Both medium ed. .347 .278 .327 .396
Both high ed. .237 .0622 .236 .216
Woman higher ed. .14 .239 .241 .193
Man higher ed. .262 .17 .175 .156
Household income level %
<25 .26 .65 .277 .258
25-50 .256 .117 .278 .26
50-75 .252 .118 .26 .244
>75 .232 .115 .184 .239
Number of children in the household
No children .15 .13 .15 .23
One child .26 .31 .17 .22
Two or more .58 .54 .67 .54
2005 (%) .499 .528 .536 .531
N 5517 9001 2984 3931
Descriptives are weighted using
the proposed personal base weight.
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Figure 3.1 – Gender differences in the distribution of work and parenthood
combinations in four countries - Mean values
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nomial regression models are reported in tables from A.3 to A.1010 in the
appendix. To grasp a better understanding of the results, I calculate and re-
port predicted probabilities for three outcomes, which are, for women: being
employed and having two or more children; not being employed and hav-
ing two or more children; being employed without children. I choose these
types as they represent three ideal-types of women: the working-mother, the
mother, and the worker. I apply the same principle to men and report the
probabilities of being employed and having two or more children; not being
employed and having two or more children; being employed without children.
In figures 3.2, 3.4 and 3.6 I plot the predicted probabilities for women in each
country conditional on level of education, partners’ relative level of education
and partner’s level of earned income. Figures 3.3, 3.5, 3.7 instead report the
predicted probabilities for men conditional on level of education, partners’
relative level of education and partner’s level of earned income. In all cases,
the predicted probabilities are calculated holding the other variables in the
models to their sample means. Thus, for example, the predicted probabilities
in figure 3.2 are adjusted for age and age squared, marital status, household
wealth, partner’s earned income, partner’s level of education and year of the
survey.
Education
As can be seen from the panels of figure 3.2, for women education is pos-
itively associated with working and having two or more children. In all four
countries, in fact, medium and higher educated women have a higher chance
of working and having two or more children than low educated ones. Fur-
thermore being highly educated is positively associated with being a childless
worker in all countries, although the association is strongest in Italy. The
result in this country could be driven by the prolonged stay in education first
and the search for a stable working position afterwards, leading to a larger
share of working childless women who are delaying the entry in parenthood.
Lower educated women, instead, have a higher chance of being non-working
mothers of two children. Again, the relation is strongest in Italy, where the
difference between a low and a high educated mother reaches almost 30 per-
centage points, followed but Germany and the UK, where the difference is
around 20 percentage points.
10Tests for the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption were performed
for each model. Results for the tests are reported in the appendix.
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In all countries, thus, being better educated protects from being out of
the labor market, and does not enhance the probability of having children.
As hypothesized, however, in Norway the impact of education on the various
outcomes is the smallest, suggesting that the importance of the individual
trait is mediated by the equalizing effect of the contextual characteristics.
Here in fact, the vast majority of women are working mothers of two or
more children, and education is only slightly related to the outcome. The
probabilities of working without children are low throughout the educational
spectrum while the probabilities of being non-working mothers of two chil-
dren are the lowest of all countries and are slightly more reduced for higher
educated women.
As can be seen in figure 3.3, education is not associated with differences
in men’s outcome. Different levels of education do not alter the probability
of working with two or more children, that is the most common outcome
in all four countries. Neither being a non working father nor being working
without children are associated with educational attainment.
Before moving to other individual traits, it is important to point out that
in Germany, Italy and the UK, education has a stronger association with
women’s outcomes than with men’s. The association, instead, is rather weak
for both genders in Norway. This could imply that the smaller overall gender
differences in the probability of experiencing a specific outcome found in
Norway can be attributed to the greater efficacy of the institutional features
in mediating the association between individual traits and outcome.
Relative education of the partners
How is the educational level of the partner related to the probability of
experiencing each outcome? Better bargaining skills and more egalitarian
gender attitudes that come with higher education would suggest that women
in highly educated partnerships are better equipped to be working mothers
of two or more children. Further, partners with equal levels of education
are likely to share similar preferences and have higher levels of reciprocal
understanding. Thus, do highly educated women have higher chances of
being working mothers of two children when their partners are also highly
educated? Figure 3.4 reports the predicted probabilities for women by the
couple’s relative level of education.
There are a few points to dwell upon. The first is that, as in the case
of education, in Norway the association between the individual trait and the
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Figure 3.2 – Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for three
outcomes by education – Women
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Figure 3.3 – Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for three
outcomes by education – Men
Working, Two Kids Not Working, Two Kids Working, No Kids
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outcome is smaller compared to the other countries, confirming the equalizing
effect of the Scandinavian country. Furthermore, in all countries, women in
couples where both members are highly educated do not have significantly
higher chances of working and having two or more children than women in
other types of couples, with the exception of Italy.
For this outcome in particular, highly educated couples and couples where
the woman is hypergamous do differ significantly in any of the four countries.
Thus, regardless of the context, it is the woman’s level of education rather
than the combination of the partners’ education, that matters most. How-
ever, in all four countries, women in highly educated partnerships are much
more likely to experience this outcome rather than being non working moth-
ers or childless workers.
As for men, in all four countries, relative education of the partners does
not imply major differences in the probability of experiencing a specific out-
come. This suggests that, as in the case of education, the contextual char-
acteristics have an equalizing effect and weaken the association between in-
dividual characteristics and the outcome.
Labor income and transfers
Finally, what is the relation between earned income of the partner and
work-parenthood combinations? Results for women are reported in figure
3.6. The first point to be made is that in all four countries there is an
association between the earned income of the male partner and the woman’s
work-motherhood outcome. Even in the social democracy, the economic well
being of the household is related to the work-motherhood combination.
Three trends emerge by eyeballing figure 3.6. First, the probability of
working without having children is negatively associated with the male part-
ner’s earned income: women are more likely to be working childless at lower
rather than at higher levels of their partner’s economic resources. Second,
the higher the partner’s earned income, the higher the probability of having
two or more children and not working. Third, the probability of working and
having two or more children is rather flat across the partner’s earned income
distribution, with the exception of the UK where the probabilities of working
and having two or more children are higher at the center of the distribution.
The way the different combinations of work and motherhood are placed
along the partner’s income distribution meshes well with three arguments of
economic theory: the cost of children, the value of the additional wage, and
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Figure 3.4 – Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for three
outcomes by relative education - Women
Working, Two Kids Not Working, Two Kids Working, No Kids
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Figure 3.5 – Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for three
outcomes by relative education - Men
Working, Two Kids Not Working, Two Kids Working, No Kids
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the opportunity costs of working and having children.
If the partner has low levels of earned income, in fact, the economic
requirements for having children may not be met, while the value of having
an additional earned income (i.e. of the woman being in paid labor) is greater.
Additionally, the opportunity costs for having children are higher for working
women. Thus, it is not surprising that the probability of working without
children is highest at lower levels of the partner’s earned income in all four
countries. At higher levels of the partner’s earned income, instead, the value
of having an additional earner is lower, the cost of children can be easily faced
and the needs of care can be addressed by the non working mothers. Hence,
the higher chances of being a non working mother of two children at the
highest levels of the partner’s income. These results entail large inequalities
in the work-motherhood relation: in fact, not only being a ‘stay-at-home-
mom’ depends largely on the partner’s position in the income distribution;
also, the high probability of being working childless in the lower part of the
distribution suggests that the partner’s earned income can impose a strong
restriction on work and childbearing decisions.
Above the general story, there are some country specificities. The first
is that in Norway, whatever the position of the partner in the income dis-
tribution, the most probable outcome is working and having two or more
children. In Germany, instead, at higher levels of the partner’s income the
most probable outcome is not working and having two or more children. In
Italy and in the UK, by contrast, at the highest level of the partner’s earned
income women are just as likely to be working with two or more children or
to be not working with two or more children.
Figure 3.7 shows the results for men. The individual trait seems to make
a larger difference for men than for women. In all countries, the probability of
working and having two or more children is lower at higher levels of women’s
earned income, while the probability of working without children is higher at
higher levels of women’s earned income. The magnitude of these associations
is stronger in Germany and the UK, and weaker in Italy and Norway. The
probability of not working and having children, however, is very low in all
countries, and does not change with the woman’s earned income.
It is noteworthy that, at high levels of the partner’s earned income, there
is an inversion of tendency between the probabilities of working and having
children and of working and not having children. This issue will be addressed
with more detail in the conclusion of the chapter, but I want to stress how
this clearly points to the fact that the opportunity costs for women (i.e. the
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Figure 3.6 – Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for three
outcomes by quartiles of the male partner’s earned income – Women
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Figure 3.7 – Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for three
outcomes by quartiles of the female partner’s earned income – Men
Working, Two Kids Not Working, Two Kids Working, No Kids
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female partner) to have children is strongly conditional on their own earned
income. That is, at higher levels of their partner’s income, men are less
likely to have children. This may happen because their high-income partners
choose to not have children.
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3.4 Discussion
In this chapter I have investigated to what extent women and men com-
bine work and parenthood in four European countries – Germany, Italy,
Norway, and the United Kingdom – and I have analyzed how individual and
household characteristics are related to different combinations of work status
and parenthood status for both women and men.
As far as gender differences in work-parenthood combinations are con-
cerned, my results show that albeit not to the same extent in all countries,
being a working parent of two children is a fairly common combination for
both women and men. Thus, work and motherhood – though not compatible
as work and fatherhood – are less incompatible than could be expected. In all
countries, however, individual characteristics seem to be more consequential
to the outcome for women than for men. Recall that, for example, better
educated women are more likely to be working and having two or more chil-
dren compared to less educated ones, and, in general, they are more likely
to be in paid work, regardless of the presence of children. The educational
level of the male partner, instead, does not appear to be consequential to
women’s outcome. Furthermore, the female partner’s earned income is much
more consequential to men’s outcome than the opposite; in other words, men
are less likely to be fathers of two or more children when their partner has
a high level of earned income, indicating that these women are less likely to
have children in the household. To the contrary, women’s probabilities of
having children – in particular if they are not employed – are higher when
their partner earns a high amount.
This brings support to the idea that women are still the main providers
of care in the European context and that their (in)availability to look after
children conditional on their working status can be negatively related to the
household’s reproductive choices.
As I have remarked at the beginning of this section, work and moth-
erhood are less incompatible than could be expected. There are, however,
large country differences in the degree of (in)compatibility between work and
motherhood, supporting the notion that contextual traits, which in these
analyses are accounted for by comparing countries belonging to different
welfare regimes, are related to the possibility of combining work and mother-
hood. In particular, the results have highlighted that women and men differ
less in their chances of working and having children in Norway, the social
democratic country. Most importantly, the association between individual
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characteristics and the outcome is much weaker for both women and men
in Norway than in any other country. For example, while men coupled to
women with very high earnings could be expected to have higher chances of
being childless – because of the greater opportunity costs faced by women
with high earnings in having children – the association between women’s
earned income and the man’s probability of experiencing a specific outcome
is weakest in the northern European country.
A possible, but certainly not the only, interpretation of this finding lies
in the nature of the social-democratic welfare state. In particular, policies
aiming at full-employment, availability of child care services and the efforts
to involve fathers in homemaking tasks – all of which are present in social-
democratic countries although not included in the present analysis – may
be important elements in determining mothers’ involvement in paid work.
These interventions, in fact, have two equalizing effects: on the one hand,
they reduce class inequalities by providing universalistic services that all in-
dividuals can benefit from; on the other hand, they reduce gender differences
by promoting female labor force participation and by encouraging men’s role
in the home. As a result, individual characteristics are less consequential to
the outcome and there is more equality in work and parenthood behavior
between women and men.
Following the same line of reasoning, if Norway emerges as the most gen-
der equal state in this analysis, the liberal welfare state, here represented by
the UK, is the next in line. In fact, its residual nature yields a similar –
though not as equalizing – result. Said otherwise, all individuals, regardless
of gender and parenthood, are encouraged to be in paid work. This happens
because the market, and not the state, is the primary source of welfare. It
follows that women and men, mothers and fathers, in principle, should not
differ much in their working effort. The results support this idea, as women
and men are not too different in their chances of working and being parents in
this country. However, the equalizing effect stops here: individual character-
istics, such as education and household income, are very strongly associated
with the outcome. This entails the presence of large class differences that
are particularly acute for women, but that are not absent for men either.
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Table 3.6 – Summary: equalization in the outcome by gender and class in
each country
Equality in outcome by:
Gender Other individual
& household traits
Norway YES YES
UK YES NO
Italy NO Only for men
Germany NO Only for men
The behavior of women and men in the southern and continental coun-
tries, instead, could reflect the intention of these welfare states to maintain
the traditional division of labor within families, as mothers in Germany and
Italy are definitely not as likely as fathers to be in paid work. To this, we
must add that women’s individual characteristics matter more than men’s
in shaping their outcome. Thus, Germany and Italy would seem to be the
countries where within household gender inequality in work and parenthood
peaks. First of all, because women and men have very different probabilities
of being in paid work and having children; and second of all, because men’s
probabilities are higher regardless of individual and household characteris-
tics, while women’s chances of being working and having children strongly
depend on their educational level and on their partner’s level of earned in-
come, especially in the case of Germany.
I summarize my interpretation of the findings in table 3.6. Since I do
not include macro-level indicators of welfare states, many factors above and
beyond the welfare state can be called upon to interpret the results. Us-
ing Esping-Andersen’s framework, however, I believe it is plausible that the
greater equality in gender roles is achieved via a greater general equalizing
effort of the social-democratic welfare state. In other words, as this regime
fosters equality between people at the highest levels, it may also foster gender
equality.
The liberal welfare state, by not intervening towards equality in general,
results in a partial equalization of gender roles at the lowest standards, so
to speak, as it goes hand in hand with strong inequalities on other indi-
vidual and household traits. Said differently, men and women have similar
chances of reaching the outcome, but they are both hindered (or favored)
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by their personal characteristics. In the continental and southern European
welfare states, instead, not only men have much higher chances than women
of reaching a certain outcome, but they are also not affected by their per-
sonal characteristics. Thus, these welfare states operate in a targeted way
by giving equal opportunities to all men to work and have children, while
conditioning the outcome on personal characteristics in the case of women.
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4Chapter Four
Presence of children and the relative
time on domestic chores
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter brought support to the notion that in most contexts
mothers are less likely than fathers to be in paid work, regardless of indi-
vidual and household characteristics. It also showed that the institutional
setting can have important repercussions on the level of intra-household gen-
der equality. The object of this chapter, instead, is partners’ relative contri-
bution to unpaid work, in particular among parents, in different European
countries.
It is widely recognized that housework is still a ‘woman’s thing’. Al-
though studies for several western countries have shown that, over the last
60 years, women have reduced the time they devote to domestic chores, men
have increased it, and the gender gap in housework has become narrower
(Gershuny 2000, Hook 2010, Sayer 2010), women still perform the majority
of domestic work. Furthermore, the gender gap for women with children is
even larger: several longitudinal studies have in fact shown that the birth of
a child leads parents to shift into a more unequal allocation of time to chores.
As individualization processes advance in contemporary societies, the per-
sistence of the unequal division of housework between partners is puzzling
(Rohler and Huinink 2010). Nonetheless, scholars have argued that the al-
location of household tasks has been studied for too short a period of time
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to expect revolutionary changes, and that eventually the unequal division of
chores will become something of the past (Sullivan 2011).
The division of domestic chores between partners has been the object
of much comparative research (among many others: Geist (2005), Breen
and Cooke (2005), Treas and Drobnicˇ (2010), Bu¨hlmann et al. (2010), Hook
(2010), Lippe et al. (2011)). Many authors have focused on how much time
women and men spend on housework (see Hook (2006, 2010), Lippe et al.
(2011)) and on the gender specialization in domestic chores (see for example
Batalova and Cohen (2002), Yodanis (2005), Tai and Treas (2012)). Other
scholars have concentrated on the amount of time spent on domestic chores
within couples by comparing those few countries for which the appropri-
ate comparable data are collected at the national level (e.g. Evertsson and
Nermo (2004), Lewin-Epstein et al. (2006)). A smaller number of articles
has researched the relative time on housework each partner performs across
a large number of countries (Fuwa and Cohen 2007, Knudsen and Waerness
2008, Voicu et al. 2009).
With this chapter I contribute to the latter line of research, which has
already provided important results, and update it using the recently released
European Social Survey Round 5 (2010). In this wave of the survey, infor-
mation on the amount of time both partners dedicated to domestic chores is
collected, allowing to build a measure of relative time on housework.
The objective of the contribution is, therefore, to study if and to what
extent partners share the burden of domestic chores in different contexts, and
in particular whether there are differences between the amount of relative
time women and men spend on housework given the presence of children in
different institutional settings.
4.2 Data, sample and measures
For the purpose of this analysis, I use data from the fifth wave of the
European Social Survey (2010, ESS hereafter). The ESS is a biennial survey
that involves over 30 nations and has been carried out since 2002/2003. Its
core questionnaire aims at capturing Europeans’ attitudes and values on a
vast number of topics. In each survey, the core questionnaire is integrated
with a different rotating module. The fifth wave rotating module is titled:
“Family, Work and Well-Being”, and is an improved repetition of the second
wave rotating module. In this wave of the survey, the respondents were asked
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to report how much time they spend on housework and how much time their
partner spends on housework, thus allowing me to build a measure of relative
time on housework. Two limitations are to be highlighted. First, there has
been some evidence that time use reported through direct questions – as op-
posed to data collected through diaries – tends to be biased: respondents over
estimate the time devoted to frequent activities and underestimate the time
devoted to infrequent ones (Juster and Stafford 1991, Marini and Shelton
1993, Niemi 1993). A second problem is that the partner is not interviewed,
and the respondent is asked to report how much time the partner spends on
housework. Previous cross-national studies have used these measures of time,
problematic as they may be (e.g. Knudsen and Waerness (2008)). Conscious
of these limitations, I interpret the findings as a result of the individuals’
perception of time used, rather than actual time used, by their partners and
themselves. This limitation gives the opportunity of exploring a further is-
sue: whether there are relevant gender differences in the reports of one’s own
and one’s partner’s use of time.
As far as the sample is concerned, I select individuals who are between
20 and 65 years old, living with a partner, and residing in: Belgium (BE),
Bulgaria (BG), Switzerland (CH), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Ger-
many (DE), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France
(FR), Great Britain (GB), Greece (GR), Croatia (HR), Hungary (HU), Ire-
land (IE), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT),
Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK).
I run the models separately for men (N 8658) and women (N 9998) as
the literature has shown that there are very large gender differences in the
time allocated to domestic chores, both in absolute and in relative terms.
Running models separately allows me to immediately see, firstly, if genders
differ in their account of housework, and secondly whether individual and
household level traits are associated differently with the share of housework
women and men report.
4.2.1 Dependent variable
In the ESS questionnaire, housework is defined as ‘things done around the
home such as cooking, washing, cleaning, care of clothes, shopping, mainte-
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nance of property, but not including child care1 or leisure activities’ and is
measured in hours per week2. The respondent is asked to report how much
time she/he spends on housework every week and how much time her/his
partner spends on housework every week. As noted in the introduction, the
limitation of this measure lies in the fact that only one household member is
interviewed and reports the time for himself/herself as well as for the partner.
As a robustness check, I compared, within each country, the mean values for
the absolute time women and men report spending on housework per week
with the mean values for the absolute time women and men report their
partners spend on housework. Results are reported in figures 4.1 and 4.2.
As can be seen, with the exception of men reporting how much time their
partners spend on housework in Portugal, the reported time of the partner
and own reported time appear rather consistent in all countries3.
1The ESS housework measure excludes child care time and with very good reason.
Unfortunately, the data do not include a separate measure for child care. Hopefully
this will be remedied in future waves, but for the time being relative child care time in
comparative perspective cannot be studied using ESS data.
2The variable is top-coded to 84 hours per week.
3As an additional control, figures from B.2 to B.7 in the appendix, instead, show the
distribution of the absolute time on housework as reported by women and men vs. the
absolute time on housework spent by men as reported by women and the absolute time
on housework spent by women according to men’s reports.
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Figure 4.1 – Men’s average own time on housework vs. women’s reports of
their partner’s time on housework
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Figure 4.2 – Women’s average own time on housework vs. men’s reports of
their partner’s time on housework
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To capture the relative amount of time each partner spends on housework,
similarly to Knudsen and Waerness (2008), I build a dependent variable that
measures the amount of time the respondent reports spending on domestic
chores relative to the total reported time partners spend on such activities
per week. The dependent variable ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 stands for
the partner doing all the housework, and 1 stands for the respondent doing
all the housework. In some applications found in previous literature, the
dependent variable is gender specific: for instance, Fuwa and Cohen (2007)
code 1 when the wife does all the housework, and -1 when the husband does
all the housework. In my case, the variable is gender neutral because I run
models separately for women and men.
4.2.2 Independent variables
As the dependent variable involves activities of two household members, I
include a set of household-level predictors along with a number of individual-
level covariates. The baseline model includes age (centered at the grand
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mean), marital status (married vs. not legally married), number of house-
hold members, and total time spent on housework by the partners. This
variable controls for the fact that the amount of housework may influence
the allocation of time to chores between partners.
Presence of children in the household is used to verify my first hypothesis,
i.e. that women report a higher share of relative time on housework if there
are children in the household. I use a dummy variable which takes value 1
when at least one child age 18 or younger is present in the household. The
gendered effect of parenthood on the relative time spent on chores is best
captured by the presence of small children in the household. Unfortunately,
not all countries included the information on the age of other household
members; on the contrary, respondents in all countries report whether there
is at least one child age 18 or younger in the household. Thus, I chose to
maximize the number of level-two units even if it means reducing the detail of
the micro-level indicators. To test for hypothesis 1.a, i.e. that the association
between the presence of children and the higher share of women’s housework
shall be weakest in the social democratic welfare regime and strongest in
countries belonging to the continental, liberal and Mediterranean welfare
regimes, I run a random intercepts and random slope model allowing the
coefficient for this variable to be country-specific4.
I then add the so-called time constraints variables. For this purpose I use
employment status (employed vs. non-employed), hours spent in paid work
per week, employment status of the partner (employed vs. non-employed).
Next, I include two variables that account for two types of relative resources
of the partners: economic resources and educational resources. The first are
included using a predictor that accounts for how large a proportion of the
household income the respondent provides. Respondents were asked whether
they earn none of the household income (reference category), a very small
4This is the only variable allowed to vary between countries because one of the objec-
tives of the dissertation is to investigate between-country differences in the association be-
tween the presence of children and an unequal allocation of time to domestic chores within
couples. The remaining variables are constrained to be equal across countries for two rea-
sons: first, because the cross-national difference concerning the remaining individual-level
traits are not among the issues considered in this analysis; and second, because previous
studies on European countries have not highlighted country-specific idiosyncrasies in the
association between individual characteristics and the allocation of time to housework.
Notwithstanding, I ran models allowing random-slopes on all the individual-level variables
and the results, reported in tables B.3 and B.4, are consistent with the random-intercepts
model.
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part, under a half, about half, over a half, a very large part, or all. To mea-
sure relative educational resources5 I build a semi-compound variable that
includes five combinations of the respondents and the partners’ level of ed-
ucation. Compound measures of relative education are found to be more
reliable and less ambiguous than difference measures (Eeckhaut et al. 2011).
The variable is the result of a recode of the original ISCED codes and, ide-
ally, should include nine categories, i.e. all combinations of low, medium and
high education of the partners. The number of observations per each country,
however, is too small to allow such a fine grained distinction, so I settle for a
five category variable: both partners are low educated (reference category);
both partners are medium educated; both partners are high educated; part-
ner is more educated than the respondent and partner is less educated than
the respondent.
To verify hypothesis 4 (i.e. women and men who favor equality in gender
roles are expected to share housework more evenly), I include a variable that
taps attitudes towards gender roles. Respondents were asked whether ‘women
should be prepared to cut down on paid work for the sake of the family’.
The responses range from 1 (Agree strongly) to 5 (Disagree strongly). After
testing for possible non-linear effects, which were not found, the variable was
included as continuous6.
Finally, hypothesis 5 stated that a greater presence of women in the labor
market in particular and in the public sphere in general are expected to be
associated with a more equal division of time on domestic chores between
5Since the models include a measure of individual gender equality, I use relative ed-
ucation as a proxy of relative power. However, it may also operate via values, as better
educated women and men have more gender egalitarian attitudes and thus share house-
work more evenly
6An index based on more than one item, such as those often used in the literature (e.g.
Batalova and Cohen (2002), Bu¨hlmann et al. (2010)), would have been more appropriate
and reliable. Unfortunately, the fifth wave of the ESS lacks these items, and this is the only
variable capturing the respondents’ attitudes towards women’s roles. While recognizing
this limitation, I maintain that the variable should be included in the model, as in similar
cases other studies have settled with one item when indices were not feasible (e.g. Breen
and Cooke (2005)). Furthermore, the item seems to be measuring gender equality. In fact,
it is positively associated with education as the mean values for women are: 2.67 for the
low educated, 2.9 for the medium educated and 3.26 for the high educated. The mean
values for low, medium and high educated men are, respectively: 2.75, 2.92, and 3.25 (see
table B.1 in Appendix B for country-specific values). Additionally, the gender ideology
item is negatively correlated with age for both women (corr: -0.03, p<0.000) and men
(corr: -0.06, p<0.000).
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partners. To test for this hypothesis regarding macro-level characteristics, I
include two predictors: a measure of female labor force participation and the
Gender Empowerment Measure. Female labor force participation (FLFP)
is included using the country-specific employment rate of women age 15-64,
in 2010. The measure is derived from the Eurostat (2012a) database and
ranges from 0 to 1. The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) (range 0-1)
is a measure of agency, developed by the UNDP and rather than capture
disparities between men and women, like the Gender Inequality Index, the
GEM takes into account women’s political and economic participation as well
as their power over economic resources (UNDP 2007). Table 4.1 reports the
descriptive statistics for the overall sample, while 4.2 reports the means and
standard deviations of the dependent variable by gender and country7.
4.2.3 Method
The hierarchical structure of the data calls for the use of multi-level mod-
els, which control for clustering within groups/levels (Hox 2010). As in many
applications in comparative social sciences, I use two-level models with indi-
viduals nested in countries. Given that the dependent variable is a proportion
and ranges from 0 to 1, rather than modeling the outcome as continuous, I
follow the approach suggested by Hox (2010) and by McDowell and Cox
(2004) and use a generalized linear model with a logit link and the binomial
family. While this approach has the advantage of producing predicted values
between 0 and 1, the raw coefficients are not interpretable as the response
proportions. Rather, they are “terms of the underlying variate defined by the
logit transformation” Hox (2010, p. 115). To grasp a better understanding
of the magnitude of the coefficients I calculate predictions of the outcome
and display results graphically.
4.3 Results
In all countries, women are responsible for most of the domestic work-
load. As can be seen in table 4.1, which reports grand means and standard
deviations for the overall sample, women on average perform about 70% of
7As far as missing observations are concerned, no imputation technique had to be
adopted since the dependent variable had about 7% of missing observations while all the
independent variables had percentages of missing values well below 5%.
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the domestic work load. Table 4.2 instead shows the dependent variable by
country and gender and allows more detail for the relative time spent on
chores in different contexts. The most unequal allocation of time on chores
is found in Greece, where women perform 84% of the domestic work. Women
in Cyprus and Ireland follow with 78% and 75%. Sweden and Finland are
the countries where women do the smallest share of housework, i.e. less than
63%. As expected, even in the most equal countries, women perform more
than half of domestic chores.
In table 4.3 I present four sets of models8, which were run separately
by gender. Model one includes time constraints, model two adds relative
resources and model three includes value orientation on gender roles. In
model four I finally include presence of children in the household. I introduce
the presence of children in the last model in order to control for all the other
characteristics as well.
Before moving to the main hypotheses concerning presence of children in
context, I briefly discuss the association between the other covariates and the
outcome. The results for first control variable, age, are not surprising: age
is significantly associated with a higher share of relative time on housework
for women and a lower share for men, probably indicating that older cohorts
display a more traditional division of housework. Alternatively, it could mean
that women do relatively more and men relatively less housework when they
become older. Due to the cross-sectional nature of the data it is difficult to
tell which of the two is more likely. The lack of longitudinal data on time
use has limited research in this directions so it is difficult to rely on previous
empirical studies. For example, longitudinal empirical research has shown
that in Europe the division of chores within-households tends to become
more unequal over time, especially when children are born (Ku¨hhirt 2011,
Schober 2013), while evidence from the US indicates the opposite (Lam et al.
2012).
Married vs. cohabiting couples do not show any statistically significant
difference, but the coefficients go in the expected direction, as married women
report performing a higher share of housework vs. women who cohabit,
while the opposite is found in men’s reports. Literature has explained this
8Measures of Cook’s distance to detect influential data at the second level were cal-
culated for the full model and reported in figure B.1 in the appendix. The plots show
that in all cases Cook’s distance is below the cut-off point of 4/23 = .17 as indicated
by Nieuwenhuis et al. (2012) and that therefore no level-two observation is significantly
influencing the estimated parameters.
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as the result of a selection of women and men with traditional attitudes into
marriage (Batalova and Cohen 2002).
Furthermore, the number of household members is associated with a
higher share of housework reported by women and a lower share of housework
reported by men. Interestingly, the coefficient for women becomes nonsignif-
icant when including the presence of children in the household: this indicates
that it is children, and not other adults, that lead to a higher share of house-
work for women.
Moving to time constraints, I find that my hypothesis is confirmed: be-
ing in paid employment, hours in employment and having a non-employed
partner are significantly and negatively associated with the share of house-
work that each partner performs. Employed women in fact are responsible
for about 63% of the housework while the figure for non-employed women
is 70%. The association for men has just about the same magnitude, as a
non-employed man does 37% of the chores vs. the 29% for an employed man.
Model two verifies the relative resources hypothesis. As far as relative
income is concerned, the results show that, for women, each increase in the
proportion of household income, up to over a half of the total, is associated
with a reduction in the proportion of housework. Above this threshold, the
association is still negative, but decreases in magnitude. To get a better idea
of the magnitude of the association, I calculate predicted values of share of
housework for both men and women at different levels of relative income and
report them in table 4.4. The predictions are calculated by setting all the
individual-level variables to their grand mean. The women who perform the
least housework, i.e. 61%, are those who earn over half of the total household
income, while the ones who earn the entire amount perform just as much
housework as those who earn under a half (66%). This non-linear result would
seem to confirm the findings in previous literature according to which women
who earn a large portion of household income compensate for the deviant
behavior by performing a larger share of housework. However, literature
has also shown that women tend to be more sensitive to their own earnings
than to their partners’ earnings. As I cannot control for this, I interpret this
finding with caution. Men, also, do not respond to relative earnings in a
linear way, as there is a significant reduction in their share of housework only
when they are contributing completely or almost completely to the household
income. In fact, only men who earn all or almost all the household income,
and who perform respectively 24% and 27% of the domestic chores, differ
significantly from those who are completely out earned and who perform
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Table 4.1 – Descriptive statistics
Women Men
Mean SD Mean SD
Individual and household-level indicators
Proportion of housework performed 0.71 0.20 0.31 0.20
Hours of housework per week 21 17 10 15
Partner’s hours of housework per week 10 16 23 20
Household total hours of housework per week 32 29 34 30
Age 45 12 46 11
Married 0.81 0.39 0.81 0.40
Number of household members 3.12 1.14 3.11 1.11
Employed 0.60 0.49 0.78 0.42
Hours in paid work per week 32.72 15.49 42.80 13.91
Partner employed 0.77 0.42 0.66 0.47
Household income 3.18 1.37 4.97 1.35
Value orientation: “Women should be prepared to 2.91 1.18 2.95 1.13
cut down on paid work for the sake of the family”
Range: 1 “agree strongly” - 5 “disagree strongly”
Presence of children 0.59 0.49 0.60 0.49
Both partners low educated 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36
Both partners medium educated 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.45
Both partners high educated 0.18 0.39 0.19 0.39
Partner more educated 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.37
Partners less educated 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
Country-level indicators - range 0-1
Female Labor Force Participation .60 .07
Gender Empowerment Measure .72 .11
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Table 4.2 – Reported relative time on housework by women and men in 23
countries (%)
Women Men
Mean SD Mean SD
Belgium .722 .189 .296 .201
Bulgaria .688 .213 .324 .198
Switzerland .735 .194 .267 .197
Cyprus .786 .225 .288 .259
Czech Republic .704 .18 .306 .187
Germany .728 .188 .282 .192
Denmark .643 .18 .373 .183
Estonia .635 .179 .378 .167
Spain .728 .218 .261 .235
Finland .628 .184 .382 .169
France .725 .204 .306 .208
Great Britain .731 .209 .325 .204
Greece .849 .199 .209 .234
Croatia .723 .212 .314 .216
Hungary .719 .194 .3 .198
Ireland .756 .194 .362 .215
The Netherlands .728 .194 .314 .196
Norway .669 .181 .374 .17
Poland .672 .205 .327 .177
Portugal .74 .25 .297 .217
Sweden .629 .169 .418 .171
Slovenia .703 .183 .339 .205
Slovakia .662 .182 .375 .208
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Table 4.4 – Predicted values of the outcome with 90% confidence bounds
for women and men by proportion of income provided and by combination of
partners’ education.
Women Men
Prediction [90% bounds] Prediction [90% bounds]
Proportion of income
Null 0.749 0.779 0.718 0.376 0.441 0.31
Very small 0.712 0.742 0.683 0.351 0.404 0.297
Under a half 0.666 0.689 0.642 0.348 0.379 0.317
About a half 0.646 0.67 0.623 0.33 0.353 0.308
Over a half 0.613 0.644 0.581 0.304 0.322 0.286
Very large part 0.634 0.682 0.586 0.273 0.296 0.251
All 0.667 0.72 0.614 0.244 0.267 0.221
Combination of partners’ education
Both low 0.709 0.736 0.683 0.304 0.333 0.274
Both medium 0.681 0.705 0.658 0.34 0.365 0.314
Both high 0.649 0.677 0.622 0.393 0.422 0.363
Respondent lower 0.69 0.716 0.664 0.354 0.382 0.326
Respondent higher 0.682 0.707 0.658 0.338 0.367 0.31
Note: predicted values are adjusted for all the variables included in model 4 by setting
all the predictors, except the ones of interest, to their grand means.
37% of the housework. Although I find this gender difference in the ‘shape’
of the effect, the difference between who is doing less housework and who is
doing more is 13 percentage points for both women and men. Given that the
dependent variable is based on reported and not actual time, the different
results by gender may be read in terms of discrepancies between women and
men in reporting their own and their partner’s time on housework at different
levels of relative income or ‘power’.
Moving on to the association between education and relative time on do-
mestic chores, I find that for both men and women the strongest predictor
of equal sharing is being part of a highly educated couple. In such partner-
ships, in fact, women perform less domestic chores (around 65%) compared
to women in lower educated couples (around 71%), who do not differ from
women living in partnerships with other combinations of education. Men
who live in highly educated couples, instead, perform more domestic chores
compared to men in lower educated couples (39% vs. 30%). This would seem
to suggest that being in a highly educated couple is more consequential to
equally sharing chores than being better educated than the partner. Fur-
ther, the magnitude of the association is smaller for women, as the difference
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between the smallest and largest predicted share of housework is 6 percent-
age points. The figure for men, instead, is of almost 10 percentage points.
Predicted values for all categories are reported in table 4.4.
The fourth individual-level hypothesis regards value orientation toward
gender roles. As expected, individuals who display gender-equal attitudes
tend to share housework more equally. Women who display traditional value
orientations, in fact, perform almost 70% of the chores compared to 62% for
least traditional women. Traditional men, instead, do around 28% of the
housework as opposed to men with more modern attitudes toward gender
roles who perform 35%.
The presence of children, finally, is associated with a 5 percentage points
larger reported share of women’s housework, while men’s share is unaffected.
The magnitude of the association is rather small but it is statistically signifi-
cant (estimate: 0.148, p<0.05), and confirms previous literature according to
which sex-specialization in housework is greater when children are present.
In the attempt to distinguish country-specific associations between the pres-
ence of children and the allocation of time to chores, I also ran a random-
intercepts random slope model estimating a different ‘presence of children’
coefficient for each country. Interestingly, the results from this operation
(shown in table 4.5) reveal, first of all, that the overall fit of the model does
not change, as intercepts and coefficients have magnitude and significance
similar to model 4. Secondly, the variance term for the random intercept is
close to zero, pointing to the fact that mothers in different contexts do not
differ substantially in their reports on the relative time spent doing chores.
Figure 4.4 reports predicted values of relative time on domestic chores for
mothers and non mothers in all countries adjusted for age, marital status,
number of household members, employment status, hours of employment,
partner’s employment status, proportion of household income, relative edu-
cation of the partners and value orientation. It clearly shows that there are
important country differences in the amount of relative time women spend on
domestic chores, and that the presence of children increases women’s share
of housework, but it also reveals that – contrary to expectations – such an
increase is constant between countries.
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To better understand the baseline differences between countries, I cal-
culate and display in figure 4.3 predicted values for each country obtained
from the full individual-level model (model four). Once again, predictions
are calculated holding all the individual variables at their grand mean.
The plot shows, for each country, the predicted average share of house-
work for women and men. The countries are displayed in ascending order
from most to least gender equal in the relative time on chores. The plot con-
firms the findings from previous literature and from the descriptive statistics.
Partners share housework more evenly in northern European countries, while
the least equal allocation of time to chores is found in southern European
countries. Another interesting result that emerges clearly from the graph –
and that can also be found by scrutinizing the variance components in table
4.7 – is that women display much more variation than men: the predicted
values for women in fact range from 60% in Finland to 75% in Greece. For
men, instead, the predictions have a range that is about a third of women’s
and fall between 29% and 35%. In other words, after controlling for a number
of relevant individual-level traits, unobserved contextual characteristics are
related to women’s perceptions of the division of domestic chores more than
to men’s. By including macro-level variables in models five and six (reported
in table 4.6) we address these unobserved sources of variance.
The results confirm my last hypothesis: couples share housework more
evenly - meaning that women report doing less and men doing more of it –
in countries where women are active in the workforce or in countries where
they are present in the public sphere. Predicted values for the macro-level
predictors are calculated and plotted in figure 4.5. The general result that
emerges is that men and women, respectively, increase and decrease their
share of housework as contextual levels of female labor force participation or
gender empowerment increase. For men, however, the traits appear to have
a very similar magnitude, although female labor force participation seems
to have a slightly steeper slope, suggesting that it has a stronger impact on
men’s contribution to housework compared to the other predictor. Female
labor force participation is the strongest predictor also for women.
Table 4.5 – Multi-level regression models for housework sharing: dependent
variable proportion of domestic chores performed by each partner (unstan-
dardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses)
Model four b: random intercepts & random slopes
Women Men
Constant 2.067*** -0.068
(0.149) (0.214)
Age 0.007** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002)
Married 0.072 -0.076
(0.064) (0.065)
N household members 0.046 -0.065*
(0.030) (0.033)
Hours of housework -0.010*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Employed vs. non-employed -0.287*** -0.387***
(0.060) (0.066)
Hours in paid work per week -0.004* -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
Partner non-employed -0.342*** -0.350***
(0.063) (0.060)
Proportion of household income provided - r.c. None
Very small -0.184 -0.117
(0.097) (0.203)
Under a half -0.405*** -0.121
(0.091) (0.178)
About half -0.489*** -0.205
(0.097) (0.172)
Over a half -0.633*** -0.322
(0.114) (0.171)
Very large -0.541*** -0.477**
(0.152) (0.178)
All -0.393* -0.624***
(0.166) (0.183)
Relative education - r.c. Both low
Both medium -0.134 0.162*
(0.080) (0.081)
Both high -0.275** 0.392***
(0.087) (0.089)
Partner higher -0.099 0.224*
(0.086) (0.089)
Partner lower -0.128 0.159
(0.085) (0.087)
Value orientation -0.064** 0.080***
(0.020) (0.021)
Presence of children 0.148* -0.066
(0.074) (0.076)
Log-likelihood -1003.724 -844.456
BIC 2219.281 1879.303
N 9998 8658
Groups 23 23
Legend: *p< 0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Two-tailed
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Figure 4.3 – Predicted values of share of housework by country and gender
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Table 4.6 – Multi-level regression models for housework sharing: dependent
variable proportion of domestic chores performed by each partner (unstan-
dardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses)
Model five Model six
Women Men Women Men
Constant 2.275*** -0.182 2.826*** -0.385
(0.154) (0.215) (0.281) (0.287)
Age 0.007** -0.009*** 0.007** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Married 0.065 -0.065 0.066 -0.069
(0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065)
N household members 0.048 -0.071* 0.046 -0.067*
(0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033)
Hours of housework -0.010*** 0.005*** -0.010*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Employed vs. non-employed -0.289*** -0.386*** -0.285*** -0.389***
(0.059) (0.066) (0.059) (0.066)
Hours of paid work per week -0.004** -0.006*** -0.004** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Partner non-employed -0.342*** -0.352*** -0.346*** -0.350***
(0.063) (0.060) (0.063) (0.060)
Proportion of household income provided (r.c. none)
Very small -0.184 -0.113 -0.189 -0.117
(0.096) (0.202) (0.096) (0.203)
Under a half -0.399*** -0.131 -0.406*** -0.130
(0.091) (0.177) (0.091) (0.178)
About half -0.486*** -0.215 -0.492*** -0.214
(0.097) (0.172) (0.097) (0.172)
Over a half -0.627*** -0.340* -0.635*** -0.337*
(0.114) (0.171) (0.114) (0.172)
Very large -0.539*** -0.493** -0.544*** -0.491**
(0.152) (0.177) (0.152) (0.178)
All -0.409* -0.618*** -0.404* -0.633***
(0.166) (0.183) (0.166) (0.183)
Relative education of the partners (r.c. both low)
Both medium -0.144 0.173* -0.153 0.175*
(0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.081)
Both high -0.275** 0.392*** -0.282** 0.396***
(0.086) (0.088) (0.086) (0.088)
Partner higher -0.099 0.226* -0.105 0.229*
(0.086) (0.089) (0.086) (0.089)
Partner lower -0.128 0.156 -0.135 0.160
(0.084) (0.087) (0.085) (0.087)
Value orientation -0.053** 0.066** -0.056** 0.073***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022)
Presence of children 0.146* -0.047 0.145* -0.056
(0.074) (0.076) (0.074) (0.076)
FLFP -1.561** 0.863*
(0.476) (0.401)
GEM -1.021** 0.459
(0.330) (0.281)
Log-likelihood -998.077 -840.103 -999.547 -843.159
BIC 2198.777 1879.664 2201.718 1885.776
N 9998 8658 9998 8658
Groups 23 23 23 23
Legend: *p< 0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Two-tailed
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Figure 4.4 – Predicted values of share of housework by women with and
without children in the household
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Table 4.7 – Multi-level regression models for housework sharing: variance
components, models one to six
Women
Model one Model two Model three Model four Model four b Model five Model six
Variance components
Intercept 0.054 0.038 0.032 0.030 0.031 0.019 0.016
Standard deviation (0.233) (0.196) (0.178) (0.174) (0.176) (0.136) (0.128)
Presence of children 0.000
Standard deviation (0.004)
Men
Model one Model two Model three Model four Model four b Model five Model six
Variance components
Intercept 0.031 0.017 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.007
Standard deviation (0.177) (0.129) (0.102) (0.102) (0.100) (0.093) (0.084)
Presence of children 0.000
Standard deviation (0.003)
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Figure 4.5 – Predicted values of share of housework by gender at various
levels of macro level characteristics
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Finally, by including macro-level predictors, the between-country varia-
tion in intercepts is strongly reduced. For women, in fact, the difference in the
range of the country-specific predictions is reduced from 15 percentage points
in the model without macro-level variables to 9 and 8 percentage points af-
ter controlling for female labor force participation and gender empowerment
respectively. The country-difference for men, which was already rather small
after controlling for individual-level characteristics, is also reduced by the
macro-level predictors, but to a smaller extent.
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4.4 Discussion
In this chapter I have investigated the allocation of time to domestic
chores among couples using data from the fifth wave of the European Social
Survey on 23 European countries. Using multi-level random intercepts mod-
els I test whether time constraints, relative resources and gender ideology are
predictors of the division of chores and whether they affect women and men
to a different extent. In particular, the presence of children as predictor of a
more unequal allocation of time to domestic chores is tested, both as a fixed
and a random effect. Further, I investigate the relation between the relative
time on housework and two macro-level characteristics: female labor force
participation and gender empowerment.
The results confirm that the relative time spent on housework by couples
in 2010 is still strongly gendered. In all countries women perform the ma-
jority of domestic work, although women do the least and men the most in
northern European countries. This is consistent with previous findings and
also with my hypothesis concerning welfare-regime differences in the division
of domestic chores between partners. In fact, in countries belonging to the
social-democratic welfare regime (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden)
where female labor market participation is encouraged and policies to in-
crease men’s involvement in the home are present, the division of chores is
most equal. On the contrary, in countries belonging to the Mediterranean
cluster, such as Portugal and Greece, and to a smaller extent in certain
Conservative countries, like Germany and Belgium, the division of domestic
chores is much more unequal, consistent with the persistence of traditional
forms of family that are pursued by the welfare state. An interesting excep-
tion is provided by Spain, where women and men report a division of chores
that is more equal than would be expected. This result suggests caution
in interpreting the results in the framework of the capitalist welfare regime
typology and indicates that other factors could be at play (e.g. social norms
not accounted for by membership in a specific welfare regime).
As far as macro-level traits are concerned, I find that the presence of
women in the work force and in the public sphere are associated with a more
equal allocation of time to domestic chores within the household, although
after controlling for individual characteristics the cross-country differences
for women are much larger than for men. This points to the fact that con-
textual features shape women’s more than men’s perception of their share
of housework. Once we control for macro-level traits, however, the variation
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between women in different countries is partially reduced. As far as domestic
chores are concerned, therefore, women seem to act upon prevailing norms
of behavior to a greater extent than men.
Although I find a large symmetry in the accounts of housework by women
and men, throughout the analysis some important gender differences emerge.
At the individual-level, mothers report a higher share of housework compared
to non-mothers, while fathers and non fathers do not differ. Since the mea-
sure I use is based on the information provided by only one respondent, this
result could be interpreted in the light of the gendered norms on parenthood.
In other words, mothers might be over-reporting their share of housework
and under-reporting their partner’s because norms on motherhood imply a
greater responsibility for housework. This result mirrors previous findings
according to which women modify their daily lives more than men when
they become parents (Craig and Mullan 2010).
Moreover, the presence of children is associated with a greater relative
time on housework for mothers regardless of welfare regime. While this result
comes as a surprise, a possible interpretation lies in the nature of the mother-
child relation that may be resistant to external pressures. In other words,
the intensive mothering ideology (Hays 1996) – that would lead mothers to
invest more in their family than in other spheres of their life – might shape
their behavior in a way that is out of reach of state-promoted policies. In
other words, the contextual features that manage to partially equalize women
and men’s time on domestic chores in Scandinavian countries – be it policies
aiming at involving men in housework, greater gender egalitarian values or
more women in the public sphere – do not seem to reach mothers, who,
regardless of the country of residence, report a higher share of housework
than childless women.
To sum up, the analysis in this chapter, while confirming previous findings
on the division of chores within households, suggests that data collected
through the response of only one household member can account for the
perception of the relative time spent on chores but is not a perfect measure
of the actual relative time spent chores. The different results that emerged
by gender confirm the need for comparable, high quality time-budget data
on a large number of countries.
With respect to the dissertation research question, in this chapter I con-
firm findings of previous studies and show that mothers report a more unequal
allocation of time to domestic chores than childless women. On the contrary,
I find no evidence of fathers reporting a smaller share of housework than non-
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fathers. Finally, although there is evidence that the relative time on chores
is more gender equal in northern European countries, possibly because of the
greater effort from the welfare state to de-familize “women’s work” and to
promote greater participation of men in the household, I do not find regime-
specific differences in the association between parenthood and relative time
on chores. Thus, the social democratic welfare state would not seem to have
the same equalizing effect on the division of chores among parents as it has
for childless women and men.
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5Chapter Five
Presence of children, childbirth and
relative earnings of the couple
5.1 Introduction
Despite the increasing presence of women in the workforce and their im-
proved levels of education (Blossfeld and Drobnicˇ 2001), many European and
western countries feature a gender gap in earnings (Eurostat 2012b, Hersch
and Stratton 2002). The disparity between genders is further increased by the
fact that when children come along, women suffer from the so-called moth-
erhood penalty (Budig and England 2001, Avellar and Smock 2003) while
fathers, to the contrary, benefit from a fatherhood premium (Koslowski 2011,
Lundberg and Rose 2002). Although studies find that part of the gender
gap in earnings and of the motherhood penalty is reduced when controlling
for individual characteristics, it does not disappear completely (Blau et al.
1998, Hersch and Stratton 2002, Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel 2007, Esping-
Andersen 2009).
Not much is known on the long term determinants of within-household
spousal inequalities in earnings. In fact, there is little empirical evidence
concerning what elements contribute to the relative share of earnings cou-
ple members bring to the household over the life course (Stier and Mandel
2009, Raley et al. 2006, Winslow-Bowe 2006). According to economic the-
ory (Becker 1985), human capital, in the form of education of the partners
and experience in the labor market, can account for partners’ different levels
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of earnings. Labor market performance, type of occupation and hours usu-
ally worked are also likely to predict a different earning balance within the
household.
Why should the presence and number of children imply a lower share of
earnings from the female partner? There are several reasons for which this
may happen. As far as work performance is concerned, mothers may lose
job experience or be less productive at work; furthermore, they might choose
jobs that are more easily reconciled with family needs. Finally, they might
be discriminated against by employers because they are mothers. One or all
of these elements may contribute to mothers having lower earnings than non-
mothers, but, at the same time, women with lower earning potential might
be selected into motherhood, and the effect may not be causal (Budig and
England 2001).
In this chapter, I first investigate the individual and household features
that are associated with within-couple inequality in earnings using multi-
level models on a large number of countries. Second, I use fixed effects panel
models to test whether the birth of a child significantly changes the earning
balance of a couple.
5.2 Cross-sectional multi-level analysis
5.2.1 Data, sample and measures
The analyses of this chapter are performed using data from the EU-
SILC 2008 longitudinal file. The data cover four years, from 2005 to 2008,
and 26 European countries: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG),
Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain
(ES), Finland (FI), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS),
Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV), the Netherlands
(NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Sweden
(SE), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK) and the United Kingdom (UK). I exclude
women who are out of the labor market for the entire observation window,
and those whose youngest child is older than 18. Thus, my sample includes
women aged 18 to 45 who live with a partner (N 93023). Table 5.1 reports
the dependent variable and sample sizes by country while table 5.2 displays
descriptive statistics for the overall sample. Descriptives are weighted using
the personal base weight of the EU-SILC database.
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Dependent variable
I use labor market earnings to capture women’s economic resources rela-
tive to their partner’s. Since the aim is understanding how motherhood re-
lates to labor market performance, following Raley et al. (2006) and Winslow-
Bowe (2006), the dependent variable measures the female partner’s share of
earnings relative to the sum of her earnings and her partner’s earnings.
Each partner’s personal earnings are calculated as the sum of the fol-
lowing measures: employee cash or near cash income1; non-cash employee
income; cash benefits or losses from self-employment (including royalties)
and unemployment benefits. The information on earned income pertains to
the income reference period which, depending on the country of residence,
can be a fixed 12-month period or a moving 12-month period preceding the
interview.
Some countries of the data-set provide the income information as gross
(G), while others as net (N). This may be problematic if the members of a
couple are taxed differently, because in this case gross-income could mask
large within-household gender differences. Table 5.1 reports which countries
have gross measures and which have net, along with country sample sizes and
the average of the dependent variable by country. With the intent of mini-
mizing the bias introduced by this issue, first of all I adopt extreme caution
when commenting on the results for the countries where income is collected
as gross. Secondly, I test the robustness of my results by running models
separately by groups of countries, according to whether the information was
collected as net or as gross.
Independent variables
Following human capital theory, I include level of education to account for
part of the relative earnings. I include a variable measuring the relative edu-
cation of the couple, which, as in the previous chapters, is a semi-compound
measure built on the original ISCED codes including five categories: both
partners are low educated; both partners are medium educated; both part-
ners are high educated; the partner is more educated than the respondent
and the partner is less educated than the respondent2.
1In defining this form of resources, the EU-SILC manual uses Income as a synonym of
earned income.
2As in chapter three, the education variable is obtained through a recode of the original
ISCED values as follows: pre-primary education (ISCED 0), primary education (ISCED
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Being in paid work and hours of paid work also predict earnings, so I
include the variable ‘number of hours usually worked per week in main job’
(coded zero for who is not in paid work) of both the partners. I include the
age of the partner to capture differences in accumulation of human capital
by the partners.
Following the argument that female partners are more likely to achieve the
status of primary breadwinner when the household is economically vulnera-
ble (Winslow-Bowe 2006), I include a four-category measure of the couple’s
relative disposable income (lowest quartile as reference group)3. This mea-
sure, similar to the one used by Mandel (2012) and Mandel and Semyonov
(2005), has the advantage of capturing the position of each household in
the “national earnings distribution, irrespective of cross-national differences
in the length of the wage ladder” (Mandel 2012, p. 245). Such a feature
is particularly useful in our case since we are comparing a large number of
1) and lower secondary education (ISCED 2) have been recoded as low levels of educa-
tion; (upper) secondary education (ISCED 3) and post-secondary non tertiary education
(ISCED 4) are recoded as medium levels of education while first stage of tertiary education
(not leading directly to an advanced research qualification, ISCED 5) and second stage of
tertiary education (leading to an advanced research qualification, ISCED 6) are coded as
high level of education.
3According to the EU-SILC manual, disposable household income can be com-
puted by adding all the personal income components with the household income com-
ponents, as follows: personal income components (employee cash or near cash in-
come (PY010G/N); non-cash employee income (PY020G/N); employers’ social insur-
ance contributions (PY030G/N); cash benefits or losses from self-employment (includ-
ing royalties)(PY050G/N); value of goods produced for own consumption (PY070G/N);
unemployment benefits (PY090G/N); old-age benefits (PY100G/N); survivor’ bene-
fits (PY110G/N), sickness benefits (PY120G/N); disability benefits (PY130G/N) and
education-related allowances (PY140G/N)) plus income components at household level:
imputed rent (HY030G/N); income from rental of a property or land (HY040G/N);
family/children related allowances (HY050G); social exclusion not elsewhere classified
(HY060G/N); housing allowances (HY070G/N); regular inter-household cash transfers
received (HY080G/N); interests, dividends, profit from capital investments in unincor-
porated business (HY090G/N); income received by people aged under 16 (HY110G/N)
minus employer’s social insurance contributions (PY030G/N); interest paid on mortgage
(HY100G/N); regular taxes on wealth (HY120G/N); regular inter-household cash transfer
paid (HY130G/N); tax on income and social insurance contributions (HY140G/N). To
build the household income variable I sum all the components of income with the exclu-
sion of family related allowances. These are not included in the computation because they
are conditional on the birth or on the presence of a child and thus would artificially shape
the relation between the couples’ relative contributions in the presence of children, which
is what I am trying to model.
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countries. Furthermore, the use of a relative measure should minimize the
differences between gross and net information on income.
Finally, I control for the number of children age 18 or younger in the
household. At this stage, it is sufficient to control for the presence and
number of children; I shall investigate the birth of the first and subsequent
children in the longitudinal analysis of the following section.
Method
As in the previous chapter, I run random intercept, two-level models,
with individuals nested in countries. As this is a panel data set, individuals
potentially contribute to the data with more than one observation. The
correlation within individuals might introduce bias in the analysis. To control
for this, I ran three-level models with time-observations nested in individuals
nested in countries. However, the results did not differ from the two-level
model; therefore, for parsimony, I report results from the latter. As far as
the model is concerned, as previously, I use a generalized linear model with
a logit link and the binomial family in order to obtain predicted values that
fall within the range of 0 and 1 (Hox 2010, McDowell and Cox 2004).
5.2.2 Results
Table 5.2 reports means and standard deviations for the variables included
in the multi-level models. On average, women earn about 38% of the total
household income. Figure 5.1 instead shows women’s mean income shares
by country, ordered from least to most equal, and by net vs. gross income
information. It is difficult to make meaningful comparisons between countries
where data were collected differently. Among the countries where data on
earnings are net (left hand side panel of figure 5.1), the country with the
most equal household contribution is Slovenia (45%), followed by Portugal
(43%), Poland (42%), Czech Republic (42%) and Romania (41%). The least
equal are Austria (34%), and Estonia (35%). Among the second group of
countries (right hand side panel of figure 5.1), Denmark and Hungary show
the most equal household contribution (both about 40%), while the lowest
value is in the Netherlands (34%).
Moving to the results of the multivariate analyses, table 5.3 reports the
results for the random intercept models (models 1-3). Given the concerns
regarding the net vs. gross data on earned income, as a robustness check,
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Figure 5.1 – Women’s average share of earnings by country
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Figure 5.2 – Random intercepts from models 3.a and 3.b. Dependent vari-
able: women’s relative earnings by country
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Table 5.1 – Income information by country
Dependent % Zero
Cluster Country NET GROSS Used Variable Earnings N
Southern
CY no yes GROSS .371 .0391 2022
IT yes yes NET .378 .0775 8348
GR yes yes NET .387 .103 2159
ES yes yes NET .39 .0894 6108
PT yes yes NET .428 .0455 1647
Northern
IS no yes GROSS .363 .0294 1853
NO no yes GROSS .363 .0332 4377
FI no yes GROSS .379 .0415 4113
SE yes yes NET .401 .0284 3920
DK no yes GROSS .406 .0252 3624
Continental
AT yes yes NET .329 .0963 3157
NL no yes GROSS .339 .0401 7001
LU yes yes NET .368 .0711 4158
BE yes yes NET .403 .0339 3542
CZ yes yes NET .419 .158 6058
Baltic
EE yes yes NET .349 .121 2248
LV yes yes NET .364 .0658 1652
LT yes yes NET .386 .102 1928
Eastern
SK no yes GROSS .393 .0865 2410
BG yes yes NET .399 .103 1125
HU no yes GROSS .4 .117 3904
RO yes yes NET .413 .0569 1674
PL yes yes NET .421 .109 5798
SI yes yes NET .452 .0351 5086
English UK no yes GROSS .371 .0696 3941
speaking IE yes yes NET .376 .105 1170
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Table 5.2 – Descriptive statistics†
Mean SD
Her share of earnings (range 0-1)
Overall .385 .233
Between .2085
Within .106
Proportion of within variation (%): .21
Proportion of between variation (%): .822
Proportion of zero relative earnings (%): 7.25
Age class (%)
18-29 .188 .39
30-34 .23 .421
35-39 .266 .442
40-45 .316 .465
Relative educational level (%)
Both low ed. .101 .301
Both medium ed. .347 .476
Both high ed .184 .387
Respondent higher ed. .224 .417
Respondent lower ed. .144 .351
Age of the partner 38.5 7.23
Hours paid work per week (range 0-99) 28.9 16.4
Partner’s hours paid work per week (range 0-99) 40 14.2
Household income (%)
< 25p .248 .432
25p-50 .252 .434
50-75 .249 .432
> 75 .251 .433
Number of children <= 18 1.45 1.05
N 93023
† Descriptives are weighted using personal base weights
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Table 5.3 – Multi-level regression models for relative earnings. Dependent
variable: proportion of women’s earnings over total (unstandardized regression
coefficients, standard errors in parentheses)
Model one Model two Model three
Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.)
Constant -1.362*** -0.659*** -0.615***
(0.027) (0.061) (0.060)
Age 30-34 (r.c. 18-29) -0.013 0.010 0.078**
(0.022) (0.024) (0.025)
35-39 0.033 0.049 0.153***
(0.021) (0.027) (0.028)
40-45 0.127*** 0.117*** 0.220***
(0.020) (0.031) (0.032)
Hours of employment per week 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age partner 0.002 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Relative education (r.c. both low)
Both medium ed. 0.034 0.061*
(0.028) (0.028)
Both high ed. 0.051 0.101**
(0.030) (0.031)
Respondent higher 0.223*** 0.244***
(0.029) (0.029)
Respondent lower -0.126*** -0.102***
(0.031) (0.031)
Partner’s hours of employment per week -0.023*** -0.022***
(0.001) (0.001)
Household income (r.c. < 25p)
25-50p -0.129***
(0.021)
50-75p -0.136***
(0.021)
> 75p -0.200***
(0.022)
Number of children <= 18 -0.078***
(0.007)
Variance components
Intercepts 0.006 0.004 0.0007
(0.079) (0.068) (0.027)
Log-likelihood -10591.778 -9484.590 -9397.869
Deviance 21183.555 18969.180 18795.738
AIC 21195.555 18993.180 18827.738
BIC 21252.199 19106.467 18978.787
N 93023
Groups 26
Legend: *p<0.05; **p< 0.01; *** p<0.001, Two-tailed.
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Table 5.4 – Multi-level regression models for relative earnings by subsample
of countries: gross and net income. Dependent variable proportion of women’s
earnings over total (unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in
parentheses.)
Model 3.a Model 3.b
Gross subsample Net subsample
Constant -0.468*** -0.686***
(0.105) (0.077)
Age 30-34 (r.c. 18-29) 0.062 0.084**
(0.041) (0.031)
35-39 0.125** 0.170***
(0.047) (0.035)
40-45 0.189*** 0.240***
(0.054) (0.040)
Hours worked per week 0.030*** 0.029***
(0.001) (0.001)
Age partner 0.001 0.004*
(0.003) (0.002)
Relative education (r.c. both low)
Both medium ed. -0.017 0.077*
(0.061) (0.033)
Both high ed. 0.051 0.110**
(0.065) (0.037)
Respondent higher 0.172** 0.269***
(0.063) (0.034)
Respondent lower -0.162* -0.086*
(0.065) (0.037)
Partner’s hours worked per week -0.023*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.001)
Household income (r.c. < 25p)
25-50p -0.088* -0.021***
(0.035) (0.001)
50-75p -0.102** -0.146***
(0.036) (0.025)
> 75p -0.188*** -0.148***
(0.039) (0.026)
Number of children <= 18 -0.076*** -0.079***
(0.012) (0.010)
Variance components
Intercepts 0.001 0.006
(0.027) (0.075)
Log-likelihood -2757.354 -6623.712
Deviance 5514.709 13247.424
AIC 5546.709 13279.424
BIC 5681.295 13423.398
N 33245 59778
Groups 9 17
Legend: *p<0.05; **p< 0.01; *** p<0.001, Two-tailed.
Gross subsample: CY NL UK HU SK IS NO FI DK.
Net subsample: RO GR IT AT LU ES IE EE PL BG CZ LV LT BE PT SE SI.
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Figure 5.3 – Predicted values of women’s relative earnings by country (pre-
dictions are obtained from models 3.a and 3.b. All variables are set to sample
grand means)
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I also run model three on two different subsamples of countries (table 5.4).
The first subsample (model 3.a) includes the countries for which information
is collected as gross, while the second subsample (model 3.b) includes the
countries for which information is collected as net.
First of all, the random intercepts in all models confirm that women
contribute less than their partners in all countries, and the predicted values
are well below 50% in most countries4, as shown in figure 5.3. The plots show
that the differences between countries, with respect to the mean values, are
reduced when controlling for individual characteristics. This means that the
compositional differences between countries – that are controlled for in the
multivariate analyses – account for some of the cross-national variation in the
household earnings balance. When controlling for individual characteristics
the differences between countries become much smaller, in particular in the
gross-income group. Recalling that I have excluded from the analyses those
women who have no earnings across the entire observation period, these
results appear to indicate that the within-couple earning balance is quite
similar between European states.
4Predictions for each country by mode of income-data collection were calculated from
models 3.a and 3.b respectively, holding all variables to the subsample means.
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The results from the pooled model and the models by subsamples are
very similar, both in sign and, to a smaller extent, magnitude. Considering
individual traits in model 3, age class seems to be an important predictor of
earnings, as it shows that middle aged women are likely to be contributing
more to the household budget than younger women. Part of this result is
probably driven by work experience, that we cannot include in the analysis
due to the large number of missing observations for this variable. Further-
more, as expected, hours of employment per week are important predictors
of relative earnings (0.029, p<0.001).
Looking at human capital via relative education, I find that women are
more likely to have higher relative earnings when they live in a highly edu-
cated homogamous partnership (0.101, p<0.01) and even more so when their
level of education exceeds their partners’ (0.244, p <0.001) than when both
partners are low educated. The hours of employment of the partner are neg-
atively related to women’s earnings but the coefficient is rather small (-0.022,
p<0.001). Not surprisingly, the number of children aged 18 or younger in
the household is associated with a lower share of women’s relative earnings
(-0.078, p<0.001).
When it comes to the association between household income and relative
earnings, I find that the better off the overall economic household standing,
the lower the woman’s relative contribution. This result is consistent with the
economic vulnerability argument, according to which women’s contribution is
more valuable when the overall economic standing of the household is low. In
other words, women in poorer households are more likely to be contributing
to the same extent as their partners. The results are robust to the mode of
income data collection, although the negative association appears stronger
among the gross-data countries.
To summarize this part of the analysis, the results show that, on average,
women earn less than half of the household income in all countries, and that
age, hours of paid work, educational attainment of both partners, partner’s
hours of paid work, level of household income and the presence of children
are important predictors of the share of earnings.
In the following section I take a longitudinal approach and investigate the
effect of a childbirth on women’s relative earnings.
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5.3 Longitudinal analysis
The analysis of the previous section has given some insights on the rela-
tion between a number of individual and household variables and partners’
relative earnings. In particular, it has confirmed that women earn less than
their partner in all European countries; that hours of paid work are positively
associated with women’s relative earnings while their partners’ hours of paid
work are negatively associated with them; that human capital – measured as
relative education of the partners – is relevant to women’s chances of having
higher earnings relative to their partners’. In the present section, taking ad-
vantage of the longitudinal nature of the EU-SILC data, I run panel models
in order to investigate whether the birth of a child leads to a reduction of
women’s relative contribution.
5.3.1 Data, sample and measures
In the following paragraphs I introduce the variables and models used for
the panel data analysis. As far as the sample is concerned, I rely on the 2008
longitudinal EU-SILC database and I select households formed by women
age 18-45 living in a household with a partner (N 93023) who reside in one
of the 26 available countries: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG),
Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain
(ES), Finland (FI), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS),
Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV), the Netherlands
(NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Sweden
(SE), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK) and the United Kingdom (UK). The EU-
SILC is an unbalanced panel where household members are interviewed every
year for a maximum of four years. Therefore, the individuals in the sample
range from a minimum of one to a maximum of four observations. As in the
previous analysis, I exclude those women who have zero earnings across the
observation window and those whose youngest child is older than 18.
Part of the analysis is conducted on the full sample by pooling countries
together. However, I also run models by clusters of countries to investigate
the mediating effect of context on individual behavior. The country clusters
resemble as much as possible the capitalist welfare regime typology. Further,
due to the data limitation on income that was introduced in the previous
section, as a robustness check I select one country per cluster – Italy, Sweden,
Austria, Estonia, Slovenia and Ireland – and run models for each of those
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countries. The countries used in the models and the respective regimes are
indicated in table 5.1. Note that these countries are chosen because their
data on income are net.
Dependent and independent variables
As in the previous section, the dependent variable captures the female
partner’s share of earned income relative to the total earned income, as of
the income reference period.
The time varying independent variables included in the models are: age;
age of the partner (range 18-70); number of hours usually worked per week
in main job (coded zero if not in paid work) of both partners; household in-
come as a four-category measure5 compared to the rest of the sample income
distribution (lowest quartile as reference group).
I use two variables to estimate the impact of childbirth on relative con-
tribution. In the longitudinal fixed effects framework, these variables should
allow testing whether the birth of a child affects a woman’s earning share,
net of individual time-invariant unobserved characteristics. The first variable
measures whether there is a newborn, i.e. a child age 0 or 1, in the household.
The second variable controls for order of birth, i.e., whether the newborn is
the first, the second or third or higher child. It is useful to consider or-
der of birth, first of all, because the selected countries have very different
fertility rates, thus focusing only on one birth, e.g. the first birth, might
lead to unwanted sample selections; second of all, the order of the child may
make substantial differences to the effect of childbirth on relative earnings;
and third, institutional characteristics may have different ways of mediating
the effect of the birth of the first and of subsequent children. For example,
the birth of the first or a second child may have different repercussions on
women’s relative earned income in different contexts. Consider a woman who
has reduced her hours of employment to take care of the first child: in a social
democracy, thanks to extensive child care services, the birth of a second child
may not lead her to further reduce her hours in employment; in a southern
European state, instead, the birth of the second child may imply that the
mother has to withdraw from work completely to look after both children.
5There may be some concerned regarding to what extent household change their posi-
tion in the income distribution over time. Table C.1 in the Appendix shows that house-
holds move from one group to another over waves, indicating that the variable is indeed
time-varying.
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Since the absolute number of children in the household may also be related
to the relative earnings of the couple, I also control for number of children
younger than 18 living in the household, excluding the newborn. Descriptive
statistics are reported in table 5.2 and in table 5.5.
Method
For this part of the analysis I run fixed effects6 models following the
research strategy presented in section 2.3.2: I first run a pooled model with
all countries included. As a second step, I obtain cluster-specific slopes for
the first time-varying variable of interest by interacting the newborn variable
with cluster dummies to obtain the ‘childbirth’ effect in different contexts.
Then, I run models by country-cluster to verify the ‘order of birth effect’ in
each cluster and to explore the effects of the remaining variables in context.
Finally, as a robustness check, I run models separately for the six countries
for which net information on income is available, choosing one country for
each cluster.
The main advantage of using panel data in this context is that by applying
fixed effects models I can control for unobserved individual heterogeneity.
Unfortunately, there is a source of endogeneity in that data that I cannot
completely correct for, as the timing of the birth and of the change in relative
income are difficult to separate out. The newborn variable, in fact, indicates
whether a childbirth took place within the current or the previous year, while
the income information refers to the 12 months preceding the interview.
Thus, the two events could overlap. However, we must consider that any
change in women’s behavior that could lead to a reduction in earnings might
be triggered not by childbirth itself, but by pregnancy. Therefore, even if
the change in earnings does take place prior to childbirth, the arrival of the
child can still be considered the triggering cause.
6Hausman (1978) tests comparing the results for fixed and random effects were per-
formed. The Hausman test is designed to detect whether there is a violation in the
random effects modeling assumption that the explanatory variables are orthogonal to the
unit effects. Results are reported in the Appendix (table C.2). The large and significant
Hausman statistic indicates that only the FE model is consistent and should be chosen
over the RE model.
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Table 5.5 – Descriptive statistics† - Continued
Mean SD
Presence of newborns
None .86 .347
First child .0649 .246
Second child .0529 .224
Third child or higher order .0218 .146
N other children excluding newborn 1.31 1.07
N 93023
† Descriptives are weighted using personal base weights
5.3.2 Results
In table 5.6 the results from the first three models are displayed: two fixed
effects pooled models with different specifications of the childbirth variable
(birth of a child, and birth of a child by order of birth) and the fixed effects
pooled model with cluster-dummies interacted with the birth of a child. I do
not interact the ‘birth of a child by order of birth’ variable because it would
yield a very high number of interaction terms. Instead, in table 5.7 I report
the results by groups of countries considering the ‘birth of a child by order
of birth’ variable.
In model 1, (table 5.6) the coefficient indicating the birth of a child is neg-
ative and significant (-0.054, p<0.001); the results in model 2, furthermore,
show that the order of birth of the child does not make a large difference
to the outcome. However, when interacting the birth of the child in differ-
ent contexts, the strongest negative effect is found in the northern European
cluster (-0.086, p<0.001), followed by the Baltic (-0.066, p<0.001), the east-
ern (-0.042, p<0.001), the continental (-0.030, p<0.001), and finally southern
European states (-0.016, p<0.001) that are the reference group. However,
the coefficient is nonsignificant in the English-speaking clusters. Thus, the
results point in the direction of a negative effect of the birth on the relative
contribution of the female partner, but with different degrees of magnitude
between welfare regimes.
As far as the other predictors are concerned, weekly hours of employment
and weekly hours of employment of the partner affect the relative share of
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earnings: own hours of work per week in fact significantly increase one’s
share of earnings, while the opposite happens when the partner increases his
work effort. Such result is not surprising and in line with previous findings.
Furthermore, the number of other children in the household is also negatively
associated with the female partner’s relative contribution.
Table 5.6 – Pooled & welfare-regime interacted fixed effect regression mod-
els. Dependent variable: woman’s relative earned income (unstandardized
coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis).
Pooled model 1 Pooled model 2 Interacted model
Newborn -0.054*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.005)
Order of birth of the newborn
1st child -0.054***
(0.004)
2nd child -0.055***
(0.003)
3rd or above -0.053***
(0.005)
Newborn X Welfare regime - r.c. Southern
Northern -0.086***
(0.006)
Central -0.030***
(0.006)
Baltic -0.066***
(0.011)
Eastern -0.042***
(0.007)
English speaking -0.015
(0.010)
Age 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age of the partner 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Hours worked per week 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partners hours worked per week -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household income (r.c. < 25)
25-50 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
50-75 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
> 75 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
N other kids -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.275*** 0.275*** 0.274***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
N 93023
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Two-tailed.
To grasp a better understanding of the variables in context, table 5.7 re-
ports the results for order of birth of the newborn by groups of countries. The
models show that there are important regime differences when considering
the order of birth. In the northern and central countries, the negative effect
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is largest when the newborn is the first child. In the English-speaking group,
the birth of a child seems to become larger as the order of birth increases,
while in the southern cluster the negative effect emerges only for the birth
of the second child. In the Baltic and Eastern groups, there seems to be a
non-linear effect: in the Baltic countries the effect is largest at the birth of
the first and third child, while in the Eastern the effect is largest at the birth
if the second child.
I test the results by performing the analyses only on the countries for
which net information is available, which reflects disposable income to a
greater extent than the gross information. Tables 5.8 and 5.9 report the
results for the six selected countries. In the first set of models I verify only
the impact of the birth of the child, while in the second set I also look at
the order of the child. Results are consistent with the ones from the welfare
regime clusters. In Italy, neither the birth of a child per se nor a higher order
birth affect mothers’ relative contribution. In Sweden, by contrast, there
is the strongest negative impact of the birth of a child (-0.127, p<0.001),
and the effect only slightly changes at different order of births. Similarly,
in Slovenia there is a rather strong negative impact of childbirth (-0.124,
p<0.001). Furthermore, the effect is statistically significant at all order of
births, although it decreases in magnitude. In Austria and Estonia, there is
a smaller negative effect of childbirth which seems to be concentrated on the
birth of the first child, while in Ireland the effect of a child of any order is
negative but nonsignificant.
5.4 Discussion
Some considerations can be drawn by these results. First of all, a gen-
dered earnings imbalance emerges in all European countries, regardless of the
presence of children and regardless of country-specific characteristics. Second
of all, partners’ contributions show less between country variability than I an-
ticipated. Considering that the sample excluded women who earned nothing
for the entire observation period, this suggests that large country differences
lie in the probability of taking part in the labor market (as seen in chapter
three) rather than in the outcome in terms of relative earnings. Furthermore,
it is noteworthy that several of the personal and household characteristics
considered in the analysis have the same effect across different contextual
circumstances. Age, weekly hours of employment, educational attainment,
partner’s work hours and household economic resources all contribute to
shaping the within-couple division of earnings to similar extents in different
contextual circumstances. This would imply that contexts have little or no
moderating effect on the way within-household differences in earnings are
shaped by individual traits.
When it comes to childbirth, however, important differences do, indeed,
emerge. Childbirth is known to entail negative consequences to women’s la-
bor market participation and to work performance. Thus the motherhood
penalty is something that could be expected in all institutional settings.
However, the northern European social democracies appear to be the ones
where the birth of a child entails the largest negative change in women’s
relative earnings. On the contrary, in southern European countries the nega-
tive effect of childbirth on women’s relative earnings is smallest. This result
emerged from the interacted model of table 5.6, from the country-by-country
models in table 5.8, and is even more clear in figure 5.4, that reports co-
efficients and 95% confidence bounds of the newborn variable estimated in
each country7 plotted against female labor force participation rates. In three
southern European countries (i.e. Italy, Greece, Portugal), the negative ef-
fect of childbirth is close to zero, while in the remaining countries of the
group (Cyprus and Spain) the effect is very small. In the northern European
countries, instead, the effect is always negative and significant.
7Tables for the full models by country are reported in the Appendix.
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Figure 5.4 – Effect of any order childbirth on women’s relative earnings by
country. Full models are reported in the Appendix.
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How do we explain this? Such large differences could be due to the
country-specific processes of selection into motherhood and into specific jobs.
As discussed in the introduction, women in northern European countries are
much more likely to be in the workforce than women in the southern states,
and they are also much more likely to have children (Ahn and Mira 2002).
However, the gender gap in earnings in some Mediterranean countries is much
smaller than in Scandinavian countries (Eurostat 2012), the labor market is
more rigid, there is less availability of family-friendly work opportunities
(i.e. part-time, flexible hours, working from home etc.) and public child care
arrangements for children under 2 years of age are scarce. Thus, compared
to their northern European peers, working women in the southern group: a)
have earnings that are not far from their partners’, b) are not likely to exit
and re-entry the rigid labor market, c) are overall less likely to have children
and d) face greater difficulties in finding child care arrangements or jobs that
they can adapt to their family needs.
Keeping all this in mind, why does the negative effect of childbirth on
relative earnings emerge in southern European countries to a smaller extent
than elsewhere? I argue that, although women in southern Europe are on the
whole less likely to be in the work force, those who are in the labor market
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have relatively high earnings and given the rigidity of the labor market they
stay in their job even when they have children. Thus, we do not see a fall in
their relative earnings. This could also be because the majority of men work
full-time and the standard work day in southern Europe is generally long and
thus difficult to increase with over-time. On the contrary, in scandinavian
countries, given the large gender gap in earnings, the availability of univer-
salistic child care facilities and large public sector, women are more likely to
end up in low-paid jobs when they become mothers or to temporarily drop
out of the work force. Hence, the higher penalty in relative earnings.
A point to keep in mind in the discussion is that, in calculating relative
earnings, family allowances are left out of the equation. The ratio behind this
choice was to avoid the endogeneity that would arise from having a predictor
(i.e. the presence or birth of a child) that directly accounts for part of the
dependent variable (i.e. non labor earnings deriving from family allowances).
It could be argued, however, that the large negative effect that arises in the
northern European countries is a result of how the dependent variable is
computed. In fact, we might imagine that women in scandinavian countries
forego labor earnings precisely because they are receiving an alternative, non
labor source of income, such as parental allowances. We could easily test
for this if it were possible to include these alternative sources of income into
women’s side of the earnings equation. Unfortunately, the EU-SILC data on
this variable is collected at the household level, so there is no way of knowing
which household member was granted the family allowance. For the sake
of speculation I ran a small experiment by running pooled models one and
two and the interacted model of table 5.6 with different specifications of
the dependent variable. Specifically, I verify how much the outcome would
change if the woman was to personally receive 0%, 50% or 100% of the
family related allowance. The results are reported in the Appendix in table
C.8 and show that the inclusion of family allowances has different effects on
women’s relative resources in different groups of countries: in the southern
group, were the effect of childbirth was very small, adding resources to women
makes almost no difference, as the coefficient goes very close to zero and is
nonsignificant. In the northern group, to the contrary, the reduction of the
negative effect is noteworthy, as it drops from -0.086 (p< 0.001) to -0.013
(p< 0.05). This could indicate that women in northern European countries
compensate the loss of earned income with non-labor sources of income. In
the other groups we also find a reduction in the negative effect of childbirth,
although small. These results are the product of a intentional manipulation
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of the data, so it is not possible to draw any conclusions from them; the
cross-national differences that emerged from the experiment, however, could
be worthwhile to investigate in further research.
Returning to the results that emerged for the remaining countries, it is
much more difficult to speculate on the intermediate cases, i.e. the large
group of continental, baltic and eastern European countries. Here, the effect
of childbirth on relative income is negative and significant, but its magnitude
is smaller than in the northern European countries. As female labor force
participation rates in most of these countries are higher than in southern
European countries, I would not expect a ‘floor effect’ to emerged as clearly
as in the latter; however, the participation rates and fertility rates are not
high enough to generate the large fall in earnings that is associated with
motherhood in the Scandinavian group. One exception to this argument
could be the Netherlands, which has fertility rates and female labor force
participation rates high enough to justify a greater motherhood penalty than
the one it actually displays.
Another important point to make regards the nature of the negative effect
of childbirth: its effect is indeed negative, but it is also event-specific. The
short duration of the EU-SILC panel does not allow me to empirically inves-
tigate whether the negative effect of childbirth is permanent or temporary.
Labor market characteristics are likely to be critical in this instance: coun-
tries with rigid labor markets, such as Italy, can make it difficult for women
to re-enter the work force if they drop out in the event of a childbirth. This
could imply long lasting negative effects of childbirth on earnings. However,
the rigidity of the labor market is probably what keeps women with earn-
ings from dropping out in the first place, hence the small negative effect we
find in the analyses. This could indicate that there are large within-gender
insider-outsider8 differences in the effect of a childbirth on earnings. Flex-
ibility in labor market legislation or availability of family friendly jobs, on
the contrary, can make it easier for women to exit and re-enter the work
force around childbirth, but the risks of having lost work experience and the
depreciation of human capital might be costly in terms of earnings on the
8The insider-outsider debate is of particular relevance in the southern European group,
where there are large differences in access to benefits (family benefits, unemployment
benefits, pensions etc.) between employees holding permanent or fixed term contracts.
A different issue that could be investigated regards the difference between employees and
self-employed, in particular for professionals with high earnings who have the most to loose
if they stay out of work.
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long run.
Thus, to conclude, the findings in the chapter point to the fact that in
all the considered European countries women contribute to their household
income less than men, and that certain individual characteristics are strong
predictors of relative earnings regardless of institutional characteristics. The
effect of a childbirth, instead, is strongly mediated by contextual circum-
stances, and the results suggest that the birth of a child is strongly related
to a reduction in relative earnings in the social democracies. The higher lev-
els of female labor force participation, of fertility rates and the higher gender
gap in earnings that can be found in these countries are likely to be the
driving forces behind this form of within-household inequality.
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6Chapter Six
Discussion and conclusion
It is an obvious and incontrovertible fact that women and men in con-
temporary societies take on different roles and behave differently. Why this
should be the case is the object of a very longstanding debate, which sees
two main, and opposing, positions. There are some scholars who argue that
the large differences between women and men can be traced down to their
DNA. The opposing position, instead, points to socialization as the main
mechanism in determining the differences in women and men’s behavior. In
the first case, the differences are intrinsic and immutable, while in the second
case they are externally imposed and modifiable. Currently, research seems
to be finding the truth somewhere in between. In a recent and discussed
article, Catherine Hakim comments:
Sex differentials that were once regarded as universal and in-
nate [such as differences in maths ability, or in overall intelligence
quotient (IQ)] have been found to be socially constructed, and
virtually eliminated. However, recent reviews (Swim 1994, Eagly
1995, Hyde 1996, pp. 114, 2005, Campbell 2002, Pinker 2002)
find that two sex differentials remain unchanged. They appear to
be unvarying across time and across cultures: men are substan-
tially more aggressive than women, and they have fundamentally
different attitudes to sexuality” (Hakim 2010, p. 506).
Adding on to this debate is beyond the scope of this dissertation. How-
ever, it is a useful starting point from which to draw some conclusions. His-
torically speaking, the ‘genetically determined roles’ explanation seems to
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fit well with the fact that societies have associated authority and leadership
with males in the vast majority of cases. This is changing in contemporary
democracies, as more women are taking active part in the public sphere, both
via labor market participation and political activity. Evidence of this is the
growing number of women head of government or head of state in European
countries. Further, as I have shown in the introduction, women and men in
many European countries now reach similar levels of education and earnings,
and compete in a much wider field of occupations than in the past. Thus,
while there is no way to rule out either position, there is evidence of the
fact that over time women and men’s standing in societies has become more
similar. However, the differences between mothers and fathers seem to be
taking longer to converge.
The narrowing of the differences between women and men, mothers and
fathers, does not have the same pace everywhere. This suggests that the
institutional setting can have large repercussions on the degree of gender
(in)equality. In particular, in this work I suggest that among the contextual
features individuals are embedded in, welfare states, even if they do not
explicitly address the issue of gender equality, are bound to have a very large
impact in shaping the behavior of women and men, mothers and fathers.
In this work, I argue that to address gender (in)equality it is not sufficient
to look at the differences between women and men in general, but it is crucial
to focus on what happens at the household level, i.e. at the differences
between partners. If the household is where gender differences are produced
in the first place, as theories of socialization suggest, then the household is the
starting point to reverse the process. I have taken a comparative approach to
address gender differences in three areas: participation in the labor market,
allocation of time to domestic work, and earning capacity.
Why do I consider these three areas? As I have argued in the intro-
duction, even in the most decommodified country having adequate economic
resources is necessary for an individual to achieve independence. Thus, being
able to participate in the labor market is the first condition for individual’s
freedom and is the first to receive attention in this study. Inequality in the
labor market and inequality in domestic work are intrinsically linked (Hook
2010). Hence, the second element to study is necessarily the time devoted
to domestic chores by women and men. Clearly, as long as women are at-
tributed the role of primary homemakers by the surrounding context and
as long as they view themselves as such, it will be difficult for them to be
engaged in paid work as fully as men. If they cannot fully participate in
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the labor market due to their commitment to the domestic sphere, then we
are back to square one in an ongoing cycle of inequality. The last domain
is inequality in earnings, which is obviously related to the first two. In fact,
women may chose to work shorter hours or to be in low paid jobs because
their responsibilities at home do not allow them to fully embrace the role of
primary breadwinner or to invest in a career. This will inevitably lead them
to have lower earnings than their partners. If women’s earnings are sys-
tematically lower than their partner’s or if they are hampered by the birth
and presence of children, their bargaining power is strongly reduced. This,
in turn, can result in women doing more domestic chores. Having access to
earnings, on the contrary, can be thought of as a loophole in the cycle. In fact,
having control over economic resources can allow women to more effectively
bargain a more equitable division of chores, or alternatively, to outsource
domestic chores (Treas and Ruijter 2008). Figures 6.1 and 6.2 provide a
graphical representation of the cycles outlined above. Note that the arrows
are used to represent associations and not causal relations. Figure 6.1 shows
how the three areas for women are interrelated in the case of within-couple
gender inequality. Domestic chores and employment are mutually related as
Hook points out; employment affects earnings which in turn are related to
domestic chores because lower earnings are associated with less bargaining
power (Schober 2013). Figure 6.2, instead, shows a scenario where the cycle
is interrupted. The key feature here is that domestic chores are not directly
associated with employment nor with earnings. It is quite easy to see that
this is the situation men have traditionally faced in the male breadwinner
model: in such a scenario, men are not expected to accommodate their work
life around their household needs, thus their effort and time are completely
devoted to employment. This leads them to have control over economic re-
sources (i.e. earnings) and ultimately to greater bargaining power vis a vis
their partner. In case of gender equality within the household, however, we
would expect this pattern for both partners, i.e. we expect both partners to
be employed, to have a certain amount of income, and to use their economic
resources to deal with housework, via bargaining, outsourcing or both.
My research strategy to investigate gender differences in the domains of
paid work, domestic chores and earnings moved as follows. First of all, I
have considered to what extent women and men’s behavior differs in the
three areas, and what individual and household traits are related to women
and men’s behavior. Second of all, I have asked whether, and to what extent,
the presence of children or the birth of a child contribute to men and women
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Figure 6.1 – Cycle of within-couple inequality in employment, domestic
chores and earnings
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Figure 6.2 – State of within-couple equality in employment, domestic chores
and earnings
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behaving differently in each of the domains. By comparing the results of
men and women living in different countries, I have been able to investigate
whether the gender differences in behavior were attributable to individual
characteristics only or could be attributed to the different institutional set-
ting.
Guided by the capitalist welfare regime typology, my main macro-level hy-
pothesis regarded the (in)effectiveness of the welfare state in reducing gender
inequalities. In general, the link between individual behavior and contextual
circumstances is not straightforward to pinpoint. Therefore, a note of cau-
tion in interpreting the results in the light of the capitalist welfare regime
typology is required. Many other factors, not accounted for in the analyses,
may very well be at play. However, the equalizing effect of the social demo-
cratic regime beyond individual characteristics in a variety of circumstances
is a consolidated finding. Thus, it seems plausible to hypothesize that the
overall equalizing aims of such regime address gender inequalities to a larger
extent that the conservative or liberal practices of the other welfare regimes.
According to my hypothesis, in the social democratic countries women
and men, mothers and fathers, were expected to behave similarly in the three
considered areas because the welfare state supports equality at the highest
standards on a universalistic basis. In other words, by promoting opportuni-
ties for everyone, the social democratic countries reach the highest levels of
gender equality. Instead, the non-interventionism of the liberal welfare state
or the explicit up-hold of the traditional division of work within households
in the conservative and southern European countries were expected to yield a
stronger degree of within-household inequality. The findings of each analysis
support this idea. The first empirical chapter highlighted that, in Norway,
women and men’s probabilities of being in paid labor and having children
were closer than in any other country. In the second empirical chapter, it was
shown that the division of domestic chores is much more gender-egalitarian
in the countries belonging to the social democratic welfare regime than else-
where; finally, the results from the last chapter brought evidence to the notion
that partners in northern European countries contribute to a similar extent
to the household economic welfare. The behavior of women and men, moth-
ers and fathers, in the considered domains – paid work, unpaid work and
relative earning capacity – in the other countries is far from being so similar.
However, even in the social democratic regime, gender differences are
far from dissolved. The second empirical chapter in fact revealed that the
presence of children yields a greater share of housework for women but not
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for men regardless of country of residence. This suggests that the equalizing
effect of the northern European countries reaches women and men but not
mothers and fathers, entailing a persistence of gender differences even in
these countries. Furthermore, although within household earnings are among
the most equal in northern Europe, they are still not full equal and, most
importantly, the birth of a child entails a reduction of the mother’s share of
earnings that is larger than in any other group of countries. Thus, even if
the reduction is event-specific, it still entails gender inequality.
Indeed, in all countries, the presence of children is associated with a
greater gender inequality in the probability of participating in the labor mar-
ket, in the division of domestic chores, and in earning capacity. This does
not mean that children cause inequality. However, the differences between
mothers and childless women suggest that, when speaking of gender inequal-
ities, we must look not only at between gender but also at within gender
difference.
To conclude, the social democratic welfare states seem to be the ones
where gender equality, though not fully present, is at least in reach. What
lies behind the high gender equality in the social democratic regime? I argue
that the propelling force behind gender equality is the strong effort of the
welfare state in promoting female and especially maternal employment. In
capitalistic societies, labor market participation is the key to independence
and well being. The economic crisis that over the last few years has been
scourging European countries and the consequent sky-high levels of unem-
ployment, especially among the younger cohorts, has rendered crystal clear
how employment is essential to well being. As long as women take on the
role of secondary earners or of housewives – be it for lack of child care ser-
vices, for earnings disparity, or for cultural resistance – one member of the
couple will be ‘less equal than the other’. I am not arguing that equality
comes from doing the same things. However, being out of the labor market
or being the ancillary earner increase the risk of being in poverty and/or
of being economically dependent, both of which imply within-household in-
equality. In this sense, the liberal welfare regime takes a step in the direction
of gender equality, as labor market participation is the primary source of
welfare for anyone living in this group of countries. However, it also takes
three steps back because it generates a large stratification by class. Conti-
nental and southern European countries, instead, fail even to take that one
step forward and are stuck in a gender unequal traditionalism. The social
democratic regime seems to have reached the aim because female labor force
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participation is encouraged and the universalistic nature of the welfare state
guarantees social rights of citizenship regardless of gender.
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Appendix A
Appendix to chapter three
In tables A.1 and A.2 chi-squared and p-values for the Small-Hsiao1 IIA
tests are reported. The tests show that in all cases the assumption of in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives is not violated, i.e. that the choice
between two alternative outcomes is unaffected by what other choices are
available.
1The tests are computed using the mlogtest command in Stata (Long and Freese 2005).
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Table A.1 – Small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption for women in four countries
Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives.
Education equation
Omitted Chi2 d.f. P> chi2 Evidence
Germany
Working, one kid 40.457 45 0.665 for Ho
N 5517
Not working, two kids 54.638 45 0.154 for Ho
Not working, one kid 48.452 45 0.335 for Ho
Working childless 43.235 45 0.547 for Ho
Italy
Working, one kid 40.888 45 0.647 for Ho
N 9001
Not working, two kids 29.375 45 0.965 for Ho
Not working, one kid 36.484 45 0.813 for Ho
Working childless 45.874 45 0.436 for Ho
Norway
Working, one kid 45.210 45 0.463 for Ho
N 2984
Not working, two kids 41.244 45 0.632 for Ho
Not working, one kid 48.110 45 0.348 for Ho
Working childless 41.562 45 0.618 for Ho
United Kingdom
Working, one kid 43.819 45 0.522 for Ho
N 3931
Not working, two kids 47.060 45 0.388 for Ho
Not working, one kid 41.879 45 0.605 for Ho
Working childless 50.552 45 0.264 for Ho
Relative education equation
Omitted Chi2 d.f. P> chi2 Evidence
Germany
Working, one kid 39.669 45 0.697 for Ho
N 5517
Not working, two kids 41.541 45 0.619 for Ho
Not working, one kid 35.244 45 0.851 for Ho
Working childless 43.087 45 0.553 for Ho
Italy
Working, one kid 49.393 45 0.302 for Ho
N 9001
Not working, two kids 59.410 45 0.073 for Ho
Not working, one kid 56.323 45 0.120 for Ho
Working childless 51.035 45 0.248 for Ho
Norway
Working, one kid 45.313 45 0.459 for Ho
N 2984
Not working, two kids 53.204 45 0.188 for Ho
Not working, one kid 44.950 45 0.474 for Ho
Working childless 45.340 45 0.458 for Ho
United Kingdom
Working, one kid 51.613 45 0.231 for Ho
N 3931
Not working, two kids 45.058 45 0.470 for Ho
Not working, one kid 43.042 45 0.555 for Ho
Working childless 52.356 45 0.210 for Ho
Baseline: working, two or more children.
Table A.2 – Small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption for men in four countries
Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives.
Education equation
Omitted Chi2 d.f. P> chi2 Evidence
Germany
Working, one kid 40.154 45 0.677 for Ho
N 5517
Not working, two kids 40.385 45 0.668 for Ho
Not working, one kid 41.155 45 0.636 for Ho
Working childless 43.364 45 0.541 for Ho
Italy
Working, one kid 34.369 45 0.875 for Ho
N 9001
Not working, two kids 45.203 45 0.463 for Ho
Not working, one kid 37.194 45 0.789 for Ho
Working childless 40.811 45 0.650 for Ho
45
Norway
Working, one kid 43.280 45 0.545 for Ho
N 2984
Not working, two kids 45.528 45 0.450 for Ho
Not working, one kid 61.207 45 0.054 for Ho
Working childless 52.964 45 0.194 for Ho
United Kingdom
Working, one kid 46.869 45 0.396 for Ho
N 3931
Not working, two kids 31.679 45 0.933 for Ho
Not working, one kid 44.261 45 0.503 for Ho
Working childless 36.598 45 0.810 for Ho
Relative education equation
Omitted Chi2 d.f. P> chi2 Evidence
Germany
Working, one kid 59.572 45 0.072 for Ho
N 5517
Not working, two kids 38.759 45 0.732 for Ho
Not working, one kid 50.156 45 0.276 for Ho
Working childless 48.797 45 0.323 for Ho
Italy
Working, one kid 44.295 45 0.502 for Ho
N 9001
Not working, two kids 47.591 45 0.368 for Ho
Not working, one kid 52.634 45 0.203 for Ho
Working childless 39.797 45 0.691 for Ho
Norway
Working, one kid 29.288 45 0.966 for Ho
N 2984
Not working, two kids 41.141 45 0.636 for Ho
Not working, one kid 36.492 45 0.813 for Ho
Working childless 44.253 45 0.503 for Ho
United Kingdom
Working, one kid 42.770 45 0.567 for Ho
N 3931
Not working, two kids 45.708 45 0.443 for Ho
Not working, one kid 54.678 45 0.153 for Ho
Working childless 63.191 45 0.038 for Ho
Baseline: working, two or more children.
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Appendix B
Appendix to chapter four
Figure B.1 – Cook’s distance by country and gender. Cut-off point: .17.
Cook’s distances were calculated for all models. For parsimony, the follow-
ing plots report Cook’s distances for the two models including all individual,
household and country-level predictors.
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Table B.1 – Mean values of the gender equality item by country, gender and
level of education
Country Women Men
Low Medium High Low Medium High
BE 3.32 3.29 3.36 3.19 3.44 3.72
BG 2.46 2.92 3.11 2.27 2.71 3.14
CH 2.12 2.35 2.94 2.72 2.37 2.63
CY 1.8 2.04 2.76 1.95 2.14 2.62
CZ 2.5 2.76 3.02 1.95 2.55 2.83
DE 2.69 2.79 3.12 2.5 2.84 2.93
DK 3.58 3.82 3.94 3.75 3.77 3.88
EE 2.61 2.67 2.82 2.57 2.72 2.85
ES 2.66 3.09 3.12 2.43 2.98 3.08
FI 3.43 3.62 3.75 3.5 3.69 3.49
FR 2.57 2.86 3.21 2.67 2.96 3.4
GB 2.84 2.67 2.99 3.14 3.22 3.16
GR 2.28 2.48 2.81 2.25 2.39 2.47
HR 2.15 2.73 3.08 2.65 2.76 3.17
HU 2.46 2.67 2.68 1.97 2.5 2.47
IE 2.96 3.21 3.29 3.37 3.33 3.33
NL 3.21 3.59 3.69 3.25 3.6 3.69
NO 3.43 3.63 3.72 3.23 3.49 3.57
PL 2.31 2.4 2.9 2.45 2.58 3.08
PT 2.52 2.84 2.82 2.5 2.89 3.19
SE 3.19 3.62 3.95 3.6 3.68 3.96
SI 2.72 2.93 3.12 2.44 2.85 3.23
SK 2.22 2.82 3 2.71 2.66 3.1
Total 2.67 2.90 3.26 2.75 2.93 3.25
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Figure B.2 – Distribution of respondent’s reported own time on housework
vs. respondent’s reported partner’s time on housework by gender and country
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Figure B.3 – Distribution of respondent’s reported own time on housework
vs. respondent’s reported partner’s time on housework by gender and country
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Figure B.4 – Distribution of respondent’s reported own time on housework
vs. respondent’s reported partner’s time on housework by gender and country
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Figure B.5 – Distribution of respondent’s reported own time on housework
vs. respondent’s reported partner’s time on housework by gender and country
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Figure B.6 – Distribution of respondent’s reported own time on housework
vs. respondent’s reported partner’s time on housework by gender and country
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Figure B.7 – Distribution of respondent’s reported own time on housework
vs. respondent’s reported partner’s time on housework by gender and country
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Table B.3 – Multi-level regression models for housework sharing. Random in-
tercepts and random slopes models. Dependent variable: proportion of domes-
tic chores performed by each partner (unstandardized regression coefficients,
standard errors in parentheses)
Women
Random Random Random Random
slopes 1 slopes 2 slopes 3 slopes 4
Constant 2.065*** 2.068*** 2.060*** 2.072***
(0.149) (0.149) (0.150) (0.148)
Age 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Married vs. not married 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.072
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
N Household members 0.047 0.046 0.046 0.046
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Hours housework -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Employed vs. not employed -0.289*** -0.288*** -0.288*** -0.288***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Hours of paid work per week -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Partner employed vs. not employed -0.343*** -0.343*** -0.342*** -0.343***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Presence of children 0.148* 0.148* 0.148* 0.148*
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Proportion of household income provided (r.c. none)
Very small -0.181 -0.183 -0.183 -0.185
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
Under a half -0.401*** -0.407*** -0.404*** -0.405***
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091)
About half -0.485*** -0.489*** -0.488*** -0.490***
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
Over a half -0.629*** -0.637*** -0.632*** -0.633***
(0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114)
Very large -0.537*** -0.541*** -0.541*** -0.541***
(0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152)
All -0.387* -0.367* -0.390* -0.395*
(0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166)
Relative education of the partners (r.c. both low educated)
Both Medium -0.133 -0.132 -0.129 -0.136
(0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080)
Both High -0.275** -0.275** -0.272** -0.276**
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087)
Partner Higher -0.098 -0.098 -0.091 -0.100
(0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086)
Partner Lower -0.127 -0.128 -0.120 -0.129
(0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
Value Orientation -0.064** -0.064** -0.064** -0.063**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Variance Components
Intercepts 0.030 0.029 0.037 0.023
(0.173) (0.169) (0.191) (0.152)
Slopes 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.040) (0.001) (0.007)
0.000
(0.013)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.004)
Log-likelihood -1003.675 -1003.474 -1003.391 -1003.665
BIC 2283.655 2449.034 2329.138 2219.164
N 9998 9998 9998 9998
Groups 23 23 23 23
Legend: * p<0.05; **p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Two-tailed.
The coefficients allowed to vary across levels for each model are in bold.
Table B.4 – Multi-level regression models for housework sharing. Random in-
tercepts and random slopes models. Dependent variable: proportion of domes-
tic chores performed by each partner (unstandardized regression coefficients,
standard errors in parentheses)
Men
Random Random Random Random
slopes 1 slopes 2 slopes 3 slopes 4
Constant -0.076 -0.086 -0.067 -0.073
(0.213) (0.213) (0.215) (0.213)
Age -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Married vs. not married -0.076 -0.074 -0.076 -0.076
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
N household members -0.064* -0.064* -0.064* -0.065*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Hours housework 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Employed vs. not employed -0.387*** -0.388*** -0.387*** -0.387***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Hours of paid work per week -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Partner employed vs. not employed -0.350*** -0.351*** -0.351*** -0.350***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Presence of children -0.067 -0.066 -0.067 -0.065
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
Proportion of household income provided (r.c. none)
Very small -0.113 -0.094 -0.116 -0.116
(0.202) (0.209) (0.203) (0.203)
Under a half -0.116 -0.099 -0.121 -0.121
(0.177) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178)
About half -0.201 -0.183 -0.205 -0.204
(0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172)
Over a half -0.318 -0.303 -0.323 -0.322
(0.171) (0.172) (0.171) (0.171)
Very large -0.473** -0.459* -0.477** -0.477**
(0.177) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178)
All -0.613*** -0.590** -0.624*** -0.625***
(0.183) (0.186) (0.183) (0.183)
Relative education of the partners (r.c. both low educated)
Both Medium 0.161* 0.158 0.160 0.164*
(0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081)
Both High 0.392*** 0.387*** 0.391*** 0.394***
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
Partner Higher 0.224* 0.219* 0.223* 0.225*
(0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089)
Partner Lower 0.160 0.156 0.159 0.160
(0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.087)
Value Orientation 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.080***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Variance Components
Intercepts 0.005 0.000 0.012 0.004
(0.069) (0.000) (0.109) (0.064)
Slopes 0.001 0.020 0.000 0.000
(0.026) (0.143) (0.012) (0.013)
0.000
(0.0105)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.026)
Log-likelihood -844.359 -843.497 -844.375 -844.287
BIC 1960.706 2122.174 2006.069 1897.098
N 8658 8658 8658 8658
Groups 23 23 23 23
Legend: * p<0.05; **p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Two-tailed.
The coefficients allowed to vary across levels for each model are in bold.

Appendix C
Appendix to chapter five
Table C.1 – Transition between classes of income over waves %
Household income, quartiles
< 25 25-50p 50-75p over 75p Total
Lagged household < 25 65.86 22.99 7.68 3.48 100
income, quartiles 25-50p 21.27 49.61 23.17 5.95 100
50-75p 6.42 21.19 52.14 20.2 100
over 75p 3.05 5.96 18.01 72.97 100
Table C.2 – Hausman test results: fixed vs. random effects
Model chi2 d.f. p-value
Pooled model 1 4940.93 9 0.000
Pooled model 2 4942.34 11 0.000
Interacted model 5000.32 14 0.000
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